United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Southern Division
RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
WALLACE CAPEL, JR. CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff,
a pro se party, has filed a Complaint (Doc. 1)
alleging breach of contract by Defendant. The District Judge
has referred this matter to the undersigned United States
Magistrate Judge for consideration and disposition or
recommendation on all pretrial matters as may be appropriate.
See Doc. 4. On May 9, 2019, the undersigned entered
an Order granting Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed
In Forma Pauperis and staying the case for an
obligatory review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1915(e). Doc. 9.
Although
this case is stayed, in Paragraph 22 of the Complaint,
Plaintiff “seeks a [p]reliminary [i]njunction which
orders defendant not to [r]epossess the Dodge Ram while these
matters are pending before the court.” The Court has
construed this request as a Motion for Preliminary Injunction
(see Dkt. Entry dated 02/08/19), and the undersigned
will address it herein. Upon consideration of Plaintiff's
motion and applicable case law, the undersigned RECOMMENDS
that Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction be
DENIED, as set forth below.
I.
Plaintiff's Factual Allegations
Plaintiff
allegedly entered into a contingency agreement with Defendant
in connection with the publishing of a book to be written by
Defendant. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 7-9. Pursuant to the alleged
agreement, the parties purchased two automobiles from the Kia
dealership in Dothan, Alabama, specifically, a 2016 Dodge Ram
1500 and a 2015 BMW X1 SUV, so Plaintiff could provide
transportation services to defendant to attend social,
religious, and business functions whenever requested by
Defendant. Id. ¶¶ 12-14. Plaintiff claims
the parties agreed that the vehicles would be purchased in
Defendant's name, but Plaintiff would pay the down
payments and be responsible for tags, insurance, and monthly
car notes. Id. ¶ 13. According to Plaintiff,
several months after the purchase of the vehicles, Defendant
said she was “being contacted by someone at the finance
companies (who held the notes to said vehicles) saying the
monthly car-notes were delinquent” and that Defendant
then “breached the [parties'] contract by having
the BMW voluntarily repossessed to Kia Motors Finance.”
Id. ¶¶ 17-18. Plaintiff now seeks a
preliminary injunction that “orders defendant not to
[r]epossess the Dodge Ram while these matters are pending
before the court.”[1] Id. ¶¶ 21-22.
II.
The Court Cannot Enjoin a Non-Party
Although
the undersigned is not entirely sure what Plaintiff means by
alleging that Defendant, as opposed to the finance
company, “voluntarily re-possessed” the BMW after
the monthly payments were delinquent, it is clear from the
Complaint that Kia Motors Finance, not the Defendant, took
the BMW. Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiff has not adequately
explained in his Complaint how the Defendant allegedly
controlled whether the finance company repossessed the BMW or
how she could control any future repossession of the Dodge
Ram truck. That is a matter to be handled by the finance
company based on whether payments are made in accordance with
the vehicle loan. Plaintiff, then, is essentially asking this
Court to prevent Kia Motors Finance - or possibly some other
unnamed finance company, since Plaintiff's Complaint is
unclear - from repossessing the Dodge Ram 1500.
However,
a court may only enjoin parties before the court. E.A.
Renfroe & Co. v. Moran, 338 Fed.Appx. 836, 838-39
(11th Cir. 2009). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d),
which governs injunctive relief, explicitly states that
orders granting injunctive relief are only binding on
“parties” to an action. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 65(d); see also Infant Formula Antitrust Litig., MDL
878 v. Abbott Lab., 72 F.3d 842, 842-43 (11th Cir. 1995)
(court lacks jurisdiction to issue preliminary or permanent
injunction against non-party); Additive Controls &
Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 96 F.3d 1390,
1394 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating that courts of equity
“have long observed the general rule that a court may
not enter an injunction against a person who has not been
made a party to the case before it”). Because the
finance company that loaned money for the purchase of the
Dodge RAM 1500 truck is not a party to this lawsuit, this
Court is without jurisdiction to enter an injunction against
it.
III.
Plaintiff Cannot Establish the Requirement of Irreparable
Harm
Even
if jurisdiction were not an issue, Plaintiff's request
for a preliminary injunction would still warrant denial. To
prevail on a motion for a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff
must show: “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on
the merits of the underlying case, (2) the movant will suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction, (3) the
harm suffered by the movant in the absence of an injunction
would exceed the harm suffered by the opposing party if the
injunction issued, and (4) an injunction would not disserve
the public interest.” North Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom
Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1217 (11th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. 1-800
Contacts, Inc., 299 F.3d 1242, 1246-47 (11th Cir.
2002)). A failure to show any of the four factors is fatal,
and a court need not consider the remaining conditions
precedent to injunctive relief if a movant is unable to
establish one of the factors. Car Fin. Servs., Inc. v.
Lambert, No. 18-CV-303-KD, 2018 WL 6431893, at *2 (S.D.
Ala. July 11, 2018); see also Am. Civ. Liberties Union of
Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cty. Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 1177,
1198 (11th Cir. 2009)) and Johnson & Johnson,
299 F.3d at 1247.
“A
showing of irreparable harm is ‘the sine qua
non of injunctive relief.' ... An injury is
‘irreparable' only if it cannot be undone through
monetary remedies. ‘The key word in this consideration
is irreparable. Mere injuries, however substantial,
in terms of money, time and energy necessarily expended in
the absence of a stay, are not enough. The possibility that
adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be
available at a later date, in the ordinary course of
litigation, weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable
harm.'” Car Fin. Servs., 2018 WL 6431893,
at *2 (quoting Nw. Fla. Chapter of Ass'n of Gen.
Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 896
F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original)).
In this
case, Plaintiff has not even alleged that he will suffer
specific irreparable harm. He asks for “specific
performance” or, alternatively, $100, 000.00 in
compensatory damages and $100, 000.00 in punitive damages;
thus, Plaintiff acknowledges that money damages will
compensate him for any injuries resulting from
Defendant's alleged breach of contract. Accordingly, the
Plaintiff has failed to establish that his alleged injuries
cannot be undone through money damages and that he will
suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction issues.
IV.
Conclusion
For the
reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends that
Plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction be
DENIED. It is further ORDERED that the parties shall file any
objections to this Recommendation on or before June
3, 2019. A party must specifically identify the
factual findings and legal conclusions in the Recommendation
to which objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or general
objections will not be considered. Failure to file written
objections to the Magistrate Judge's findings and
recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) will bar a
party from a de novo determination by the District
Court of legal and factual issues covered in the
Recommendation and waives the right of the party to challenge
on appeal the District Court's order based on
unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions accepted ...