United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Eastern Division
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
GRAY
M. BORDEN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I.
INTRODUCTION
This 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action is pending on a complaint filed by
Larry Moore, an inmate incarcerated at the Chambers County
Detention Facility (“CCDF”) in LaFayette,
Alabama. Moore complains that Defendant Jimmy Hunt subjected
him to excessive force on November 7, 2016. Moore also
complains that Defendant Hunt acted negligently regarding his
welfare and safety on November 30, 2016. Moore seeks monetary
damages for the alleged violations of his constitutional
rights. Doc. 1 at 2-4.
Defendant
Hunt filed an answer, special report, and supporting
evidentiary materials addressing the claims in the complaint.
In these documents Hunt denies he acted in violation of
Moore's constitutional rights and argues this case is due
to be dismissed because Moore failed to exhaust the
administrative remedy available to him at the CCCDF for
addressing his claims. Doc. 19 at 8-10.
Upon
receipt of Defendant Hunt's special report, the court
issued an order providing Moore an opportunity to file a
response. This order directed Moore to address Defendant
Hunt's arguments that: “(i) Plaintiff's claims
are due to be dismissed because he failed to exhaust his
available administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
[(“PLRA”) prior to filing this federal civil
action] . . .; and (ii) [t]he claims contained in the
complaint fail to establish a violation of his constitutional
rights by Defendant.” Doc. 20 at 1-2 (footnote
omitted). The order also advised Moore that his response
should be supported by affidavits or statements made under
penalty of perjury and/or appropriate other evidentiary
materials. Doc. 20 at 3. The order further cautioned Moore
that unless “sufficient legal cause” is shown
within ten days of entry of this order “why such action
should not be undertaken, . . . the court may at any time
[after expiration of the time for his filing a response] and
without further notice to the parties (1) treat the special
report and any supporting evidentiary materials as a motion
to dismiss or motion for summary judgment, whichever is
appropriate, and (2) after considering any response as
allowed by this order, rule on the motion in accordance with
the law.” Doc. 20 at 3-4 (footnote omitted). Moore has
not filed a response to Hunt's report.
Pursuant
to the aforementioned order, the court deems it appropriate
to treat the report filed by Hunt as a motion to dismiss
regarding the exhaustion defense. This case, therefore, is
now pending on Hunt's motion to dismiss. See Bryant
v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1374-75 (11th Cir. 2008)
(“[A]n exhaustion defense . . . is not ordinarily the
proper subject for a summary judgment [motion]; instead, it
should be raised in a motion to dismiss, or be treated as
such if raised in a motion for summary judgment.”);
Trias v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 587 Fed.Appx. 531,
534 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that the district court
properly construed Defendant's “motion for summary
judgment as a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies”).
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In addressing the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e
exhaustion, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that [t]he
plain language of th[is] statute makes exhaustion a
precondition to filing an action in federal court. This means
that until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted, a prisoner is precluded from filing suit in
federal court.
Leal v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1279
(11th Cir. 2001) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Furthermore, “the question of exhaustion under the PLRA
[is] a ‘threshold matter' that [federal courts
must] address before considering the merits of the case,
” and that cannot be waived. Myles v. Miami-Dade
Cnty. Corr. & Rehab. Dep't, 476 Fed.Appx. 364,
366 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Chandler v. Crosby,
379 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004)).
When deciding whether a prisoner has exhausted his remedies,
the court should first consider the plaintiff's and the
defendants' versions of the facts, and if they conflict,
take the plaintiff's version of the facts as true. If in
that light, the defendant is entitled to have the complaint
dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, it
must be dismissed. If the complaint is not subject to
dismissal at this step, then the court should make specific
findings in order to resolve the disputed factual issues
related to exhaustion.
Myles, 476 Fed.Appx. at 366 (citations and internal
quotations omitted). Consequently, a district court
“may resolve disputed factual issues where necessary to
the disposition of a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust
[without a hearing]. The judge properly may consider facts
outside of the pleadings to resolve a factual dispute as to
exhaustion where doing so does not decide the merits, and the
parties have a sufficient opportunity to develop the
record.” Trias, 587 Fed.Appx. at 535. Based on
the foregoing, the Eleventh Circuit has rejected an
inmate-plaintiff's argument that “disputed facts as
to exhaustion should be decided” only after a trial
either before a jury or judge. Id. at 534.
III.
DISCUSSION
Moore
complains that Defendant Hunt subjected him to excessive
force on November 7, 2016, when Hunt maced him without
provocation while his hands were cuffed behind his back.
Moore further complains that Hunt acted negligently in
response to Moore's statement that he “felt he
would kill [him]self” by responding that if Moore felt
like killing himself to “make sure he d[id] it
right.” Doc. 1 at 2. Hunt denies these allegations and
also asserts that this case is subject to dismissal because
Moore failed to exhaust the administrative remedy provided to
him at the CCDF prior to filing suit, as required by the
PLRA.
The
PLRA compels proper exhaustion of available administrative
remedies before a prisoner can seek relief in federal court
on a § 1983 complaint. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a) states that “[n]o action shall be brought with
respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this
title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in
any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.” As the Supreme Court has observed,
“Congress has provided in § 1997(e)(a) that an
inmate must exhaust irrespective of the forms of relief
sought and offered through administrative remedies.”
Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001).
“[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all
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