United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Middle Division
TAMERA JEAN PEACE, as Administrator of the Estate of Donald Ray Peace, Plaintiff,
v.
KEITH ROCK, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ANNEMARIE CARNEY AXON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This
case is before the court on Plaintiff Tamara Jean Peace's
second renewed motion for default judgment against Defendant
Berkeley Scrap Metal.[1](Doc. 42). Ms. Peace filed suit against,
among others, Berkeley Scrap Metal, for the wrongful death of
Donald Ray Peace in a car accident with its employee, Keith
Rock. (See generally Doc. 1-8 at 99-114). Ms. Peace
asserted claims of negligence; wanton and reckless conduct;
negligent, reckless, and/or wanton violations of the rules of
the road; and negligent entrustment. (Id. at
108-10).
The
court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN
PART the second renewed motion for default judgment.
Because the well-pleaded allegations and evidence submitted
establish that Berkeley Scrap Metal is liable under a theory
of respondeat superior for Keith Rock's
negligence, the court finds that Berkeley Scrap Metal is
liable for negligence and GRANTS the motion
as to that claim. But because Ms. Peace has abandoned her
claim for wanton and reckless conduct, the court
DENIES the motion for default judgment on
that claim. The court DENIES the motion for
default judgment on the claim of negligent, reckless, and/or
wanton violations of the rules of the road because Ms. Peace
failed to present any argument about that claim. Finally, the
court DENIES the motion for a default
judgment on the claim of negligent entrustment because Ms.
Peace neither alleged nor presented evidence that Berkeley
Scrap Metal had knowledge of Mr. Rock's incompetence.
In her
second renewed motion for a default judgment, Ms. Peace
requested that the court award her $5, 000, 000 in punitive
damages. (Doc. 42 at 10-11). Because the court cannot enter
that award on the record currently before it, the court
DEFERS RULING on the motion. The court will
set a jury trial on damages by separate order.
I.
FACTS
A
defaulting defendant “admits the plaintiff's
well-pleaded allegations of fact” for purposes of
liability. Buchanan v. Bowman, 820 F.2d 359, 361
(11th Cir. 1987) (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, for
purposes of this motion for default judgment, the court takes
as true the well-pleaded allegations of Ms. Peace's
amended complaint, as well as the supplemental evidence she
submitted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)(C).
On May
23, 2017, Mr. Rock drove a trailer owned by Berkeley Scrap
Metal to Alabama to pick up a load of scrap aluminum that
Berkeley Scrap Metal had hired him to transport. (Doc. 1-8 at
105 ¶ 11, 106 ¶ 14; Doc. 42-1 at 15-17, 26). Mr.
Rock arrived at the business to pick up the load around 3:00
a.m. (Doc. 42-1 at 25). Believing that he needed to turn the
tractor-trailer around, Mr. Rock continued driving past the
business until he found a side street. (Id.). In an
attempt to turn the truck around, he blocked both the
northbound and southbound lanes of a highway. (Doc. 1-8 at
105 ¶ 10; Doc. 42-1 at 27). Mr. Peace then drove into
the side of the tractor-trailer. (Doc. 1-8 at 105 ¶ 10;
Doc. 42-1 at 28). Mr. Peace eventually died from the injuries
he sustained in the crash. (Doc. 1-8 at 105 ¶ 10).
Before
the crash, Mr. Rock had had his commercial driver's
license suspended “[m]aybe three times” for
failure to pay fines. (Doc. 42-1 at 4-5). He also has two
convictions for drug trafficking and one for his trailer
missing a VIN plate. (Doc. 42-1 at 5-6).
Ms.
Peace, as the administrator of Mr. Peace's estate, filed
this lawsuit against several defendants, asserting state law
claims for negligence; wanton and reckless conduct;
negligent, reckless, and/or wanton violations of the rules of
the road; and negligent entrustment. (Doc. 1-8 at 108-110).
All of the defendants except Berkeley Scrap Metal appeared,
and Ms. Peace dismissed all of the claims against those
defendants with prejudice. (Doc. 40). Berkeley Scrap Metal,
however, has not appeared, and on July 9, 2018, the Clerk
entered default against it. (Doc. 24). Ms. Peace now moves
for a default judgment against Berkeley Scrap Metal. (Doc.
36).
II.
DISCUSSION
Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 55 establishes a two-step procedure
for obtaining a default judgment. First, when a defendant
fails to plead or otherwise defend a lawsuit, the Clerk of
Court must enter the party's default. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a).
Second, if the defendant is not an infant or an incompetent
person, the court may enter a default judgment against the
defendant as long as the well-pleaded allegations in the
complaint state a claim for relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b);
Nishimatsu Contr. Co. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515
F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975).[2]
Here,
Ms. Peace has obtained from the Clerk an entry of default
against Berkeley Scrap Metal, so she has satisfied the first
step of the procedure. The court must now determine whether
the well-pleaded allegations and evidence submitted in
support of default judgment establish that Berkeley Scrap
Metal is liable for negligence; wanton and reckless conduct;
negligent, reckless, and/or wanton violations of the rules of
the road; and negligent entrustment.
To do
so, the court must determine whether the claims would
“survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.” Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789
F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2015). “When evaluating a
motion to dismiss, a court looks to see whether the complaint
‘contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (some quotation marks
omitted) (alteration in original). A claim to relief is
plausible on its face if “the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)) (quotation marks
omitted). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true
all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft, 556
U.S. at 678.
Before
addressing whether Ms. Peace has satisfied this standard, the
court must address two preliminary issues. First, although
Ms. Peace's motion acknowledges the existence of her
claim of negligent, reckless, and/or wanton violations of the
rules of the road, she does not set out the elements of such
a claim or any argument explaining how the well-pleaded
allegations in her complaint satisfy that claim. Accordingly,
the court DENIES ...