United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
KATHERINE P. NELSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
This
action is before the Court on the motion for attorney fees
under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412
(“EAJA”) (Doc. 29) filed by the Plaintiff, Donna
Marie Wilson (hereinafter, “the Plaintiff”),
which requests an award of $5, 138.72 in attorney fees from
the Defendant Commissioner of Social Security (“the
Commissioner”). Prior to the deadline for the
Commissioner to file a response (see Doc. 30), the
parties submitted a joint filing “stipulat[ing] that
Defendant will pay Plaintiff $3, 539.12 in attorney's
fees in full satisfaction of all claims arising under the
Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C §
2412.” (Doc. 31). Upon consideration, the Court finds
the Plaintiff's motion (Doc. 29) is due to be
GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part, such that the Plaintiff will be awarded
attorney fees under EAJA in the amount to which the parties
have stipulated.[1]
I.
Analysis
“The
EAJA provides that the district court ‘shall award to
the prevailing party other than the United States fees and
other expenses ... incurred by that party in any civil action
(other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings
for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against
the United States ..., unless the court finds that the
position of the United States was substantially justified or
that special circumstances make an award unjust.' ”
Newsome v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 775, 777 (11th Cir. 1993)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)-(B)) (footnotes
omitted). “Thus, eligibility for a fee award in any
civil action requires: (1) that the claimant be a
‘prevailing party'; (2) that the Government's
position was not ‘substantially justified'; (3)
that no ‘special circumstances make an award
unjust'; and, (4) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(1)(B), that any fee application be submitted to the
court within 30 days of final judgment in the action and be
supported by an itemized statement.” Comm'r,
I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 158 (1990).
a.
Timeliness
EAJA
“provides that a ‘party seeking an award of fees
and other expenses shall, within thirty days of final
judgment in the action, submit to the court an application
for fees and other expenses....” 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(1)(B) (1982). It is settled that a ‘final
judgment' means that the judgment is final and not
appealable. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(G).” United
States v. J.H.T., Inc., 872 F.2d 373, 375 (11th Cir.
1989). Where, as here, “the district court enters a
‘sentence four' remand order[ under 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g)], that judgment is appealable.”
Newsome, 8 F.3d at 778. “[W]hen a remand was
pursuant to sentence four, the 30-day filing period for
applications for EAJA fees ‘begins after the final
judgment (‘affirming, modifying, or reversing') is
entered by the [district] court and the appeal period has
run, so that the judgment is no longer appealable.'
” Id. (quoting Melkonyan v. Sullivan,
501 U.S. 89, 102 (1991)).
Here,
final judgment was entered on January 30, 2019 (see
Doc. 28), and no appeal was taken from that judgment. Because
a United States officer sued in an official capacity is a
party to this action, the time to appeal expired after
Monday, April 1, 2019 - 60 days from the date of entry of
final judgment, excluding the date of entry, and the last day
of the 60 day period because it fell on a Sunday.
See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B)(iii); Fed. R. App. P.
26(a)(1)(A) & (C). Because the Plaintiff filed and served
the present motion within 30 days of that date, on April 26,
2019, the motion is timely.[2]
b.
Prevailing Party
An
individual qualifies as a “party” under §
2414(d)(1)(A) if the individual's “net worth did
not exceed $2, 000, 000 at the time the civil action was
filed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B). Based on the
Plaintiff's unchallenged assertion that she “did
not have a net worth of two million dollars at the time this
civil action was commenced” (Doc. 29 at 3, ¶ 13),
the Court finds that the Plaintiff qualifies as a
“party” for purposes of EAJA. And because the
Plaintiff received a remand of a final decision of the
Commissioner under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(see Doc. 27), the Plaintiff is a
“prevailing” party under EAJA. See Shalala v.
Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993); Newsome,
8 F.3d at 777 (“Courts have routinely awarded EAJA
attorney's fees to claimants in Social Security cases who
satisfy the statutory conditions.”); Myers v.
Sullivan, 916 F.2d 659, 666 (11th Cir. 1990)
(“Since the EAJA's enactment, the vast majority of
EAJA awards have gone to claimants who succeeded in
challenging contrary benefits decisions made by the Secretary
of Health and Human Services.”).
c.
Substantially Justified Position or Special
Circumstances
An EAJA
applicant is only required to allege that the
Government's position was “not substantially
justified.” Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S.
401, 414-15 (2004). See also 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(1)(B) (a motion for EAJA fees and expenses must
“allege that the position of the United States was not
substantially justified”). “Whether or not the
position of the United States was substantially justified
shall be determined on the basis of the record (including the
record with respect to the action or failure to act by the
agency upon which the civil action is based) which is made in
the civil action for which fees and other expenses are
sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). “The
government's position is substantially justified under
the EAJA when it is justified to a degree that would satisfy
a reasonable person-i.e. when it has a reasonable basis in
both law and fact.” United States v. Jones,
125 F.3d 1418, 1425 (11th Cir. 1997) (citations and
quotations omitted). “The burden of establishing that
the position of the United States was substantially
justified…must be shouldered by the Government.”
Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 414-15.
As
required, the Plaintiff has alleged in the present motion
that “the Defendant's position was not
substantially justified.” (Doc. 29 at 3, ¶ 12).
The Commissioner has not attempted to rebut that allegation,
and there are no special circumstances apparent from the
record which countenance against the awarding of fees. Thus,
the Court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to an award
under EAJA.
d.
Amount of Fees
The
“fees and other expenses” that a prevailing party
is entitled to receive under § 2412(d)(1)(A)
“includes…reasonable attorney
fees…” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). As noted
in the parties' joint stipulation, the Plaintiff agrees
to a total EAJA award of $3, 539.12 in attorney fees for 25.7
hours of federal court work performed by Plaintiff's
counsel, ...