United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
W.
KEITH WATKINS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)
brought this action for judicial enforcement of an
administrative subpoena it issued to Joon, LLC, d/b/a Ajin
USA (“Ajin”). The subpoena pertains to the
EEOC's investigation into a third-party charge of
employment discrimination filed against Ajin. In response,
Ajin moved to quash the subpoena. (Doc. # 9.) Before the
court is the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation that the
district court issue the subpoena but narrow its scope. Ajin
filed objections to the Recommendation. (Doc. # 23.) It
argues that the EEOC lacked authority to issue the subpoena
on grounds that the underlying third-party charge is untimely
and not based on personal knowledge. (Doc. # 52.)
Having
conducted a de novo review of those portions of the
Recommendation to which objection is made, 28 U.S.C. §
636(b), the court will overrule the objections, adopt the
Recommendation as modified, and deny Ajin's motion to
quash. Accordingly, the EEOC's application for an order
directing Ajin to comply with the subpoena and for costs will
be granted.
I.
JURISDICTION
The
EEOC may apply to the district court in the jurisdiction
where it is investigating for an order to compel production
of subpoenaed information. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-9 (incorporating by reference 29 U.S.C. § 161(2)).
This court has jurisdiction because Ajin is located in this
district.
II.
BACKGROUND
Simon
Gang's third-party charge is the catalyst for the
EEOC's investigation of Ajin's employment practices
pertaining to its internship program. A brief background on
Gang's employment with Ajin and his EEOC filings is
helpful to provide context to the issues under consideration.
Gang is a former employee of Ajin, which is an automotive
body parts manufacturer located in Cusseta, Alabama. He
contends that Ajin made his work conditions so intolerable
that he had to resign. He resigned on March 26, 2015, and
filed an EEOC charge against Ajin, alleging that it
constructively discharged him based on his national origin
(“first-party charge”).
This
subpoena enforcement proceeding is not about Gang's
first-party charge. It is about the EEOC charge Gang filed on
August 8, 2016, five hundred and two days after his
resignation. Namely, on this date, Gang filed a charge, not
as an aggrieved person, but on behalf of other Korean
employees of Ajin (“third-party charge” or
“charge”).[1] In his third-party charge, Gang contends
that, during his employment with Ajin, he also
“witnessed [A]in's] disparate treatment of Korean
employees.” (Doc. # 1-1, at 6.) He asserts that Ajin
subjected Korean interns to various forms of national origin
discrimination, that they tolerated the discrimination
“in hopes for immigration status sponsorship, ”
and that “he believes these practices continue.”
(Doc. # 1-1, at 6.)
Gang
filed his charge using the form provided by the EEOC
(“EEOC Form 5”). The EEOC Form 5 includes a block
that requires claimants to include the earliest and latest
dates on which the discrimination took place. In this block,
Gang indicates that the discrimination took place beginning
on March 3, 2016, and continued until July 28, 2016, in
violation of “the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended.” (Doc. #1-1, at 5.) He also checked the box
for a “continuing violation.” (Doc. # 1-1, at 5.)
Gang signed the third-party charge under penalty of perjury
and dated it. (Doc. # 1-1, at 6.)
In its
investigation of Gang's third-party charge, the EEOC
issued a subpoena to Ajin to produce documents pertaining to
Ajin's internship program. The subpoena sought
information about Ajin's practices for recruiting and
hiring interns from Korea and requested documentation as to
the interns' identities, job assignments, pay, and living
arrangements. (Doc. # 1-1, at 18-20); see also 29
U.S.C. § 161(1) (permitting the EEOC to issue
“subp[o]enas requiring the attendance and testimony of
witnesses or the production of any evidence”). After
the EEOC rejected Ajin's petition to revoke the subpoena,
Ajin still refused to comply with it. (Doc. # 1-1, at 24-40.)
Hence, the EEOC brought this action asking the court to issue
an order enforcing the subpoena pursuant to § 161(2).
In the
Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge concludes that the EEOC
has authority to issue the subpoena because, contrary to
Ajin's position, Gang's third-party charge is timely
on its face and any “perceived deficiency in the
verification of Gang's charge may be cured during the
course of the EEOC's investigation.” (Doc. # 22, at
3-7.) But the Magistrate Judge imposed temporal limitations
and narrowed the scope of documents that Ajin must produce.
(Doc. # 22, at 7-12.) Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge
recommends enforcement of the EEOC subpoena, as modified, and
the denial of Ajin's motion to quash. Ajin objects.
III.
DISCUSSION
Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of “race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a). Title VII “entrusts the enforcement of that
prohibition to the EEOC.” McLane Co. v.
E.E.O.C., 137 S.Ct. 1159, 1164 (2017) (citation
omitted). The EEOC's “responsibilities are
triggered by the filing of a specific sworn charge of
discrimination.” McLane Co., 137 S.Ct. at 1164
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). An EEOC
charge can be filed “by or on behalf of”
aggrieved parties who have suffered employment discrimination
prohibited by Title VII. § 2000e- 5(b). “When it
receives a charge, the EEOC must first notify the employer
and must then investigate to determine whether there is
reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true.”
McLane Co., 137 S.Ct. at 1164 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); see also § 2000e-5(b)
(providing that, “[w]henever a charge is filed, ”
the EEOC “shall make an investigation thereof”).
“The
EEOC's authority to investigate under Title VII is quite
broad.” E.E.O.C. v. Tempel Steel Co., 814 F.2d
482, 485 (7th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). The EEOC
“shall” have access to “any evidence”
of any person under investigation “that relates to
unlawful employment practices . . . and is relevant to the
charge under investigation.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-8(a). To aid its investigation, the EEOC has “the
authority to issue administrative subpoenas and to request
judicial enforcement of those subpoenas” against
non-complying employers. E.E.O.C. v. Shell Oil Co.,
466 U.S. 54, 63 (1984) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9);
see also § 161(1).
A
subpoena enforcement proceeding is “designed to be
summary in nature.” Tempel Steel, 814 F.2d at
485. A court should “not . . . encourage or allow an
employer to turn a summary subpoena-enforcement proceeding
into a mini-trial by allowing it to interpose defenses that
are more properly addressed at trial.” E.E.O.C. v.
Dillon Cos., 310 F.3d 1271, 1277 (10th Cir. 2002).
Hence, “[a] district court's role in a proceeding
to enforce an administrative subpoena is limited.”
U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Tire Kingdom, Inc., 80 F.3d 449,
450 (11th Cir. 1996);see also E.E.O.C. v. KlosterCruise Ltd., 939 F.2d 920, 922 (11th Cir. 1991)
(“It is well-settled that the role of a district court
in a proceeding to enforce an administrative subpoena is
sharply limited.”). “The court may inquire into
(1) whether the ...