Pope, McGlamry, Kilpatrick, Morrison & Norwood, P.C.
v.
Jason DuBois
Appeal
from Etowah Circuit Court (CV-12-900349)
STEWART, Justice.
Pope,
McGlamry, Kilpatrick, Morrison & Norwood, P.C. ("the
firm"), appeals from a judgment of the Etowah Circuit
Court ("the trial court") awarding postjudgment
interest to Jason DuBois. For the reasons set forth herein,
we reverse the judgment and remand the cause.
Facts
and Procedural History
DuBois
brought an action in the trial court asserting a worker's
compensation claim and tort claims against various
defendants. DuBois was represented in the underlying action
by two attorneys who were employed by the firm. After
DuBois's attorneys ended their employment with the firm,
DuBois terminated the firm's representation. The two
former attorneys of the firm, however, continued to represent
DuBois. The firm then intervened in the action, asserting an
attorney-fee lien and claiming attorney fees and expenses.
DuBois subsequently obtained settlements from the defendants,
which disposed of all the claims he had asserted, but the
firm's claim for attorney fees and reimbursement of
expenses remained pending. The trial court ordered the clerk
of the Etowah Circuit Court ("the trial-court
clerk") to deposit the settlement funds "in an
interest bearing account and to retain said funds until
further order of the court."
Following
a bench trial on the attorney-fee dispute, the trial court
entered a judgment finding that the firm was not entitled to
any fees or reimbursement of expenses. The firm appealed that
judgment to the Court of Civil Appeals and filed in the trial
court a motion seeking to stay execution of the judgment and
the disbursement of funds on deposit with the trial-court
clerk pending the outcome of the appeal. In support of its
motion to stay, the firm offered a letter of credit as
security for the appeal in the amount of $199,185. The trial
court stayed execution of the judgment pending resolution of
the appeal.
On July
14, 2017, the Court of Civil Appeals issued an opinion
affirming the trial court's judgment. Pope, McGlamry,
Kilpatrick, Morrison & Norwood, P.C. v. DuBois, 266
So. 3d 1064 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017). The firm filed a petition
for the writ of certiorari in this Court, which this Court
granted. On June 22, 2018, after holding oral argument, this
Court quashed the writ. Ex parte Pope, McGlamry,
Kilpatrick, Morrison & Norwood, P.C., 266 So. 3d
1083 (Ala. 2018).
On June
29, 2018, the day after this Court and the Court of Civil
Appeals issued their certificates of judgment, DuBois filed a
motion in the trial court seeking the disbursement of the
funds being held by the trial-court clerk. The trial court
entered an order directing the disbursement of the funds,
and, on July 4, 2018, DuBois filed a motion seeking the
determination of postjudgment interest, citing § 8-8-10,
Ala. Code 1975, and Rule 37, Ala. R. App. P. The trial court
directed both parties to submit a proposed order with their
calculation of postjudgment interest. Instead, the firm filed
a response to DuBois's motion in which it asserted that
there was no "money judgment" against the firm from
which interest could accrue under § 8-8-10. DuBois
replied, asserting that the purpose of postjudgment interest
is to compensate for the loss of use of funds and requested
the amount of $100,517.94 in postjudgment interest. On August
7, 2018, the trial court entered an order filed under seal
awarding postjudgment interest to DuBois. On September 18,
2018, the firm filed its notice of appeal.
Discussion
The
firm's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court
erred by awarding DuBois postjudgment interest under §
8-8-10. The firm asserts that there was no "money
judgment" on which interest could accrue and that the
stay of the judgment did not trigger the accrual of
postjudgment interest. The firm relies on § 8-8-10 and
Bank Independent v. Coats, 621 So. 2d 951');">621 So. 2d 951, 952 (Ala.
1993).
Section
8-8-10 authorizes the accrual of postjudgment interest for
"money judgments" and provides, in particular:
"(a) Judgments for the payment of money, other than
costs, if based upon a contract action, bear interest from
the day of the cause of action, at the same rate of interest
as stated in the contract; all other judgments shall bear
interest at the rate of 7.5 percent per annum, the provisions
of Section 8-8-1 to the contrary notwithstanding; provided,
that fees allowed a trustee, executor, administrator, or
attorney and taxed as a part of the cost of the proceeding
shall bear interest at a like rate from the day of
entry."
In
Coats, Bank Independent sued the Coatses alleging
that Mr. Coats had fraudulently conveyed a note and mortgage
secured by certain real property to Mrs. Coats in a divorce
action. After an unrelated entity purchased the real property
from Mrs. Coats, it interpleaded the purchase amount into the
trial court in Bank Independent's pending action against
the Coatses. After a jury determined that there had been no
fraudulent conveyance, the trial court entered a judgment in
favor of the Coatses, awarding the interpleaded funds to Mrs.
Coats. Bank Independent appealed that judgment, and the
interpleaded funds were placed in an interest-bearing
account, earning interest at a rate of 7.5%, pending the
resolution of the appeal. After this Court affirmed the trial
court's judgment, Mrs. Coats filed a motion in the trial
court seeking postjudgment interest. The trial court awarded
Mrs. Coats 12% postjudgment interest, the amount permitted by
§ 8-8-10 at the time, but credited Bank Independent for
the amount of interest the funds had earned in the
interest-bearing account. Bank Independent appealed to this
Court, which found that "the judgment following the
jury's verdict was not a 'money judgment' that
would entitle Mrs. Coats to 12% post-judgment interest
pursuant to § 8–8–10" because
"[t]he interpleaded sum was not money that Bank
Independent owed to Mrs. Coats pursuant to any note,
mortgage, judgment, or other indebtedness, nor was it awarded
as the result of any legal claims against Bank
Independent." 621 So. 2d at 953.
DuBois
argues that Coats is distinguishable because, in
that case, Bank Independent was not seeking relief that
involved the payment of money or the award of damages while,
in the present case, the firm sought the payment of money. In
Coats, Bank Independent sought to set aside Mr.
Coats's conveyance of the house to Mrs. Coats as
fraudulent. In this case, the firm sought to impose a lien
for an award of attorney fees on a portion of the
interpleaded funds. The trial court determined that the firm
was not entitled to the relief it requested, and, as a result
of that determination, DuBois was entitled to retain the
entirety ...