United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Northern Division
K. DuBOSE CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the Court is defendant Gerald Barber's pro se
“Motion to Receive Jail Credit.” (Doc.
115). Barber is presently incarcerated at
Federal Correctional Institution McDowell, located in Welch,
West Virginia. He is serving a prison term of 120 months,
followed by an eight-year term of supervised release. (Doc.
motion, Barber recounts the history of his custody while his
federal charges were pending. He notes that the United States
successfully petitioned the Court for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
Ad Prosequendum in order to prosecute Barber, who was then
detained in Marengo County Jail. (Doc. 3, Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus). Barber contends that the Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”) has calculated his jail time to begin
when he was sentenced, on April 23, 2018. He submits that
this calculation was in error. He requests that the Court
grant his motion and award him credit for the time served
prior to his sentencing hearing.
major impediments inhibit this Court from considering his
motion. The first is that this Court is not authorized to
compute credit awards towards sentencing. Only the BOP may do
so. The second impediment is that because Barber is
incarcerated outside this judicial district, this district is
not the proper place to challenge the BOP's calculation.
relevant statute concerning credit for time served provides:
(b) Credit for prior custody.--A defendant
shall be given credit toward the service of a term of
imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention
prior to the date the sentence commences--
(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence
was imposed; or
(2) as a result of any other charge for
which the defendant was arrested after the commission of the
offense for which the sentence was imposed; that has not been
credited against another sentence.
18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). The Eleventh Circuit has held, when
addressing a similar motion brought by an inmate challenging
his credit, that:
The Attorney General through the BOP, and not the
district courts, is authorized, under 18 U.S.C. §
3585(b), to compute sentence credit awards after sentencing.
Dawson v. Scott, 50 F.3d 884, 889 (11th Cir. 1995).
The Attorney General delegated his authority in this area to
the BOP. United States v. Lucas, 898 F.2d 1554,
1555-56 (11th Cir. 1990). We have held that the granting of
credit for time served is in the first instance an
administrative, not a judicial, function. United States
v. Flanagan, 868 F.2d 1544, 1546 (11th Cir. 1989). The
district court, therefore, cannot circumvent the Attorney
General's initial discretion concerning whether to credit
a defendant's time in custody prior to sentencing.
Lucas, 898 F.2d at 1555.
U.S. v. Berrio, 428 Fed. App'x 944 (11th Cir.
2011) (emphasis added). Therefore, Congress vested the
authority to calculate credit with the BOP, not this Court.
and finally, this Court is not the appropriate venue to
challenge the BOP's calculation, even if Barber had
properly exhausted his administrative remedies. As the Eleventh
Circuit has held, a claim concerning credit for time served
“should be filed as a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241 . . . .” Id. And a
§ 2241 petition “may be brought only in the
district court of the district in which the inmate is
incarcerated.” Fernandez v. United States, 941
F.2d 1488, 1495 (11th Cir. 1991). In this case, Barber is
incarcerated in West Virginia, not in a facility located in
the Southern District of Alabama. Consequently, this Court
lacks jurisdiction to address Barber's motion.
on the foregoing, Barber's “Motion to Receive Jail
Credit[, ]” (Doc. 115), is DISMISSED
for lack of jurisdiction. The ...