United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
TERRY
F. MOORER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Pending
before the Court is the Defendant's Motion to Review
and Reverse Detention Order (Doc. 13, filed 3/18/19) and
the Government's Response to Defendant's Motion
to Review and Reverse Detention Order (Doc. 17, filed
3/26/19). The Court held a hearing on the matter on May 6,
2019. At the hearing, the Court DENIED the
Defendant's motion (Doc. 13) and
AFFIRMED the decision of the Magistrate
Judge. This memorandum opinion states the basis for that
decision.
I.
Procedural Background
On
January 8, 2019, the grand jury returned an indictment
against Defendant for allegations of possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon (Count 1) and violations of the
controlled substance act (Count 2). See Doc. 1.
After Defendant's arrest, the Government timely moved to
detain Defendant due to the nature of the charge against him
and the flight risk he posed. See Doc. 4. On March
6, 2019, the Magistrate Judge conducted a pretrial detention
hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) and after
considering the evidence presented, ordered that Defendant be
detained pending his criminal trial. See Docs. 10,
12, 14.
In
addition to the testimony, proffers, and arguments made at
the hearing, the Magistrate Judge considered the pretrial
services report prepared by the United States Probation
Office. The pretrial services report was made part of the
record at the hearing. The Magistrate Judge found that there
are no conditions or combination of conditions which would
reasonably assure the defendant's presence at trial and
the safety of the community pending trial. See Docs.
12, 14.
On
March 18, 2019, the Defendant appealed the magistrate
judge's order. See Doc. 13. The hearing was
transcribed and the United States responded on March 26,
2019. See Docs. 14, 16. A defendant whom the
magistrate judge has ordered detained pending trial may move
the court with original jurisdiction over the offense to
revoke or amend the order of detention. 18 U.S.C. §
3145(b). The Court held another hearing, at which it heard
additional testimony from Jeffrey Iomio, Terrence Marshall,
Patrion Brown, Patrion Austin, and Robert Head.
II.
Decision and Analysis
The
Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150,
governs the release or detention of a defendant pending
trial. “Section 3142(e) accords the judicial officer
substantial latitude in determining whether pretrial
detention is appropriate.” United States v.
King, 849 F.2d 485, 487 (11th Cir. 1988). A finding that
a defendant poses a flight risk or is a danger to another
person or the community requires his detention pending trial.
18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1).
The
undersigned independently examined the proceedings before the
Magistrate Judge, including the transcript of the detention
hearing and the pretrial services report, as well as the
post-detention arguments and evidence presented at the second
hearing.
Having
conducted this de novo review, the Court also finds
that the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)
clearly warrant Defendant's detention. § 3142(g)(1)
requires the Court to consider “the nature and
circumstances of the offense[s] charged.” Taunton is
charged with offense involving controlled substances and
firearms. More importantly, the Court takes very seriously
the possibility that if Taunton is in possession of a gun
when he becomes explosively angry, grave consequences would
likely ensue. In light of the circumstances presented, the
charges weigh significantly in favor of detention.
Next,
under §3142(g)(2), the Court considers the weight of the
evidence against the Defendant. As he is a felon (as noted
extensively in the pretrial services report) and in
possession of a firearm at the time of the incident and
attempted to dump the weapon (that was retrieved) as noted in
the testimony presented that the detention hearing, it
appears (at first blush) that he is guilty of at least one
count of the indictment. Even by Defense's own witness
(Taunton's then and current girlfriend), testimony
established that after an altercation, she heard a loud pop
indicative of the firing of a gun. Therefore, this factor
also weighs in favor of detention.
Third,
§ 3142(g)(3) requires the Court to consider “the
person's character, physical and mental condition, family
ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in
the community, community ties, past conduct, history relating
to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record
concerning appearance at court proceedings.” Taunton
has an extensive history of violence including threatening
family members by brandishing a weapon when becoming angry.
He also has a history of attempts to flee police when pursued
- including damage to property and endangering person during
the attempts.
This
brings the Court to the fourth requirement of §
3142(g)(4) which states “the nature and seriousness of
the danger to any person or the community that would be posed
by the person's release.” Though Taunton's
girlfriend (and alleged victim in the underlying allegation)
has reconciled with the Defendant and wishes for him to
return home, the Court cannot overlook that when Taunton gets
angry, he takes it out on his family members or those close
to him - as demonstrated by his criminal history. Together
the third and fourth factors also weigh heavily in favor of
continued detention.
While
the Defense notes about the gap in his criminal history and
attempts to paint March 2018 as some sort of aberration, the
Court cannot overlook the similarities to his prior crimes.
Additionally, Defense counsel notes the Defendant surrendered
to the Marshals when informed about the instant arrest
warrant. While commendable, it does not negate a number ...