Etowah
Circuit Court, CV-18-900604
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
PER
CURIAM
On
August 15, 2018, Randy Farley filed in the Etowah Circuit
Court ("the trial court") a complaint against his
employer, Transport America, Inc. ("Transport
America"), seeking an award of workers' compensation
benefits. Among other things, Farley alleged that he had
suffered a permanent vocational impairment as a result of an
on-the-job injury. Transport America answered and denied
liability.
During
the pendency of discovery in the action, Transport America
asked Farley to execute releases in order for it to obtain
Farley's Social Security disability records, Social
Security earnings records, Alabama Department of Internal
Revenue records, and Alabama Department of Labor records
regarding workers' compensation and unemployment
benefits. Farley opposed that request, arguing that no
provision of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure required
the execution of those releases. Transport America filed in
the trial court a motion requesting an order compelling
Farley's execution of the releases. Farley opposed that
motion to compel.
On
February 26, 2019, the trial court entered an order stating
that, "[i]f [Farley] is alleging a non-scheduled injury
and/or a vocational loss, then he is to sign said releases
for [Transport America]. However, if [Farley] is alleging a
scheduled injury, then [Farley] is not required to sign said
releases." It appears to be undisputed that Farley has
alleged an injury that is not scheduled under the
Workers' Compensation Act and vocational loss. On March
1, 2019, Farley filed a "motion to reconsider" the
February 26, 2019, order. On March 12, 2019, the trial court
entered an order denying the motion to reconsider. On March
25, 2019, within 42 days of the entry of the February 26,
2019, order, Farley timely filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus in this court from the February 26, 2019, order.
See Rule 21(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P. ("The
petition shall be filed within a reasonable time. The
presumptively reasonable time for filing a petition seeking
review of an order of a trial court or of a lower appellate
court shall be the same as the time for taking an
appeal."); Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P. (providing that
an appeal must be filed within 42 days of the entry of the
order or judgment from which the appeal is
taken).[1]
In his
brief filed in support of his petition for a writ of
mandamus, Farley argues that neither the Alabama Rules of
Civil Procedure nor other Alabama law permits a trial court
to enter an order compelling a party to execute a release of
documents to the opposing party; he contends that requiring
him to execute the releases would result in an overly broad
release of information. In its response to the petition,
Transport America alleges that Farley did not seek a
protection order to narrow the scope of any information
obtained under executed releases. Transport America also
argues that this matter is not appropriate for review by way
of a petition for a writ of mandamus under the authority of
Ex parte Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB, 872 So.2d
810 (Ala. 2003). In that case, our supreme court stated:
"Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and will be granted
only where there is '(1) a clear legal right in the
petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon
the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so;
(3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court.' Ex parte Alfab,
Inc., 586 So.2d 889, 891 (Ala. 1991). This Court will
not issue the writ of mandamus where the petitioner has
'"full and adequate relief"' by appeal.
State v. Cobb, 288 Ala. 675, 678, 264 So.2d 523, 526
(1972) (quoting State v. Williams, 69 Ala. 311, 316
(1881)).
"Discovery matters are within the trial court's
sound discretion, and this Court will not reverse a trial
court's ruling on a discovery issue unless the trial
court has clearly exceeded its discretion. Home Ins. Co.
v. Rice, 585 So.2d 859, 862 (Ala. 1991). Accordingly,
mandamus will issue to reverse a trial court's ruling on
a discovery issue only (1) where there is a showing that the
trial court clearly exceeded its discretion, and (2) where
the aggrieved party does not have an adequate remedy by
ordinary appeal. The petitioner has an affirmative burden
to prove the existence of each of these
conditions."
872 So.2d at 813 (emphasis added).
The
court in Ocwen then noted that, generally, an appeal
provides an adequate remedy for challenging a discovery order
and, therefore, that filing a mandamus petition is not an
appropriate method for challenging a trial court's
discovery rulings; the court noted the expense to the
judiciary associated with review of interlocutory discovery
orders and the interruption of litigation as reasons for not
reviewing all petitions for a writ of mandamus pertaining to
discovery orders. Ocwen, 872 So.2d at 813. In
Ocwen, our supreme court held that Alabama's
appellate courts would no longer review a discovery order by
way of a petition for a writ of mandamus, except
"(a) when a privilege is disregarded ...; (b) when a
discovery order compels the production of patently irrelevant
or duplicative documents, such as to clearly constitute
harassment or impose a burden on the producing party far out
of proportion to any benefit that may obtain to the
requesting party ...; (c) when the trial court either imposes
sanctions effectively precluding a decision on the merits or
denies discovery going to a party's entire action or
defense so that, in either event, the outcome has been all
but determined, and the petitioner would be merely going
through the motions of a trial to obtain an appeal; or (d)
when the trial court impermissibly prevents the petitioner
from making a record on the discovery issue so that the
appellate court cannot review the effect of the trial
court's alleged error."
872 So.2d at 813-14.
In this
case, this court granted a motion filed by Farley to allow
him to submit a reply brief in response to Transport
America's answer to his petition for a writ of mandamus.
In that reply brief, Farley argues that Transport America has
mischaracterized his petition for a writ of mandamus as
challenging a discovery order. Farley contends that
Ocwen and similar authority do not preclude review
of this matter by a petition for a writ of mandamus because,
he says, his argument is that the February 26, 2019, order is
not a permissible discovery order and that the
method for obtaining information pursuant to that order is
outside the methods of discovery that are listed in Rule
26(a), Ala. R. Civ. P. However, another portion of Rule 26
provides, in part:
"Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is: (I) relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the
claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the
claim or defense of any other party; and (ii) proportional to
the needs of the case, considering the importance of the
issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the
parties' relative access to relevant information, the
parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in
resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of
the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. It is
not ground for objection that the ...