United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division
DAVID LEACH, Personal Representative of the Estate of Henry S. Lockett, Plaintiff,
v.
MARY WEHLING, EUGENE WEHLING, and REGIONS BANK, Defendants.
ORDER
KRISTI
K. DuBOSE CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This
action is before the Court on the Motion to Reconsider filed
by David Leach, Personal Representative of the Estate of
Henry S. Lockett (hereinafter the Personal Representative)
(doc. 38). Upon consideration and for the reasons set forth
herein, the Motion is DENIED.
Previously,
the Magistrate Judge recommended granting Defendants'
motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Magistrate Judge found that the parties were all citizens
of Alabama and therefore, the Court lacked diversity
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The
Magistrate Judge also found that the complaint did not
satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule and therefore did not
invoke federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331. The Court adopted the recommendation and the action was
dismissed without prejudice (docs. 36, 37). The Court also
denied the Personal Representative's motion to amend the
complaint on basis that allowing the amendment would be
futile (doc. 35).
Pursuant
to Rule 59(e), a party may move to alter or amend a judgment.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). “[A] motion for reconsideration
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may only be
granted based on newly discovered evidence or manifest errors
of law or fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Britt v. United
States Gov't, ___ Fed. Appx.___, 2019 WL 2024812, at
*2 (11th Cir. May 8, 2019). Also, “courts may alter
prior holdings based on ‘a change in controlling
authority, new evidence or the need to avoid manifest
injustice.'” Jupiter Wreck, Inc. v.
Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 762
Fed.Appx. 852 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). “A
motion for reconsideration cannot be used ‘to
relitigate old matters, [or to] raise argument or present
evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of
judgment.'” Id.
Because
the Personal Representative does not present any change in
controlling law or newly-discovered evidence, he appears to
argue that the Court committed a manifest error of law or
fact or should alter its prior decision to avoid manifest
injustice. See Daniele v. United States, 740
Fed.Appx. 973, 977 (11th Cir. July 3, 2018) (quoting
Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263
(11th Cir. 1998)) (“. . . pro se
‘pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than
pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be
liberally construed.'”).
The
Personal Representative first argues that the dispute over
his residency and representation could not be resolved
without sworn testimony; therefore, the Court erred when it
denied his motion for discovery (doc. 38, p.
1).[1]
The Personal Representative references his earlier argument
that he filed the complaint in his individual capacity as
David Leach, a citizen of Ohio, [2] not as Personal
Representative, and Defendants' arguments to the
contrary. In the motions to dismiss, the Defendants argued
that the Personal Representative, by federal law, is deemed
to be a citizen of the state of the deceased, which in this
case is Alabama. Since the Defendants were also citizens of
Alabama, the Court lacked diversity jurisdiction. In an
attempt to remain in this Court, the Personal Representative
responded that he filed the complaint in his individual
capacity, and since he is a citizen of Ohio, the Court had
diversity jurisdiction.
However,
the Court did not need sworn testimony. The complaint is
styled “Estate of Henry S. Lockett, Personal
Representative-David Leach, Plaintiff” and identifies
the “Plaintiff's Name and Address” as
“Estate of Henry Lockett” and Robertsdale,
Alabama (doc. 1, p. 1-2). The complaint also states that
Leach, the “Plaintiff's Representative is from
Ohio” (Id., p. 2). Importantly, Leach signed
the complaint in his capacity as Personal Representative
(Id., p. 10) and filed it with this Court.
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. Thus, the Personal
Representative has not shown that the Court erred by not
allowing discovery, i.e., a sworn affidavit.
In
Issue Two, [3] the Personal Representative argues that
“[o]nce Plaintiff stated that Plaintiff only
represented Plaintiff that should be taken as truth, Defence
could have objected. Defence did not object. Furthermore, the
court could have objected. The court did not object”
(doc. 38, p. 2). He argues that the “issue of
Representation was over and the Court should hear no more
about it.” (Id.)[4] The Personal Representative
appears to argue that when he objected (doc. 30) to the
Report and Recommendation and explained[5] that Leach was
the Plaintiff and not the Estate of Henry Lockett, the Court
erred by adopting the Report and Recommendation instead of
accepting his objection as the truth. The Court finds no
error in its decision to reject the objection to the Report
and Recommendation. As required by 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1), the Court made a de novo determination of the
parts of the report and recommendation to which objections
were made, and found no error in the decision that the Estate
of Henry Lockett was the Plaintiff in this action.
Issue
Three is captioned “residency” (doc. 38, p. 2).
The Personal Representative argues that he “clearly
stated” that Leach “was a resident of Ohio”
(doc. 38, p. 2). The parties did not dispute the fact that
Leach in his individual capacity was a resident of Ohio. This
issue has already been litigated and the Personal
Representative may not use a motion for reconsideration to
“relitigate old matters.” Jupiter Wreck,
Inc., 762 Fed.Appx. at 852.
Issue
four is captioned “Denial of Amended Complaint, Rule
15” (doc. 38, p. 2). The Personal Representative argues
that the Court “clearly errored in not granting the
Amended Complaint” (sic) (doc. 38, p. 2). In
support, he asserts that he believed his argument in response
to the motions to dismiss was sufficient, [6] but to proceed to
trial in this Court he would need to amend the complaint. He
argues that the Court erred because the “statute
clearly states a Judge should grant an Amended
Complaint” and that it was “not unusual and well
within the courts power” to grant a motion to amend.
(Id.)
The
Personal Representative correctly states that district courts
may grant motions to amend the complaint. However, the Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that the
district courts “may deny leave to amend a complaint if
it concludes that the proposed amendment would be futile,
meaning that the amended complaint would not survive a motion
to dismiss.” Christman v. Walsh, 416 Fed.Appx.
841, 844 (11th Cir. 2011). The Court denied the motion on
that basis. The Court explained that if the Personal
Representative amended the complaint to name David Leach in
his individual capacity as the Plaintiff, the complaint would
be subject to dismissal because Leach in his individual
capacity cannot enforce claims on behalf of the Estate of
Henry S. Lockett to recover assets that were taken from
Lockett before he died (doc. 35).[7] Therefore, the Personal
Representative has failed to show that the Court committed an
error of law or fact or should correct a manifest injustice.
As the
fifth issue, the Personal Representative argues, in one
sentence, that “Every case should be decided on the
merits and facts” (doc. 38, p. 2). This conclusory
statement does not show an error of law or fact. Moreover,
and importantly, cases must be decided by courts that have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the parties'
dispute. Since this Court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction, it could not decide the case on the merits and
the facts.
As the
sixth issue, the Personal Representative points out that
Defendant Regions Bank raised only procedural defenses, with
no defenses against the allegations of misconduct by its
employees. He states that these “side bets on procedure
have nothing to do with the fact that [Regions] Banks
employees carried on a deceptive personal attack on”
him (doc. 38, p. 3). The Personal Representative incorrectly
states that Defendant Regions Bank raised only procedural
defenses. In addition to the argument that this Court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1),
Regions Bank also argued that the complaint against it was
due to be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (doc. 11,
p. 6-9).
The
Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court grant Regions
Bank's Rule 12(b)(1) motion and dismiss the complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction (doc. 26). Thus, the
Magistrate Judge properly determined that the Court did not
have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the claims made
by the Estate of Henry Lockett. Since this Court did not have
subject matter jurisdiction, it could not decide the Rule
12(b)(6) motion, and therefore did not ...