United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division
ORDER
KRISTI
K. DUBOSE, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
This
matter is before the Court on non-party Richardson Alabama
Equipment Leasing, Inc.'s Rule 24(a) Motion to Intervene
(Doc. 35) and Plaintiff's opposition thereto (Doc. 40).
I.
Background
On
November 12, 2018, Glovis initiated this action against
Richway in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama
(Glovis Alabama, LLC v. Richway Transp. Servs.,
Inc., 02-CV-2018-902866). (Doc. 1-1). Based on
Richway's alleged indebtedness related to a contract
regarding certain leased equipment, Glovis alleged breach of
lease, replevin and unjust enrichment, and seeks an order for
the release of property and for monetary damages ($370, 506),
pre and post judgment interest, attorney's fees, and
costs. On December 14, 2018, Richway removed this case to
this Court on the basis of federal diversity subject matter
jurisdiction. (Doc. 1). On December 21, 2018, Richway
answered and counterclaimed against Glovis for "suit on
sworn account pursuant to Ala. Code §
12-21-111," breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and
fraud. (Doc. 2). Richway seeks $474, 524.65 in actual and
liquidated damages, pre/post judgment interest,
attorney's fees, and costs. (Id.) Richway denies
that it is in default and/or that it owes any payments to
Glovis, "because such amounts were deducted" from
Glovis' "outstanding payables owed to Richway."
On
April 30, 2019, Richway moved to amend its
answer/counterclaim because it discovered that the equipment
at issue is not owned by Glovis: "[r]eview of State of
Alabama Certificates of Title confirm the majority __ and
likely all __of the Equipment is owned by Richardson Alabama
Equipment Leasing, Inc….which is not a party to the
Lease Agreement…Alabama Department of Revenue license
and registration receipts similarly identify RAEL as the
owner…." (Doc. 33 at 3). Richway also added a
counterclaim for quantum meruit. While given the
opportunity to file a response to Richway's motion for
leave to amend (Doc. 34), none was filed by Glovis. On May
24, 2019, Richway's motion was granted, and on May 28,
2019, Richway filed its amended answer/counterclaims. (Doc.
37).
On May
24, 2019, Richardson Alabama Equipment Leasing, Inc. (RAEL)
filed a Rule 24(a)(2) motion to intervene.[1] (Doc. 35). In so
doing, RAEL asserts that it, not Glovis, is the true owner of
the leased equipment, and so seeks to intervene to protect
its ownership and possessory rights. Specifically, per RAEL:
….Plaintiff…neither owns nor maintains any
possessory interest in the Equipment…. The Equipment
was acquired by Intervenor directly from Transcraft
Corporation in June and July of 2016, and thereafter
registered and titled in Intervenor's name. [ ] The
Equipment has remained under Intervenor's ownership and
control since it was acquired. [ ]
…Plaintiff does not maintain any legal ownership,
possessory, or security interest in any of the Equipment at
issue. Intervenor has not transferred, granted, or otherwise
conferred any ownership, possessory, or security interest in
the Equipment to Plaintiff. [ ] Intervenor and Plaintiff have
not entered into any agreements
with respect to the Equipment. [ ] Plaintiff….has
never even been in possession of the Equipment…
…Plaintiff contends that is it has contractual and
legal rights to immediate possession of the
Equipment…despite a complete and utter absence of
same. Plaintiff contends it may repossess, sell, or release
the Equipment, despite not having any legal ownership or
possessory interest in any of the Equipment in
issue….Plaintiff may not “repossess”
property that it never possessed to begin with, and cannot
“sell” what it does not own.
….Intervenor…maintains the only legal ownership
and possessory interest in the Equipment…not
Plaintiff. Intervenor claims that right pursuant to State of
Alabama Certificates of Title and Alabama Department of
Revenue license and registration receipts…..
(Doc. 35 at 3-4 (footnotes omitted, emphasis in original)).
On May
31, 2019, Glovis filed its opposition, contending that
Richway is acting "surreptitious[ly]" and in bad
faith with RAEL, to take Glovis' equipment without
payment, when RAEL is not a necessary party. (Doc. 40).
Glovis argues that the motion is untimely, RAEL is not
necessary because it is not a party to the Glovis-Richway
equipment lease agreement, "it could not logically be
the owner" of the equipment per Richway's answers,
and RAEL and Richway are related entities simply working
together to avoid payment to Glovis.
II.
...