United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division
HECTOR RAMON DE JESUS, Reg. No. 65144-019, Petitioner,
WALTER WOODS, Respondent.
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
CHARLES S. COODY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
case is before the court on a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition
for writ of habeas corpus filed by Hector Ramon de Jesus, a
federal inmate currently confined in the Maxwell Federal
Prison Camp. In this petition, de Jesus contends he is
entitled “[t]o serve the remaining part of [his]
imposed sentence in home confinement, less any good time
earned.” Doc. 1 at 7. Specifically, de Jesus alleges
that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has failed to
immediately recalculate his sentence and correct his Good
Conduct Time (“GCT”) credit in accordance with
the provisions of the First Step Act enacted on December 21,
2018. He also asserts that the BOP is denying him his right
to placement on home confinement based on his age as mandated
by the Act. He requests that the court issue an order
directing the BOP to immediately calculate his GCT and place
him on home confinement as required by the First Step Act of
2018. Doc. 2 at 4.
response to the habeas petition, the respondent argues that
the petition is due to be denied because de Jesus failed to
exhaust his available administrative remedies provided by the
BOP prior to seeking relief from this court as required by
well-settled federal law. Doc. 13 at 3-6. The respondent
further denies any violation of de Jesus' constitutional
rights or federal law with respect to either the calculation
of his GCT or his lack of placement on home confinement. Doc.
13 at 6-8.
support of his exhaustion defense, the respondent maintains
The Administrative Remedy Program [established by the BOP] is
described at 28 C.F.R. § 542.10, et seq., Administrative
Remedy Procedures for Inmates. In accordance with the
[formal] administrative remedy procedures, inmates must first
present their complaint to the Warden of the facility in
which the inmate is confined[.] . . . Administrative Remedy
Form BP-229(13) is the form to be utilized at the institution
level, which is commonly referred to as a “BP-9”
form. If the inmate is not satisfied with the response to the
BP-9 received from the Warden, the response may be appealed
to the Regional Director within 20 days of when the warden
signed the response. Administrative Remedy Form BP-230(13) is
the form to be utilized at the regional level, which is
commonly referred to as a “BP-10” form. If the
inmate is not satisfied with the response of the Regional
Director, that response may be appealed to the General
Counsel's Office within 30 days of when the Regional
Director signed the response. Appeal to BOP's Office of
General Counsel is the final step in the BOP's
administrative remedy process. Administrative Remedy Form
BP-231(13) is the form to be utilized at the final level,
which is commonly referred to as a “BP-11” form.
The response from the General Counsel's Office is
considered the final agency decision.
If the inmate does not receive a response within the time
allotted for reply, including extension, the inmate may
consider the absence of a response to be a denial at that
level. 28 C.F.R. § 542.18.
. . . .
The Sentry Administrative Remedy Log for inmate DeJesus
reflects that he has not submitted any twelve remedy requests
throughout his time in the BOP.
Thus, inmate DeJesus did not exhaust the available remedies
to request release to home confinement [or GCT] under the
First Step Act (FSA).
Because Petitioner has not exhausted the available
administrative remedies, his petition should be dismissed.
Doc. 13-3 at 2-4 (paragraph numbering omitted) (footnote
respondent further argues that even had de Jesus exhausted
his administrative remedies he is entitled to no relief on
the claims pending before this court. Initially, with respect
to de Jesus' claim seeking an immediate award of GCT
credit under the First Step Act of 2018, the respondent
argues that “[t]his particular change does not become
effective until the Attorney General completes, within 210
days of the FSA's passage, [sometime in mid-July of 2019,
] a ‘risks and needs assessment system.'
See FSA, Sections 101(a) & 102(b)(2).”
Doc. 13 at 3. As such, he maintains this claim is premature.
The respondent next argues that de Jesus is not entitled to
home confinement because the BOP retains complete discretion
“as to whether and when a prisoner is assigned home
confinement” and claims alleging a right to home
confinement “are expressly insulated from judicial
review.” Doc. 13 at 6-7.
29, 2019, the court entered an order allowing de Jesus until
June 13, 2019 to address the arguments set forth by the
respondent in his response. Doc. 14. As of the present date,
de Jesus has filed no response to this order.
is well-settled that a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for
writ of habeas corpus is the proper vehicle for a prisoner to
challenge the manner, location or execution of his sentence.
See Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 236 (2001);
Williams v. Pearson, 197 Fed.Appx. 872, 877 (11th
Cir. 2006); Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 897
(9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams, 425 F.3d
987, 990 (11th Cir. 2005); Bishop v. Reno, 210 F.3d
1295, 1304 n.14 (11th Cir. 2005); Jiminian v. Nash,
245 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v.
Miller, 871 F.2d 488, 490 (4th Cir. 1989). Here, de
Jesus alleges the BOP has failed to calculate his good time