United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Eastern Division
WILLIAM B. LEONARD, #317 373, Plaintiff,
v.
DEPUTY SHERIFF S. PARKER, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER [1]
CHARLES S. COODY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff,
William Leonard, an inmate incarcerated at the Russell County
Detention Center in Phenix City, Alabama, when he initiated
this pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action,
[2]
brings suit against Defendant Stephon Parker for an alleged
use of excessive force which occurred at the Russell County
Courthouse.[3] Leonard names as the defendant Stephon
Parker, a Deputy Sheriff with the Russell County
Sheriff's Department. For relief, Leonard requests
damages and that Parker be reprimanded or fired. Doc. 1.
Parker
filed a special report and supporting evidentiary materials
addressing Leonard's claims for relief. In these
documents, Parker denies he acted in violation of
Leonard's constitutional rights. Parker further argue
this case is due to be dismissed because prior to filing this
cause of action Leonard failed to properly exhaust the
administrative remedy available to him at the Russell County
Jail regarding the claims presented in the complaint. Doc. 12
at 6-8. Parker bases his exhaustion defense on Leonard's
failure to follow the available required administrative
procedures at the Russell County Jail regarding the claims
presented. Id.
The
court provided Leonard an opportunity to file a response to
Parker's special report in which he was advised, among
other things, to address Parker's argument that “he
failed to fully exhaust his administrative remedies available
at the Russell County Jail as required by 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”).” Doc. 12 at 1 (footnote omitted).
The order advised Leonard his response should be supported by
affidavits or statements made under penalty of perjury and
other evidentiary materials. Id. at 3. This order
further cautioned Leonard that unless “sufficient legal
cause” is shown within fifteen days of entry of this
order “why such action should not be undertaken, . . .
the court may at any time [after expiration of the time for
his filing a response to this order] and without further
notice to the parties (1) treat the special report and any
supporting evidentiary materials as a [dispositive] motion .
. . and (2) after considering any response as allowed by this
order, rule on the motion in accordance with the law.”
Id. at 3-4. Leonard has filed no response to the
order within the time allowed by the court.
Pursuant
to the February 15, 2019, order, the court deems it
appropriate to treat the report filed by Parker as a motion
to dismiss regarding the exhaustion defense and resolve this
motion in his favor. Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368,
1374-1375 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted)
(“[A]n exhaustion defense ... is not ordinarily the
proper subject for a summary judgment [motion]; instead, it
should be raised in a motion to dismiss, or be treated as
such if raised in a motion for summary judgment.”);
see also Trias v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, 587
Fed. App'x 531, 534 (11th Cir. 2014) (District court
properly construed defendant's “motion for summary
judgment as a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies....”).
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In
addressing the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e about
exhaustion, the Eleventh Circuit has
recognized that [t]he plain language of th[is] statute makes
exhaustion a precondition to filing an action in federal
court. This means that until such administrative remedies as
are available are exhausted, a prisoner is precluded from
filing suit in federal court.
Leal v. Georgia Dept. of Corrs., 254 F.3d 1276, 1279
(11th Cir. 2001) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Furthermore, the law is well-settled that “the question
of exhaustion under the PLRA [is] a ‘threshold
matter' that [federal courts must] address before
considering the merits of the case, ” and that cannot
be waived. Myles v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Corr. & Rehab.
Dept., 476 Fed.Appx. 364, 366 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir.
2004)).
When deciding whether a prisoner has exhausted his remedies,
the court should first consider the Leonard's and the
defendants' versions of the facts, and if they conflict,
take the Leonard's version of the facts as true. If in
that light, the defendant is entitled to have the complaint
dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, it
must be dismissed. If the complaint is not subject to
dismissal at this step, then the court should make specific
findings in order to resolve the disputed factual issues
related to exhaustion.
Myles, 476 Fed. App'x at 366 (citations and
internal quotations omitted). Consequently, a district court
“may resolve disputed factual issues where necessary to
the disposition of a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust
[without a hearing]. The judge properly may consider facts
outside of the pleadings to resolve a factual dispute as to
exhaustion where doing so does not decide the merits, and the
parties have a sufficient opportunity to develop the
record.” Trias, 587 Fed.Appx. at 535. Based on
the foregoing, the Eleventh Circuit has rejected an
inmate-Plaintiff's argument that “disputed facts as
to exhaustion should be decided” only after a trial
either before a jury or judge. Id. at 534.
II.
DISCUSSION
Leonard,
an inmate previously confined at the Russell County Jail,
alleges Parker subjected him to excessive force during a
court appearance in the Russell County Courthouse. Parker
denies Leonard's allegations and maintains this case is
subject to dismissal because Leonard failed to exhaust the
administrative remedy provided at the Russell County Jail
prior to filing this complaint as required by the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). As
explained, federal law directs this court to treat
Parker's response as a motion to dismiss for failure to
exhaust an administrative remedy and allows the court to look
beyond the pleadings to relevant evidentiary materials in
deciding the issue of proper exhaustion. Bryant, 530
F.3d at 1375.
The
Prison Litigation Reform Act compels exhaustion of available
administrative remedies before a prisoner can seek relief in
federal court on a § 1983 complaint. Specifically, 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a) states that “[n]o action shall
be brought with respect to prison conditions under section
1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility
until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.” “Congress has provided in §
1997(e)(a) that an inmate must exhaust irrespective of the
forms of relief sought and offered through administrative
remedies.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741
n.6 (2001). “[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement
applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they
involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and
whether they allege excessive force or some other
wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532
(2002). “The PLRA strengthened [the exhaustion]
provision [applicable to inmate complaints] in several ways.
Exhaustion is no longer left to the discretion of the
district court, but is mandatory. Prisoners must now exhaust
all ‘available' ...