United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division
ANN CALHOUN, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Beverly Calhoun, Plaintiff,
SENTRY CREDIT, INC., Defendant.
MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Ann Calhoun, as personal representative of the estate of
Beverly Calhoun, alleges that defendant Sentry Credit
violated the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act's
prohibition against third-party communications by calling her
about her daughter's consumer debt. (Doc.
On behalf of her daughter, Ms. Calhoun asserts claims under
15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b and 1692c(b). (Doc. 22, pp. 1,
4). Sentry Credit has moved to dismiss Ms. Calhoun's
claims under §§ 1692b and 1692c(b), (Docs. 23, 30),
and Ms. Calhoun seeks partial summary judgment on her claim
under § 1692b (Doc. 29). For the reasons discussed
below, the Court dismisses Ms. Calhoun's claim under
§ 1692b and denies Sentry Credit's motion to dismiss
Ms. Calhoun's claim under § 1692c(b).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
12(b)(6) enables a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint
for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint against the
“liberal pleading standards set forth by Rule
8(a)(2).” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007). Pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Specific facts are
not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.'” Erickson,
551 U.S. at 93 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555, (2007)); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
(Rule 8 generally does not require “detailed factual
deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must view
the allegations in a complaint in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party. Watts v. Fla. Int'l Univ.,
495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007). A court must accept
well-pleaded facts as true. Grossman v. Nationsbank,
N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000). In other
words, “[o]n a motion to dismiss, the facts stated in
the . . . complaint and all reasonable inferences therefrom
are taken as true.” Bickley v. Caremark RX,
Inc., 461 F.3d 1325, 1328 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing
Stephens v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
901 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1990)). Nevertheless, on a
motion to dismiss, courts “are not bound to accept as
true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,
to this standard, the Court describes the facts alleged in
the second amended complaint in the light most favorable to
Credit, Inc. is a debt collector subject to the provisions of
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. (Doc. 22, p. 2,
¶ 3). On January 16, 2018, Sentry Credit sent a
collection letter to Beverly Calhoun for a $12, 502.92 debt
that she incurred relating to her purchase of a vehicle.
(Doc. 22, p. 3, ¶¶ 7-9). Three days later, Sentry
Credit called Beverly Calhoun's home and left a message
asking her to contact Barbara Brown, a representative of
Sentry Credit. (Doc. 22, p. 3, ¶ 10). Beverly Calhoun
returned Ms. Brown's call and informed Ms. Brown that she
was bed-ridden and would contact her after she recovered.
(Doc. 22, p. 3, ¶ 11). Beverly Calhoun provided Ms.
Brown with a return phone number. (Doc. 22, p. 3- 4, ¶
11). After not hearing from Beverly Calhoun for three days,
Ms. Brown called Beverly Calhoun and left a message. (Doc.
22, p. 4, ¶ 12).
January 30, 2018, Ms. Brown called Beverly's mother. Ms.
Brown's conversation with Ms. Calhoun proceeded as
Caller: Hi. Beverly?
Caller: Can I speak with Beverly please?
Answerer: You must have the wrong ...