EX PARTE TYSON CHICKEN, INC., and Charles Gregory Craig In re Lisa Burke Huffstutler
v.
Tyson Chicken, Inc., and Charles Gregory Craig
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[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
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Marshall Circuit Court, CV-18-900113
K.
Donald Simms of Webster, Henry, Bradwell, Cohen, Speagle
& DeShazo, P.C., Birmingham, for petitioners.
M.
Clay Martin of Martin & Helms, P.C., Huntsville; and R.
Champ Crocker of Crocker & Sparks, Cullman, for
respondent.
On
Application for Rehearing
PETITION
FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
PER
CURIAM.
This
Court's opinion of November 30, 2018, is withdrawn, and
the following is substituted therefor.
Tyson
Chicken, Inc. ("Tyson"), and Charles Gregory Craig,
defendants in a personal-injury action below, petition this
Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Marshall Circuit
Court to vacate its order denying Tyson and Craig's
motion for a change of venue and to enter an order
transferring the underlying action to the Cullman Circuit
Court. We deny the petition.
Facts
and Procedural History
In
November 2017, Craig, while working for his employer, Tyson,
was driving westbound on County Road 1609 in Cullman County
in a tractor-trailer rig. As Craig reached the intersection
of County Road 1609 and County Road 747, he attempted to turn
left into the southbound lane of County Road 747. As Craig
was turning, a vehicle driven by Lisa Burke Huffstutler, who
was traveling northbound on County Road 747, collided with
Craig's tractor-trailer. As a result of the collision,
Huffstutler was injured; she was taken to Cullman Regional
Medical Center for treatment.
Subsequently,
Huffstutler sued Craig and Tyson in the Marshall Circuit
Court. She asserted the following claims: (1) negligence and
wantonness against Craig; (2) negligent and/or wanton
supervision or training of Craig by Tyson; and (3) negligent
and/or wanton hiring, retention, and/or entrustment by Tyson
in relation to Craig's operation of a tractor-trailer rig
on its behalf.
Tyson
and Craig filed a joint motion to transfer the case from
Marshall County to Cullman County under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens. Huffstutler responded and argued that the
case should not be transferred. Following a hearing, the
trial court denied Craig and Tyson's motion. Thereafter,
Craig and Tyson timely filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus with this Court, and we ordered answers and briefs.
Standard
of Review
"A petition for a writ of mandamus is the proper method
for challenging a ruling denying a motion to transfer for
forum non conveniens reasons. Ex parte Integon
Corp., 672 So.2d 497, 499 (Ala. 1995). `A writ of
mandamus. . . is appropriate when the petitioner can show (1)
a clear legal right to the order sought; (2) an imperative
duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal
to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4)
the properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.' Ex
parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So.2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001).
This Court reviews mandamus petitions seeking review of a
ruling on a motion to transfer based on forum non conveniens
by asking
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whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in granting
or denying the motion. Malsch v. Bell Helicopter
Textron, Inc., 916 So.2d 600, 603 (Ala. 2005); see
also Ex parte Kia Motors America, Inc., 881 So.2d 396
(Ala. 2003)."
Ex parte DaimlerChrysler Corp., 952 So.2d 1082,
1086-87 (Ala. 2006).
Analysis
In
their petition, Craig and Tyson contend that the doctrine of
forum non conveniens requires that the underlying action be
transferred from Marshall County to Cullman County.
Initially, we note that neither Craig and Tyson, on the one
hand, nor Huffstutler, on the other, disputes that both
Marshall County and Cullman County are appropriate venues for
the underlying action. Alabama's forum non conveniens
statute provides that,
"[w]ith respect to civil actions filed in an appropriate
venue, any court of general jurisdiction shall, for the
convenience of parties and witnesses, or in the interest of
justice, transfer any civil action or any claim in any civil
action to any court of general jurisdiction in which the
action might have been properly filed and the case shall
proceed as though originally filed therein."
§ 6-3-21.1(a), Ala. Code 1975. "The purpose of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens is to `prevent the waste of
time, energy, and money and also to protect witnesses,
litigants, and the public against unnecessary expense and
inconvenience.'" Ex parte Perfection Siding,
Inc., 882 So.2d 307, 312 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Ex
parte New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 663 So.2d 952');">663 So.2d 952, 956
(Ala. 1995)). "`A defendant moving for a transfer under
§ 6-3-21.1 has the initial burden of showing that the
transfer is justified, based on the convenience of the
parties and witnesses or based on the interest of
justice.'" Ex parte Southeast Alabama Timber
Harvesting, LLC, 94 So.3d 371, 373 (Ala.
2012)(quoting Ex parte National Sec. Ins.
Co., 727 So.2d 788');">727 So.2d 788, 789 (Ala. 1998)).
In the
present case, Craig and Tyson argued both that Marshall
County was an inconvenient forum and that the transfer was
required "based on the interest of justice." As the
parties moving for the transfer, Craig and Tyson had the
burden of demonstrating "either that [Cullman] County is
a more convenient forum than [Marshall] County or that having
the case heard in [Cullman] County would more serve the
interest of justice...." Ex parte Fuller, 955
So.2d 414, 416 (Ala. 2006).
With
regard to the "convenience-of-the-parties" prong of
§ 6-3-21.1, this Court has recognized that
"`[a] defendant seeking a transfer based on §
6-3-21.1 has the burden of proving to the satisfaction of the
trial court that the defendant's inconvenience and
expense in defending the action in the venue selected by the
plaintiff are so great that the plaintiff's right to
choose the forum is overcome. Ex parte New England Mut.
Life, 663 So.2d [952,] 956 [(Ala. 1995)]; Ex parte
Townsend, 589 So.2d [711,] 715 [(Ala. 1991)]. For a
transfer to be justified, the transferee forum must be
"significantly more convenient" than the forum
chosen by the plaintiff. Ex parte Townsend, 589
So.2d at 715. See also[] Ex parte Johnson,
638 So.2d 772, 774 (Ala. 1994).'"
Ex parte Blair Logistics, LLC, 157 So.3d 951, 955
(Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (quoting Ex parte Integon
Corp., 672 So.2d 497, 500 (Ala. 1995) (emphasis added)).
Thus, a trial court should not grant a motion for a change of
venue under the convenience-of-the-parties prong unless the
new forum is shown to be "significantly more
convenient" than the forum in which the action was
filed.
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See Ex parte First Tennessee Bank Nat'l
Ass'n, 994 So.2d 906, 909 (Ala. 2008).
In
cases in which this Court has found that the
"convenience of the parties and witnesses" warrants
a transfer of the action, evidence was provided demonstrating
that the proposed transferee forum was "significantly
more convenient" than the transferor forum. Such
evidence included affidavits from parties and witnesses
stating that the incident underlying the action occurred in
the transferee forum, affidavits from the parties stating
that they lived in the transferee forum, and evidence
indicating that requiring the parties and/or the witnesses to
travel to the transferor forum would be a significant burden.
See, e.g., Ex parte Kane, 989 So.2d 509, 511, 512-13
(Ala. 2008) (noting affidavits submitted by the movant in
support of the motion for a change of venue in holding that
the transferee forum would be a "substantially more
convenient" forum than the transferor forum). In
contrast, in cases in which the party moving for the transfer
has failed to present evidence demonstrating that the
transferee forum is "significantly more convenient"
than the transferor forum, this Court has declined to order a
transfer. See, e.g., Ex parte Gentile Co., 221 So.3d
1066, 1069 (Ala. 2016) (noting that the petitioner failed to
present any evidence in support of its motion for a change of
venue under the doctrine of forum non conveniens in declining
to order a transfer of the case).
In the
present case, Craig and Tyson have not presented evidence or
affidavits demonstrating that Cullman County is a
"significantly more convenient" forum than Marshall
County. Although they argue that the "overwhelming
majority" of documentary evidence related to the
accident is located in Cullman County, this Court has stated
that a party who makes this argument "`"must make a
showing on the factors such as volume, necessity, and
inconvenience that would support such a
claim."'" Ex parte Yocum, 963 So.2d
600, 602 (Ala. 2007) (quoting Ex parte Nichols, 757
So.2d 374, 378 (Ala. 1999), quoting in turn Ex parte
Wiginton, 743 So.2d 1071, 1076 (Ala. 1999)); see
also Ex parte General Nutrition Corp., 855 So.2d 475,
480 (Ala. 2003), and Ex parte Nichols, 757 So.2d at
379. This means that the moving party must identify those
documents and provide information demonstrating how
burdensome it would be for it to move those documents to the
transferor forum. Nichols, 757 So.2d at 379. Here,
Craig and Tyson have not presented information regarding the
nature of the documentary evidence, and, thus, we cannot
consider the location of the documents in determining whether
the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying the
transfer.
Additionally,
Craig and Tyson mention that the paramedics who responded to
the accident are located in Cullman County. The evidence
before us, however, shows only that the paramedics'
employer is located there, not that the paramedics who
responded to the accident live there or that it would
otherwise be inconvenient for them to appear at trial in
Marshall County. Craig and Tyson also note that
Huffstutler's employer, which they say could testify as
to the impact her injuries had on her ability to earn a
living, is located in Cullman County. Although this may be
true, there is no evidence before us, such as affidavits from
potential witnesses, indicating that witnesses who might
testify on behalf of Huffstutler's employer would be
"seriously inconvenienced" by having to travel to
Marshall County for trial. See, e.g., Ex parte General
Nutrition, 855 So.2d at 480 ("`[A] defendant cannot
assert the inconvenience of its witnesses without making a
detailed statement specifying the key witnesses and providing
generally
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statements of the subject matter of their
testimony.'" (quoting Ex parte Preston Hood
Chevrolet, 638 So.2d 842, 845 (Ala. 1994))). Finally,
Craig and Tyson have not provided any evidence demonstrating
how the "inconvenience and expense in defending the
action" in Marshall County is "so great" that
Huffstutler's ability, as the plaintiff, to choose the
forum is overcome. See, e.g., Ex parte Perfection
Siding, 882 So.2d at 312 (holding that the moving party
failed to show how its inconvenience and expense in defending
the action in a county that was 20 minutes away from the
forum county justified a transfer under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens). Thus, Craig and Tyson have not satisfied
their burden of establishing that Cullman County is a
"significantly more convenient" forum than Marshall
County, and the trial court did not exceed its discretion in
denying their motion under the convenience-of-the-parties
prong.
Next,
Craig and Tyson argue that the "interest of
justice" requires that the underlying case be
transferred to Cullman County. In addressing this prong, this
Court has stated:
"The
`interest of justice' prong of § 6-3-21.1 requires
`the transfer of the action from a county with little, if
any, connection to the action, to the county with a strong
connection to the action.' Ex parte National Sec.
Ins. Co., 727 So.2d [788,] 790 [(Ala. 1998)].
Therefore, `in analyzing the interest-of-justice prong of
§ 6-3-21.1, this Court focuses on whether the
"nexus" or "connection" between the
plaintiff's action and the original forum is strong
enough to warrant burdening the plaintiff's forum with
the action.' Ex parte First Tennessee Bank
Nat'l Ass'n, 994 So.2d 906, 911 (Ala.
2008).... Further, in examining whether it is in the
interest of justice to transfer a case, we consider `the
burden of piling court services and resources upon the
people of a county that is not affected by the case and ...
the interest of the people of a county to have a case that
arises in their county tried close to public view in their
county.' Ex parte Smiths Water & Sewer
Auth., 982 So.2d 484, 490 (Ala. 2007)."
Ex
parte Indiana Mills & Mfg., Inc., 10 So.3d 536, 540
(Ala. 2008). Additionally, this Court has consistently upheld
the principle that litigation should be handled in the forum
where the injury occurred. See, e.g., Ex parte Indiana
Mills & Mfg., Inc., 10 So.3d at 540; Ex parte
Fuller, 955 So.2d at 416.
Here,
the evidence before us shows that Huffstutler was injured in
Cullman County. The evidence also shows that the company that
provided emergency medical care and the hospital at which
Huffstutler was treated for her injuries are located in
Cullman County. Finally, there is also evidence before us
indicating that Tyson operates a facility in Cullman County.
Thus, the connection between the underlying action and
Cullman County appears to be "strong."
Our
forum non conveniens analysis under the interest-of-justice
prong, however, "has never involved a simple balancing
test weighing each county's connection to an
action." Ex parte J & W Enters., LLC, 150
So.3d 190, 196 (Ala. 2014). Rather, to compel a change of
venue under this prong, the underlying action must have both
a "strong" connection to the county to which the
transfer is sought and a "weak" or
"little" connection to the county in which the case
is pending, which necessarily depends on the specific facts
of each case. Id.; see also Ex parte
Elliott, 254 So.3d 882, 886 (Ala. 2017)("Even
accepting Allstate's contention that Montgomery County
has a `strong' connection to this action, we note that
Allstate must also
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demonstrate that Lowndes County has a `weak' or
`little' connection to the action."). Thus, despite
the above evidence demonstrating that Cullman
County—where the accident occurred—has a strong
connection to the present case, that evidence alone does not
require a transfer. Craig and Tyson must still show that
Marshall County's connection to the underlying action is
"weak" or "little."[1]
Ex
parte J & W Enterprises, supra, illustrates this point.
In Ex parte J & W Enterprises, the plaintiff was injured
in an accident involving a tractor-trailer rig that occurred
in Mobile County. The plaintiff sued the driver of the rig
and the driver's employer in Clarke County. Both the
driver and his employer moved to transfer the case from
Clarke County to Mobile County. In support of their motion,
they argued that the interest-of-justice prong in
Alabama's forum non conveniens statute required that the
case be transferred to the location where the accident
occurred.
This
Court held, however, that the interest-of-justice prong did
not warrant a transfer despite the fact that the injury
occurred in Mobile County. In doing so, this Court noted,
among other things, both that the driver lived and that his
employer was located in Clarke County where the action was
filed. In denying the mandamus petition, this Court concluded
that the connections to the plaintiff's chosen
forum—Clarke County—were not "weak."
Id.
In the
present case, Marshall County's connection to the
underlying action is not weak. All the parties in this case
either live in or operate in Marshall County. Specifically,
Huffstutler and Craig both reside there.[2] Additionally, it is
undisputed that Tyson maintains a facility in Marshall County
and, according to the accident report, Craig works at that
facility. Although Tyson and Craig dispute this by alleging
that all the documentary evidence relating to Craig's
employment and training is located at its facility in Cullman
County, that assertion, as noted above, is not supported by
evidence. Thus, under these circumstances, although there is
a strong connection between the present case and Cullman
County, the connection to Marshall County is also strong.
Because Craig and Tyson have not satisfied their burden of
showing that Marshall County's connection to the
underlying action is "weak" or "little,"
the trial court did not exceed its discretion in denying
Craig and Tyson's motion for a change of venue under this
prong. Thus, Craig and Tyson have failed to establish that
the trial court exceeded
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its discretion or that they have a clear legal right to the
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