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Appeal
from Madison Circuit Court (CV-15-902120)
SELLERS,
Justice.
Daniel
Kyle Donaldson appeals from a summary judgment in favor of
Country Mutual Insurance Company ("Country
Mutual"). We affirm.
Facts
and Procedural History
The
underlying action stems from a November 2015 accident in
which Donaldson, while working in a construction zone on the
west side of Bailey Cove Road in Madison County, was struck
by a GMC Yukon sport-utility vehicle, owned and driven by
Gregory Ryan Johnston. As a result of the collision,
Donaldson suffered severe injuries to one of his legs that
ultimately required the amputation of the leg.
Donaldson
sued Johnston and Country Mutual, asserting claims of
negligence and wantonness against Johnston and asserting that
Country Mutual was vicariously liable for Johnston's
conduct under theories of agency and respondeat superior. At
the time of the underlying accident, Johnston was working as
an insurance agent under an "agent's agreement"
with Country Mutual and a number of other companies that are
collectively referred to in that agreement as "Country
Insurance and Financial Services."[1] Pursuant to that
agreement, Johnston solicited applications for the insurance
products of Country Mutual and the other named companies,
bound coverage and delivered insurance policies as approved
by those companies, transmitted premiums received from
policyholders to those companies, and provided customer
service to policyholders. The agent's agreement expressly
identified Johnston as an independent contractor and stated
that "nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to
create the relationship of employer and employee"
between the parties.
Country
Mutual filed a motion for a summary judgment, arguing that
Johnston was not its agent or employee but, instead, was an
independent contractor. Country Mutual further argued that,
even assuming Johnston was its employee, his actions in
relation to the accident were outside the line and scope of
his alleged employment. In opposition, Donaldson argued that
a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether
Johnston was an employee of Country Mutual and whether he was
acting
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within the line and scope of that employment at the time the
accident occurred. The Madison Circuit Court ("the trial
court") granted Country Mutual's motion for a
summary judgment. The case proceeded to trial on the
remaining claims against Johnston; the jury found in favor of
Donaldson on both the negligence and wantonness claims and
awarded him $5,560,000 in compensatory damages. After the
trial court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict,
Donaldson filed this appeal challenging the summary judgment
in favor of Country Mutual.
Standard
of Review
"This Court's review of a summary judgment is de
novo. Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,886 So.2d 72, 74 (Ala. 2003). We apply the same standard of
review as the trial court applied. Specifically, we must
determine whether the movant has made a prima facie showing
that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the
movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule
56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Alabama v. Hodurski,899 So.2d 949, 952-53 (Ala. 2004).
In making such a determination, we must review the evidence
in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Wilson v.
Brown, 496 So.2d 756, 758 (Ala. 1986). Once the movant
makes a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of
material fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to
produce `substantial evidence' as to the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank
of Baldwin County,538 So.2d 794, 797-98 (Ala. 1989);
Ala. Code 1975, ยง 12-21-12. `[S]ubstantial evidence is
evidence ...