United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Southern Division
RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
WALLACE CAPEL, JR. CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff
Kevin Saffold, a pro se party, filed a Complaint
(Doc. 1) against Defendant Myra K. McLeod alleging breach of
contract. The District Judge referred this matter to the
undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for consideration
and disposition or recommendation on all pretrial matters as
may be appropriate. See Doc. 4. On May 9, 2019, the
undersigned entered an Order granting Plaintiff's Motion
for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and staying
the case for an obligatory review of the Complaint pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e). Doc. 9. The undersigned has reviewed
this case and recommends that it be stayed pursuant to
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
I.
PLAINTIFF'S FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff
claims he entered into a contingency agreement with Defendant
in connection with the publishing of a book to be written by
Defendant. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 7-9. Plaintiff did not file a
copy of the alleged contract with his Complaint. Plaintiff
asserts that, pursuant to the alleged agreement, the parties
purchased two automobiles from the Kia dealership in Dothan,
Alabama, specifically, a 2016 Dodge Ram 1500 and a 2015 BMW
X1 SUV, so Plaintiff could provide transportation services to
Defendant to attend social, religious, and business
functions. Id. ¶¶ 12-14. Plaintiff claims
the parties agreed that the vehicles would be purchased in
Defendant's name, but Plaintiff would pay the down
payments and be responsible for tags, insurance, and monthly
car notes. Id. ¶ 13. According to Plaintiff,
several months after the purchase of the vehicles, Defendant
said she was “being contacted by someone at the finance
companies (who held the notes to said vehicles) saying the
monthly car-notes were delinquent” and that Defendant
then “breached the [parties'] contract by having
the BMW voluntarily re-possessed to Kia Motors
Finance.” Id. ¶¶ 17-18. On November
8, 2018, Defendant in this case contacted the Dothan Police
Department and had Plaintiff arrested and charged with first
degree financial exploitation of the elderly. Id.
¶ 19, Doc. 6 ¶3.
II.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff
seeks specific performance of the parties' contract or,
alternatively, $100, 000.00 in compensatory damages and $100,
000.00 in punitive damages. He admits that the Defendant in
this case is the victim in the state criminal case, that the
criminal case is related to the allegations in his Complaint,
and that the criminal case is still pending. Doc. 6
¶¶ 2-4. Thus, the issue before the undersigned is
whether this civil action should proceed while the state
court criminal action is ongoing.
In
Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court instructed that
the principles of equity, comity, and federalism support a
long-standing public policy against federal court
interference with state court proceedings. 401 U.S. at 44-45.
Younger applies if the ongoing state court
proceedings fall into one of three categories of
“exceptional” cases: (1) criminal proceedings;
(2) civil enforcement proceedings that are “akin”
to criminal proceedings; and (3) “civil proceedings
involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of
the state courts' ability to perform their judicial
functions.” Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v.
Jacobs, 134 S.Ct. 584, 588 (2013) (quoting New
Orleans Public Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New
Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 367-68 (1989)). If the state
court proceeding does not fall into a category of exceptional
cases, Younger abstention is not appropriate.
If the
case does fall into one of the exceptional categories, a
court must then analyze the three factors set forth in
Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar
Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982): (1) whether the federal
court proceeding will interfere with an ongoing state
proceeding; (2) whether the state proceeding implicates an
important state interest; and (3) whether the state
proceeding provides an adequate opportunity to raise any
federal claims. 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d
1255, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003); Parris v. Taft, 630
Fed.Appx. 895, 898 (11th Cir. 2015). An essential part of the
first Middlesex factor is interference; if there is
no interference, abstention is not required. 31 Foster
Children, 329 F.3d at 1276. In order to assess possible
interference, courts examine the relief requested and the
effect it would have on the state proceedings. Id.
at 1274. “The relief sought need not directly
interfere with an ongoing proceeding or terminate an ongoing
proceeding in order for Younger abstention to be
required.” Id.
Based
on the above case law and the facts before the Court, the
undersigned recommends abstention pursuant to
Younger. The case pending against Plaintiff in state
court falls into one of the three “exceptional”
categories, as it is a criminal prosecution for alleged
financial exploitation of the elderly. Additionally, the
three Middlesex factors are satisfied. First, in
this civil case, Plaintiff is asserting that he had a
contractual right to purchase two vehicles in Defendant's
name and then possess those vehicles. Thus, any decision by
this Court on the issues raised in Plaintiff's Complaint
would significantly interfere with - and potentially
undermine - the ongoing state criminal proceeding, which is
based on Plaintiff's purchase of the vehicles. Second,
Alabama has an important interest in enforcing its laws and
prosecuting violations of its laws. See Roberts v.
Buchanah, No. 1:16-CV-4295-MHC, 2017 WL 5247943, at *3
(N.D.Ga. June 16, 2017) (citing Juidice v. Vail, 430
U.S. 327, 335 (1977) (recognizing important state interest in
enforcement of criminal laws) and Christman v.
Crist, 315 Fed. App'x. 231, 232 (11th Cir. 2009)
(per curiam) (recognizing that ability to prosecute DUI
charges is important state interest)). Third, Plaintiff has
not identified any federal questions at issue in this
lawsuit, and the undersigned is unaware of any federal
questions applicable to this case that could not be
adequately addressed in the state court proceedings.
When
Younger applies, any claims for injunctive relief
are properly dismissed.[1]Wheat v. Pub. Defs. Office, No.
5:15-CV-0294-MTT-MSH, 2015 WL 4877236, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Aug.
14, 2015) (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564
(1973)). However, in cases involving claims for damages, as
here, the common practice is to stay the federal proceeding
until the criminal case has ended. Wheat v. Pub. Defs.
Office, No. 5:15-CV- 0294-MTT-MSH, 2015 WL 4877236, at
*2 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 14, 2015) (citing Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384, 394 (2007) and Deakins v. Monaghan,
484 U.S. 193, 194 (1987)). See also Parris, 630
Fed.Appx. at 899 (citing Doby v. Strength, 758 F.2d
1405, 1406 (11th Cir. 1985) and finding no abuse of
discretion when district court concluded that
Younger abstention was appropriate because resolving
defendant's claims that officers fabricated evidence and
violated speedy trial rights would interfere with results of
the state court criminal proceedings). Thus, it is
appropriate to stay this federal proceeding pending final
resolution of Plaintiff's state court criminal case.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the
above reasons, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate
Judge that:
1. This
case be STAYED pending resolution of the related state
criminal case proceeding;
2. That
the Plaintiff be required to file a notice with the Court
within fourteen days of the conclusion of the state court
proceedings advising the Court ...