Ex parte J.R.H.
v.
J.R.H. In re: State of Alabama Department of Human Resources ex rel. A.D.D.
Morgan
Juvenile Court, CS-18-900072
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
THOMPSON, PRESIDING JUDGE
J.R.H.
("the father") filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus requesting that this court direct the Morgan
Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") to vacate its
order denying his motion to dismiss filed in this action and
to enter an order granting his motion to dismiss. For the
reasons set forth below, we deny the petition.
The
materials submitted to this court in support of the
father's petition indicate that on April 11, 2008, the
Morgan Circuit Court ("the circuit court") entered
an order dismissing a complaint filed by B.D.D. ("the
mother") against the father insofar as it sought a
divorce; the mother asserted initially that the parties were
married at common law. In that order, however, the circuit
court explained that the mother and the father had agreed
that no common-law marriage existed between them. The circuit
court also ordered that the mother's and the father's
claims pertaining to custody of their two minor children and
child support be transferred to the juvenile court.
On
March 3, 2009, the juvenile court entered a judgment in which
it adjudicated the father's paternity of the two minor
children, awarded the mother sole custody of the children
subject to the father's rights of visitation, and ordered
the father to pay $177 per month in child support. That March
3, 2009, judgment was entered in case number CS-08-133.
In
January 2015, the State of Alabama Department of Human
Resources ("DHR"), on behalf of the mother, filed a
petition in the juvenile court seeking to have the father
held in contempt for failure to pay child support and
requesting a modification of the father's child-support
obligation. That action was designated by the juvenile-court
clerk as case number CS-13-90211.01. The materials submitted
to this court do not indicate whether an order was entered in
that action or whether the action was renumbered. However, it
is clear that the petition originally filed in case number
CS-13-90211.01 sought to enforce and modify the $177 per
month child-support obligation established in the March 3,
2009, judgment entered in case number CS-08-133. The
materials submitted to this court indicate that the juvenile
court entered in case number CS-08-133.01 an April 21, 2015,
judgment addressing the claims asserted in DHR's January
2015 petition filed on behalf of the mother in case number
CS-13-90211.01. In that April 21, 2015, judgment entered in
case number CS-08-133.01, the juvenile court found the father
to be $14, 391.97 in arrears on his child-support obligation,
ordered the father to pay $100 per month toward that
accumulated child-support arrearage, and increased the
father's regular monthly child-support obligation to $650
per month.
On
March 3, 2018, DHR, on behalf of the mother, filed a petition
to modify the father's child-support obligation. That
action was designated as case number CS-08-133.02. In that
action, DHR alleged that the mother no longer had physical
custody of the children, and it sought to suspend the
father's child-support obligation being paid to the
mother, but DHR requested an increase in the
child-support-arrearage payments established in the April 21,
2015, judgment. The father answered and filed a counterclaim
seeking to enforce and/or to modify the visitation provisions
set forth in the March 3, 2009, judgment and to modify
custody of the children. In his answer and counterclaim, the
father alleged that the mother had left the children with her
mother, A.A.D. ("the maternal grandmother").
Also on
March 3, 2018, DHR, on behalf of the maternal grandmother,
filed a separate action against the father seeking to
"establish" a child-support obligation in favor of
the maternal grandmother and seeking an award of retroactive
child support. DHR's March 3, 2018, action filed on
behalf of the maternal grandmother was designated as case
number CS-18-900072, and that action is the one from which
this petition for a writ of mandamus arises. On March 30,
2019, the father moved to dismiss case number CS-18-900072.
In his motion to dismiss, the father specifically referenced
Rule 12(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P. (permitting dismissal on the
basis of "lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter"), and argued that the maternal grandmother had
no right to an award of child support.
DHR
replied to the father's motion to dismiss by arguing that
the maternal grandmother had applied for services from the
Child Support Enforcement Division of the Morgan County
Department of Human Resources ("the Morgan County
DHR") and that, when she had done so, the maternal
grandmother had alleged that she had custody of the children.
DHR argued that it was attempting to enforce the father's
continuing obligation to contribute to the support of the
children.
On
April 10, 2019, the juvenile court entered an order denying
the father's motion to dismiss. The father filed a timely
petition for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the juvenile
court erred in failing to grant his motion to dismiss case
number CS-18-900072.
"'"'The denial of a motion to dismiss or a
motion for a summary judgment generally is not reviewable by
a petition for writ of mandamus, subject to certain narrow
exceptions ....'"' Ex parte University of
South Alabama, 183 So.3d 915, 918 (Ala. 2016) (quoting
Drummond Co. v. Alabama Dep't of Transp., 937
So.2d 56, 57 (Ala. 2006), quoting in turn Ex parte
Haralson, 853 So.2d 928, 931 n.2 (Ala. 2003)).
'"In all but the most extraordinary cases,
an appeal is an adequate remedy ...."' Ex parte
Watters, 212 So.3d 174, 181 (Ala. 2016) (quoting Ex
parte Jackson, 780 So.2d 681, 684 (Ala. 2000) (emphasis
added)). In Ex parte U.S. Bank National Ass'n,
148 So.3d 1060 (Ala. 2014), this Court recognized that one of
the exceptions under which this Court will review by a
petition for a writ of mandamus the denial of a motion to
dismiss or a motion for a summary judgment is when there is a
question regarding the trial court's subject-matter
jurisdiction. 148 So.3d at 1064."
Ex parte Sanderson, 263 So.3d 681, 685 (Ala. 2018).
In his
petition for a writ of mandamus, the father acknowledges the
limited review available to a petitioner challenging the
denial of a motion to dismiss. However, the father argues
that he is challenging the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
juvenile court. Therefore, he argues, his petition falls
within the "subject-matter jurisdiction exception"
recognized in Ex parte Sanderson, supra, and similar
cases.
"'"Subject-matter
jurisdiction concerns a court's power to decide certain
types of cases."'" Ex parte
B.W., 257 So.3d 334, 335 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018) (quoting
Bates v. Stewart, 99 So.3d 837, 850 (Ala. 2012),
quoting in turn Ex parte Seymour, 946 So.2d 536, 538
(Ala. 2006)). Among other things, the father argues that he
does not have any children with the maternal grandmother,
and, therefore, he says, the juvenile court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction to order him to pay child support
to her or to DHR on her behalf. The father cites no authority
in support of ...