United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division
ORDER ENTERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN DEFENDANT'S
FAVOR
KRISTI
K. DuBOSE, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
In an
Order dated May 6, 2019, this Court notified pro se
Plaintiff Ronald Jackson that, based on the evidence
submitted during his motion for summary judgment, it believed
this case merited sue sponte summary judgment in
favor of Defendant Doubleback Transportation,
LLC.[1](Doc. 52). Doubleback did not move for
summary judgment. However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56(f)(1) permits the Court to grant summary judgment for a
nonmovant.[2] Rule 56(f)(1) serves as a convenient
method by which courts may dispose of a case without
proceeding to an “unnecessary trial[, ]” 10A
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice
& Procedure § 2720.1 (4th ed. 2008), so long as it
provides “notice and a reasonable time to
respond[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f). The May 6 Order
provided the requisite notice. (See Doc. 52 at 16).
And importantly, in this case, all claims “have been
fully developed in the evidentiary record . . .
.”[3] Artistic Ent., Inc. v. City of Warner
Robins, 331 F.3d 1196, 1202 (11th Cir. 2003). Jackson
therefore had the opportunity to develop and marshal the
evidence necessary to support and sustain his claims.
The May
6 Order outlined elements of Jackson's claims that a
plaintiff in the Eleventh Circuit must satisfy in order to
withstand summary judgment. Moreover, the May 6 Order gave
Jackson three weeks within which to supplement the record and
persuade the Court-already familiar with the facts of this
case-that its belief was in error. Unpersuaded, the Court now
sua sponte grants summary judgment in
Doubleback's favor.
I.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The
Court provided a more complete procedural background in the
May 6 Order. For present purposes, the Court provides the
following background. Jackson filed an amended complaint
after the Court afforded him the opportunity. (Doc. 34). As
amended, the complaint alleged the following claims:
a. Workplace Discrimination on the Basis of Race
b. Hostile Work Environment on the Basis of Race and in
Retaliation
c. Retaliation
d. Failure to Adequately Train
See (Doc. 42 at 1 (“The Plaintiff is pursuing
claims against Double Back Transportation for hostile work
environment, termination/discharge in regards to same or
similiar [sic] under Section 1981 and Title VII and failure
to adequately train.”); see also Doc. 34-1 at
7 (“The [n]egative appraisal occu[r]red after protected
activity on April 11, 2017, Plaintiff was subjected to
adverse activity.”)).
Jackson
then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Doc. 42).
The Court converted his motion into a motion for summary
judgment because it implicated factual issues. The Court
afforded Jackson time within which to supplement his motion
and entered a briefing schedule for a response to
Jackson's motion for summary judgment. (Docs. 43 &
44). Thereafter, the Court issued an order notifying Jackson
that, having reviewed the evidence, the Court believed
summary judgment may be due to Doubleback, a nonmovant.
Jackson has now responded in a 20-page brief, to which 67
pages of exhibits were attached. See (Doc. 53).
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A factual dispute is
“‘genuine' if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is “material” if it
“might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing [substantive] law.” Id. “In
reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met its burden, the
court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making
credibility determinations of the truth of the matter . . .
the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”
Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994,
998-999 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
III.
M ...