United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
GRAY
M. BORDEN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff,
an inmate incarcerated at the Elmore Correctional Facility in
Elmore, Alabama, files this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
against the District Attorney of Montgomery County, Alabama,
and The Honorable J.R. Gaines. He seeks to challenge the
constitutionality of state-court criminal proceedings pending
against him in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County,
Alabama. Plaintiff requests that his case be
“naturalized” and that he be released from
custody. Upon review, the court concludes that dismissal of
this case prior to service of process is appropriate under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).[1]
I.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff
alleges that his trial on pending criminal charges has been
rescheduled since July 2018. He contends, however, that the
State of Alabama does not have enough evidence to bring him
to trial, that the “defendant” testified under
oath she could not identify Plaintiff from a line-up, and
that the available evidence reflects that he is innocent of
the charges. Doc. 1.
A.
Claims Against Judge Gaines
1.
Non-Final Orders
To the
extent Plaintiff seeks relief from non-final adverse rulings
Judge Gaines has made in his judicial capacity during
state-court criminal proceedings over which he has
jurisdiction, Plaintiff is not entitled to relief from this
court on these claims because there is an adequate remedy at
law. Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir.
2000) (“In order to receive declaratory or injunctive
relief, plaintiff[] must establish that there was a
[constitutional] violation, that there is a serious risk of
continuing irreparable injury if the relief is not granted,
and the absence of an adequate remedy at law.”).
Specifically, Plaintiff could appeal orders issued by the
state court to the appropriate higher state court. Since
state law provides an adequate remedy for Plaintiff to
challenge non-final orders, Plaintiff is “not entitled
to declaratory or injunctive relief in this case.”
Id. at 1243.
2.
Final Orders
To the
extent Plaintiff seeks to challenge the constitutionality of
orders issued by Judge Gaines that have become final under
state law, this court lacks jurisdiction over such an action
filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents . . . lower federal
courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by
‘state-court losers' challenging ‘state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced.'” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S.
459, 460 (2006) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). Although
“Rooker-Feldman is a narrow doctrine, ”
it bars Plaintiff from proceeding before this court on any
claims challenging final orders issued by the state court
because these claims are “‘brought by [a]
state-court loser[] complaining of injuries caused by
state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments.'” Lance, 546
U.S. at 464 (citation omitted); D.C. Ct. of App. v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983) (holding that federal
district courts “do not have jurisdiction . . . over
challenges to state court decisions in particular cases
arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges
allege that the state court's action was
unconstitutional”). Moreover, a § 1983 action is
not an appropriate avenue to compel or to appeal a particular
course of action by a state court. Datz v. Kilgore,
51 F.3d 252, 254 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that § 1983
suit arising from alleged erroneous decisions of a state
court is a prohibited appeal of the state-court judgment);
see also Rolleston v. Eldridge, 848 F.2d 163 (11th
Cir. 1988).
In
light of the foregoing, the court concludes that dismissal of
the request for relief from final actions undertaken by Judge
Gaines during proceedings related to Plaintiff's
state-court criminal case is appropriate under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). See Clark v. St. of Ga. Pardons
& Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636 (11th Cir. 1990);
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
B.
Claims Against the District Attorney
Plaintiff
names the District Attorney for Montgomery County, Alabama,
as a defendant. He complains the State has insufficient
evidence on which to bring him to trial. Doc. 1. However,
“a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity for all
actions he takes while performing his function as an advocate
for the government.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,
509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993); Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d
1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999) (“A prosecutor enjoys
absolute immunity from allegations stemming from the
prosecutor's function as advocate.”); Van de
Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 342 (2009) (holding in
a § 1983 action that “the immunity that the law
grants prosecutors [for actions intimately associated with
initiation, prosecution and punishment in a criminal case] is
‘absolute'”); Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 420 (1976) (“[A] prosecutor enjoys
absolute immunity from § 1983 suits for damages when he
acts within the scope of his prosecutorial duties.”);
Rowe v. Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th
Cir. 2002) (“A prosecutor is entitled to absolute
immunity for all actions he takes while performing his
function as an advocate for the government.”). The
absolute immunity afforded prosecutors protects against
“impair[ing] the performance of a central actor in the
judicial process.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.
335, 343 (1986). Absolute immunity from § 1983 liability
is afforded to all conduct of a prosecutor that is
“intimately associated with the judicial phase of the
criminal process, ” and this includes the
prosecutor's representation of the State's interests
during the sentencing phase of a criminal aciton. Burns
v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991) (citing
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31). Furthermore, this
immunity is applicable even where the prosecutor acts
“maliciously, unreasonably, without probable cause, or
even on the basis of false testimony or evidence.”
Henry v. Farmer City St. Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1238
(7th Cir. 1986); accord Prince v. Wallace, 568 F.2d
1176, 1178-79 (5th Cir. 1978).
Plaintiff's
challenge to the actions of the District Attorney for
Montgomery County in initiating and prosecuting criminal
charges against him arises from this defendant's role
“as an ‘advocate' for the state” and
relates to actions that are “intimately associated with
the judicial phase of the criminal process.”
Mastroianni v. Bowers, 60 F.3d 671, 676 (11th Cir.
1998) (citations omitted). The defendant prosecutor is
entitled to absolute immunity for this conduct.
Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273; Burns, 500 U.S.
at 493. Further, Plaintiff is entitled to no declaratory or
injunctive relief in this § 1983 complaint for any
adverse action taken during the state-court criminal
proceedings related to his conviction or sentence. See
Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486-87; Newman v. Alabama,
683 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1982).
C.
Challenge to Plaintiff's Pending ...