United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
GRAY
M. BORDEN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff
Terrance Reaser, an inmate in the custody of the Alabama
Department of Corrections, files this pro se civil
rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges a claim
of excessive force in violation of his Eighth Amendment
rights during his incarceration at the Easterling
Correctional Facility in Clio, Alabama.[2] The complaint is
filed against Sgt. Mitchell Borders, Lieutenant Larry Peavy,
and Correctional Officer Munchie Keeton. Reaser requests
relief for the violation of his constitutional rights and for
pain and suffering. Doc. 1.
Defendants
filed an answer, special report, and supporting evidentiary
materials addressing Reaser's claims for relief. Docs. 11
& 12. In these filings, Defendants deny they acted in
violation of Reaser's constitutional rights. Docs. 11
& 12. Upon receipt of Defendants' special report, the
court issued an order directing Reaser to file a response,
including sworn affidavits and other evidentiary materials,
and specifically cautioning Reaser “the court may at
any time thereafter and without notice to the parties (1)
treat the special report and any supporting evidentiary
materials as a motion for summary judgment.” Doc. 13.
Reaser responded to Defendants' special report,
see Doc. 16, but his response does not demonstrate
there is any genuine issue of material fact. See
Doc. 13 at 2. The court will treat Defendants' report as
a motion for summary judgment and resolve this motion in
their favor.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Summary
judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine
[dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d
1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)
(“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”). The party moving for summary judgment
“always bears the initial responsibility of informing
the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of the [record, including
pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine [dispute] of
material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by
presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of
material fact or by showing the non-moving party has failed
to present evidence to support some element on which it bears
the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-24.
Defendants
have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated the
absence of any genuine dispute of material fact. Thus, the
burden shifts to Reaser to establish, with appropriate
evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute
material to the case exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at
324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to
properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly
address another party's assertion of fact [by citing to
materials in the record including affidavits, relevant
documents or other materials], the court may . . . grant
summary judgment if the motion and supporting
materials-including the facts considered undisputed-show that
the movant is entitled to it . . . .”); see also
Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098
(11th Cir. 2014) (holding that the court should consider
facts pled in a plaintiff's sworn complaint when
considering summary judgment). A genuine dispute of material
fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that
would allow a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict in
its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263. The evidence
must be admissible at trial, and if the nonmoving party's
evidence “is merely colorable . . . or is not
significantly probative . . . summary judgment may be
granted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). For this reason,
a “mere ‘scintilla' of evidence supporting
the opposing party's position will not suffice.”
Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir.
1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). Only
disputes involving material facts are relevant, and
materiality is determined by the substantive law applicable
to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
To
demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the party
opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply
show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead
a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party,
there is no ‘genuine [dispute] for trial.'”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “The evidence of the
non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences
are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 255; see also United States v. Stein, 881
F.3d 853 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that a plaintiff's
self-serving and uncorroborated, but not conclusory,
statements in an affidavit or deposition may create an issue
of material fact which precludes summary judgment);
Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244,
1253 (11th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted) (“To be sure,
[plaintiff's] sworn statements are self-serving, but that
alone does not permit us to disregard them at the summary
judgment stage. . . . ‘Courts routinely and properly
deny summary judgment on the basis of a party's sworn
testimony even though it is self-serving.'”).
“Conclusory, uncorroborated allegations by a plaintiff
in an affidavit or deposition will not create an issue of
fact for trial sufficient to defeat a well-supported summary
judgment motion.” Solliday v. F. Officers, 413
Fed.Appx. 206, 207 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Earley v.
Champion Int'l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir.
1990)); see also Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555,
1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that conclusory
allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise
insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact).
Although
factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable
to the nonmoving party and pro se complaints are
entitled to liberal interpretation by the court, a pro
se litigant does not escape the burden of sufficiently
establishing a genuine dispute of material fact. See
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 525 (2006); Brown v.
Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, a
plaintiff's pro se status alone does not mandate
that the court disregard elementary principles of production
and proof in a civil case. Here, Reaser fails to demonstrate
a genuine dispute of material fact to preclude summary
judgment on his claims against Defendants.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Absolute Immunity
To the
extent Reaser sues Defendants in their individual and
official capacities, they are entitled to absolute immunity
from monetary damages in an official capacity suit. Official
capacity lawsuits are “in all respects other than name,
. . . treated as a suit against the entity.”
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985).
“A state official may not be sued in his official
capacity unless the state has waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity, or Congress has abrogated the state's immunity.
Alabama has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, and
Congress has not abrogated Alabama's immunity. Therefore,
Alabama state officials are immune from claims brought
against them in their official capacities.”
Lancaster v. Monroe Cnty., 116 F.3d 1419, 1429 (11th
Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
In
light of the foregoing, Defendants are state actors entitled
to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for claims
seeking monetary damages from them in their official
capacities. Id.; Jackson v. Ga. Dep't of
Transp., 16 F.3d 1573, 1575 (11th Cir. 1994).
B.
Qualified Immunity
In
response to Reaser's allegations, Defendants argue that
they are entitled to qualified immunity against suits in
their individual capacities. Qualified immunity offers
complete protection from civil damages for government
officials sued in their individual capacities if their
conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739
(2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818 (1982)). Qualified immunity is not merely a defense
against liability but rather immunity from suit, and the
Supreme Court “repeatedly [has] stressed the importance
of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible
stage in litigation.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009) (quotation marks and citations
omitted). To receive qualified immunity, the public official
must first prove he was acting within the scope of his
discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts
occurred. Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th
Cir. 2002). The record shows Defendants were acting within
the course and scope of their discretionary authority at the
time of the events giving rise to Reaser's claims. Reaser
must, therefore, allege facts that, when read in a light most
favorable to him, show that Defendants are not entitled to
qualified immunity. Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352,
1358 (11th Cir. 2003).
To
satisfy his burden, a plaintiff must show two things: (1)
that a defendant committed a constitutional violation and (2)
that the constitutional right a defendant violated was
“clearly established.” Crosby v. Monroe
Cnty., 394 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004). “To
be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear
that every reasonable official would [have understood] that
what he is doing violates that right. In other words,
existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.” Reichle v.
Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). “Clearly established law”
means (1) “a materially similar case has already been
decided”; (2) “a broader, clearly established
principle that should control the novel facts of the
situation”; or (3) “the conduct involved in the
case may so obviously violate the constitution that prior
case law is unnecessary.” Gaines v. Wardynski,
871 F.3d 1203, 1208-09 (11th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). The controlling authority is from
“the United States Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit,
or the highest court in the relevant state.” See
id. at 1209. “Qualified immunity gives government
officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken
judgments, and protects all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law.” Messerschmidt
v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (quotation marks
and citations omitted). A per se rule that qualified
immunity is inappropriate on summary judgment where a
plaintiff has not presented evidence that could sustain an
Eighth Amendment excessive force claim would eviscerate the
plaintiff's burden of proof to show a constitutional
violation once a defendant evokes qualified immunity and turn
Rule 56 on its head.[3] See Hope, 536 U.S. at 736;
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (holding
that a plaintiff bears the burden of showing that a
constitutional violation occurred to defeat a defendant's
assertion of qualified immunity); see also Celotex,
477 U.S. at 323-24; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Skelly v. Okaloosa
Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 456 Fed.Appx. 845,
847-48 (11th Cir. 2012) (engaging in a qualified immunity
analysis on Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment excessive force
claims and distinguishing between a plaintiff's burden to
show a constitutional violation in the first instance from
the fact that, once a violation is demonstrated, the Eighth
Amendment right always is clearly established).
The
Eleventh Circuit “has stated many times that if case
law, in factual terms, has not staked out a bright line,
qualified immunity almost always protects the
defendant.” Gaines, 871 F.3d at 1210.
“Exact factual identity with the previously decided
case is not required, but the unlawfulness of the conduct
must be apparent from pre-existing law.” Coffin v.
Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1013 (11th Cir. 2011). If a
plaintiff cannot establish both elements to satisfy his
burden, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity,
and the court may analyze the elements “in whatever
order is deemed most appropriate for the case.”
Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 839 (11th Cir. 2010)
(citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 241-42).
1.
Summary Judgment Facts ...