United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Northern Division
KATHERINE P. NELSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Emanuel Reese brought this action under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of
the final decision of the Defendant Commissioner of Social
Security (“the Commissioner”) denying his April
8, 2013 applications for a period of disability and
disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title
II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et
seq., and for supplemental security income
(“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq. In response to
Reese's brief and fact sheet (Docs. 12, 13) listing the
specific errors upon which he seeks reversal of the
Commissioner's decision, the Commissioner filed a motion
to remand Reese's case for further proceedings under
sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The
[district ]court shall have power to enter, upon the
pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming,
modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a
rehearing.”),  representing that Reese consents to the
motion. (See Doc. 16).
consideration, it is ORDERED that the
Commissioner's consent motion to remand (Doc. 16) is
GRANTED, the Commissioner's final
decision denying Reese's April 8, 2013 applications a
period of disability, DIB, and SSI is
REVERSED, and this cause is
REMANDED under sentence four of §
405(g) for further proceedings. Securing a “sentence
four” remand makes Reese a prevailing party for
purposes of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2412, see Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993),
and terminates this Court's jurisdiction over this cause.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(B), should Reese be
awarded Social Security benefits on the subject applications
following this remand, the Court hereby grants Reese's
counsel an extension of time in which to file a motion for
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) until thirty days after
the date of receipt of a notice of award of benefits from the
Social Security Administration. Consistent with 20 C.F.R. §
422.210(c), “the date of receipt of notice …
shall be presumed to be 5 days after the date of such notice,
unless there is a reasonable showing to the contrary.”
If multiple award notices are issued, the time for filing a
§ 406(b) fee motion shall run from the date of receipt
of the latest-dated notice.
judgment shall issue separately hereafter in accordance with
this order and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.
 On notice from the Defendant (see Doc.
16 at 1 n.1), Commissioner of Social Security Andrew M. Saul,
as successor to Acting Commissioner Nancy A. Berryhill, is
automatically substituted as the Defendant in this action
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). (See
(last visited June 25, 2019)). The Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to update the docket heading
 With the consent of the parties, the
Court has designated the undersigned Magistrate Judge to
conduct all proceedings and order the entry of judgment in
this civil action, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §
636(c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73, and S.D. Ala.
GenLR 73. (See Docs. 17, 18).
 See also 42 U.S.C. §
1383(c)(3) (“The final determination of the
Commissioner of Social Security after a hearing [for SSI
benefits] shall be subject to judicial review as provided in
section 405(g) of this title to the same extent as the
Commissioner's final determinations under section 405 of
 Sentence six of § 405(g) provides
that “[t]he court may, on motion of the Commissioner of
Social Security made for good cause shown before the
Commissioner files the Commissioner's answer, remand the
case to the Commissioner of Social Security for further
action by the Commissioner of Social Security…”
However, the Commissioner filed his answer (Doc. 10) prior to
requesting remand, and the motion does not set forth
“good cause, ” other than that Reese consents to
See Bergen v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 454 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)
(“Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2) applies to a § 406(b)
attorney's fee claim.”); Blitch v. Astrue,
261 Fed.Appx. 241, 242 n.1 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)
(unpublished) (“In Bergen v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec.,454 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2006), we suggested the
best practice for avoiding confusion about the integration of
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(2)(B) into the procedural framework of a
fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 406 is for a plaintiff to
request and the district court to include in the remand
judgment a statement that attorneys fees may be ...