United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division
ORDER
WILLIAM H. STEELE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
This
matter comes before the Court on defendant's First
Amended Motion for Leave to Amend Answer (doc. 35). The
Motion has been briefed and is now ripe.
I.
Background.
Plaintiff,
Queen Boykin, brought this action against her former
employer, Home Choice of Alabama, Inc., alleging violations
of the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).
Boykin's claims are predicated on contentions that,
inter alia, Home Choice “discriminated against
the Plaintiff on the basis of the Plaintiff's
relationship and association with an individual with a
disability by subjecting her to disparate treatment and
termination, ” and that Home Choice
“discriminated/retaliated against Plaintiff for
asserting her federally protected rights under the FMLA by
subjecting her to disparate treatment and termination as a
direct result of her need for FMLA leave.” (Doc. 5,
¶¶ 28-29.) Simply put, Boykin's theory is that
Home Choice terminated her employment because she requested
accommodation and FMLA leave to care for her disabled adult
son, who suffers from permanent brain injury as a result of a
car accident.
In its
First Amended Motion for Leave to Amend Answer,
[1]
Home Choice seeks leave to amend its Answer to add a
Thirty-Third Defense, to-wit: “The Alabama Department
of Labor's May 30, 2017, finding that Plaintiff was
discharged for misconduct collaterally estops Plaintiff from
re-litigating the reason for her termination.” (Doc.
35, Exh. A at 17.) Defendant explains that the Alabama
Department of Labor denied Boykin's request for
unemployment benefits based on an express finding that Home
Choice terminated her employment for misconduct. Defendant
further indicates that it now understands this determination
has become final because any appeals from that administrative
decision have concluded.
Plaintiff
objects to this proposed amendment on both futility and delay
grounds.
II.
Analysis.
Defendant's
Motion to Amend is governed by Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that, as a general
proposition, “a party may amend its pleading only with
the opposing party's written consent or the court's
leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so
requires.” Rule 15(a)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. “The
thrust of Rule 15(a) is to allow parties to have their claims
heard on the merits, and accordingly, district courts should
liberally grant leave to amend when the underlying facts or
circumstances relied upon by a [movant] may be a proper
subject of relief.” In re Engle Cases, 767
F.3d 1082, 1108 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). In light of the relaxed
15(a) standard, “[d]istrict courts have limited
discretion in denying leave to amend, and should grant a
motion to amend unless there are substantial reasons to deny
it.” Bowers v. U.S. Parole Com'n, Warden,
760 F.3d 1177, 1185 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation and
internal marks omitted); see also Florida Evergreen
Foliage v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 470 F.3d
1036, 1041 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[U]nless a
substantial reason exists to deny leave to amend, the
discretion of the District Court is not broad enough to
permit denial.”) (citation omitted).
“Although
leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so
requires, a motion to amend may be denied on numerous grounds
such as undue delay, undue prejudice to the defendants, and
futility of the amendment.” Mann v. Palmer,
713 F.3d 1306, 1316 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted); see also Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Elan
Corp., PLC, 421 F.3d 1227, 1236 (11th Cir.
2005) (“Leave may be denied because of undue delay, bad
faith or dilatory deadline of September 30, 2019.
Defendant's Motion and proposed amendment would not
jeopardize either of these settings. motive on the part of
the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the
opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or]
futility of amendment.”) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). In opposing Home Choice's
Motion for Leave to Amend, Boykin invokes the futility and
undue delay bases for denial. Each will be considered in
turn.
As
noted, leave to amend may properly be denied “when such
amendment would be futile.” Hall v. United Ins. Co.
of America, 367 F.3d 1255, 1263 (11th Cir.
2004). In the context of a motion to amend complaint, the
Eleventh Circuit has explained that a proposed amendment is
futile “when the complaint as amended would still be
properly dismissed.” Coventry First, LLC v.
McCarty, 605 F.3d 865, 870 (11th Cir. 2010)
(citation omitted). “Translating that standard to the
amended answer context, a finding of futility is, in effect,
a legal conclusion that the proposed defense would
necessarily fail.” Bartronics, Inc. v. Power-One,
Inc., 245 F.R.D. 532, 535 (S.D. Ala. 2007); see also
Univalor Trust, SA v. Columbia Petroleum, LLC, 315
F.R.D. 374, 379 (S.D. Ala. 2016) (same); Allied
Portables, LLC v. Youmans, 2016 WL 7104863, *2 (M.D.
Fla. Sept. 16, 2016) (same). As the party opposing the
amendment, Boykin bears the burden of establishing that the
proposed amendment would be futile.[2] Thus, in order for futility
to constitute a “substantial reason” to disallow
Home Choice's proposed amendment, Boykin must show that
defendant's proposed 33rd affirmative defense
(relating to collateral estoppel) would necessarily fail as a
matter of law.
It is
well-settled that “when a state agency acting in a
judicial capacity … resolves disputed issues of fact
properly before it which the parties have had an adequate
opportunity to litigate, … federal courts must give
the agency's factfinding the same preclusive effect to
which it would be entitled in the State's courts.”
University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788,
799, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986) (citations
omitted).[3] In Alabama, a state administrative
agency's decision has preclusive effect when “(1)
there is identity of the parties or their privies; (2) there
is identity of issues; (3) the parties had an adequate
opportunity to litigate the issues in the administrative
proceeding; (4) the issues to be estopped were actually
litigated and determined in the administrative proceeding;
and (5) the findings on the issues to be estopped were
necessary to the administrative decision.” Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Smitherman, 743 So.2d 442, 445 (Ala.
1999) (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by
Ex parte Rogers, 68 So.3d 773, 781 (Ala. 2010). Courts
applying these criteria under Alabama law have concluded that
an employee found in an unemployment-compensation proceeding
to have been discharged for misconduct is collaterally
estopped, or precluded, from relitigating the reason for his
or her discharge in subsequent litigation. See, e.g.,
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Hepp, 882 So.2d 329, 335 (Ala.
2003) (“Because all five elements of collateral
estoppel are met, Hepp is estopped from relitigating in his
retaliatory-discharge action the reason for his
discharge.”), overruled on other grounds by Ex
parte Rogers, 68 So.3d 773, 781 (Ala. 2010);
Smitherman, 743 So.2d at 448 (“The
requirements for applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel
… have been satisfied, and, thus, Smitherman is
collaterally estopped from relitigating, in this
retaliatory-discharge action, the reason for her
discharge.”).
In
arguing that Home Choice's proposed 33rd
affirmative defense of collateral estoppel / issue preclusion
is futile, Boykin focuses on the second element
(i.e., identity of issues). Although she
acknowledges that the relevant administrative decision
included a specific determination that she was terminated for
misconduct, Boykin maintains that “the Alabama
Unemployment Compensation Act's definition of misconduct
… is completely irrelevant and unhelpful in
determining violations of the ADA and the FMLA, ” that
she is not required to prove that her relationship to a
person with a disability or her FMLA leave status were the
sole reasons for her discharge in order to prevail on her ADA
and FMLA claims (i.e., misconduct could have been a
reason for dismissal too), and that she could bring a viable
ADA or FMLA claim even if she engaged in misconduct, if a
similarly situated employee committed a similar infraction
but was not discharged. (Doc. 38, at 4.) Notwithstanding her
arguments, multiple federal district courts in this Circuit
have concluded that identity of issues does exist in
circumstances the same as or similar to Boykin's.
See, e.g., Franks v. Indian Rivers Mental Health
Center, 2014 WL 514130, *4 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 7, 2014)
(“The issue before DIR was ‘the reason for
plaintiff's termination.' … This issue is the
same for Franks's FMLA claims based on her termination.
… Therefore, the court finds that this element is
satisfied.”); Petty v. United Plating, Inc.,
2012 WL 2047532, *12 (N.D. Ala. May 31, 2012) (“the
issue before the Department of Industrial Relations was the
same as the issue now before the court for plaintiff's
FMLA interference claim: the reason for plaintiff's
termination”); see generally Ross v. Renaissance
Montgomery Hotel & Spa at the Convention Center,
2012 WL 1032618, *5 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 27, 2012) (“The
more difficult question, however, is whether the state
court's finding that the Renaissance Hotel fired him for
misconduct bars him from claiming age discrimination under a
pretext theory. This Court holds that it
does.”).[4]
The
Court need not - and does not - make any conclusive
determinations today about whether Home Choice's
collateral estoppel defense will or will not prevail. Rather,
the Court simply finds, based on the incomplete, skeletal
arguments presented by the parties in briefing the Motion to
Amend, that Boykin has not met her burden of showing futility
of the proposed amendment. In other words, she has not shown
that defendant's proposed 33rd affirmative
defense would necessarily fail. The record does not show
exactly what the administrative decision did or did not
state, what findings were made, what evidence and arguments
were considered, and so on. Nor does the record establish the
specifics of the ALJ's misconduct determination.
Moreover, as defendant aptly points out, Home Choice has not
yet articulated its arguments for how the affirmative defense
will work in this context (doc. 42, at 3); rather,
plaintiff's opposition simply assumes that Home Choice
will present that defense in a particular manner, without any
apparent basis for doing so. Thus, Boykin would have this
Court declare the proposed 33rd defense futile
based on hypothetical arguments that defendant may or may not
even assert. Such objections do not warrant a conclusion that
this proposed defense must necessarily fail. And plaintiff
has not come forward with supporting decisional authority to
bolster her objection that collateral estoppel / issue
preclusion cannot possibly apply here. Under the
circumstances, the Court does not find at this time that the
proposed amendment will necessarily fail as a matter of law.
Accordingly, plaintiff's futility objection to the Motion
to Amend is overruled.
Plaintiff
also objects to the proposed amendment on timeliness grounds.
It is well settled that “generally, the mere passage of
time, without more, is an insufficient reason to deny leave
to amend a complaint.” Engle, 767 F.3d at 1109
(citation omitted). That said, “undue delay may clearly
support such a denial.” Id. “A district
court may find undue delay when the movant knew of facts
supporting the new claim long before the movant requested
leave to amend, ” and where the amendment would cause
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