United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ABDUL
K. KALLON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Antonio
Jones filed this lawsuit against Savage Services Corporation
(“SSC”) alleging race discrimination, harassment,
hostile work environment, and retaliation claims under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2, and Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Doc. 1. Before the court is
SSC's motion to dismiss Jones' complaint due to
circumstances implicating the equitable principles of
judicial estoppel and subject matter
jurisdiction.[1] Doc. 24. The motion to dismiss is fully
briefed and ripe for review, docs. 24 and 26, and is due to
be granted in part.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes a motion to
dismiss based on the defense that the court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Rule
12(b)(1) motions come in two forms-facial, where the inquiry
is confined to the allegations in the complaint, or factual,
where the court is permitted to look beyond the complaint to
extrinsic evidence. Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d
1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). When deciding a factual
challenge, the court may hear conflicting evidence and decide
the factual issues that bear on jurisdiction. Colonial
Pipeline Co. v. Collins, 921 F.2d 1237, 1243 (11th Cir.
1991). In other words, “when a defendant properly
[raises a factual] challenge[ ] [to] subject matter
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) ... ‘no presumptive
truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the
existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the
trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of the
jurisdictional issue.'” Morrison v. Amway
Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 925 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529). “In the face of a
factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, the burden
is on the plaintiff to prove that jurisdiction exists.”
OSI, Inc. v. United States, 285 F.3d 947, 951 (11th
Cir. 2002).
However,
the court “should only rely on Rule 12(b)(1)
‘[i]f the facts necessary to sustain jurisdiction do
not implicate the merits of plaintiff's cause of
action.'” Morrison, 323 F.3d at 925
(quoting Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs.,
104 F.3d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir. 1997)). Instead, “[w]hen
the jurisdictional basis of a claim is intertwined with the
merits, the district court should apply a Rule 56 summary
judgment standard when ruling on a motion to dismiss which
asserts a factual attack on subject matter
jurisdiction.” Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1530.
This approach is designed “‘to allow
jurisdictional dismissals only in those cases where the
federal claim is clearly immaterial or
insubstantial.'” Garcia, 104 F.3d at 1261
(quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 416
(5th Cir. 1981)). Thus, “it is extremely difficult to
dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
” at least when the jurisdictional challenge is
intertwined with the substantive merits of the action.
Id. at 1260. Here, SSC's motion relies on
evidence outside the pleadings, and the court construes its
jurisdictional challenge as factual.
II.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Jones,
who is African American, has worked since June 2012 at SSC.
Doc. 1 at 3. His workplace trainer Randy Brisco, who is
white, allegedly made disparaging comments about African
American churches and conveyed his preference for hiring
white applicants. Id. at 4. Jones complained about
these comments to his General Manager apparently to no avail.
Id. at 5. In June 2015, after Russ Shinert became
the new General Manager, Jones again complained about Brisco
and attempted unsuccessfully to contact SSC's corporate
office after Shinert took no action. Id. That same
month, SSC instructed Jones to sign a “responsibilities
duties form” following a complaint by Brisco that Jones
was purportedly leaving trucks without fuel. Id. at
6. Roughly a month later, SSC discharged Jones for
“stealing time.” Id. at 7-8. Jones
disputes this allegation, contending that Brisco, who is
responsible for time cards, never raised any issues about
time entries with Jones. Id. Jones subsequently
filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Doc. 1 at 3.
Nearly
a year after filing his EEOC charge, Jones filed a Chapter 13
Voluntary Petition. Doc. 24-1. In response to the required
disclosure of assets, liabilities, and creditors, Jones
declared under the penalty of perjury that he was not a party
in any lawsuit, court action, or administrative proceeding
and that he had no claims against third parties, including
lawsuits, employment disputes, or rights to suits. Doc. 24-1
at 14, 32. Approximately a year after the bankruptcy filing,
the EEOC issued Jones a notice of right to sue, and Jones
filed this lawsuit on the day after the bankruptcy court
confirmed his Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan.[2]Docs. 1; 24-2 at
12.
III.
ANALYSIS
SSC
raises two arguments in support of dismissal: (1) that Jones
is judicially estopped from pursuing this lawsuit in light of
his failure to disclose it as an asset in his bankruptcy
case, doc. 24 at 5-13, and (2) that Jones lacks judicial
standing because only his bankruptcy trustee can pursue legal
claims that are the property of the bankruptcy estate,
id. at 13-15. In response, Jones acknowledges his
failure to disclose and asks to amend his bankruptcy filings
to reflect his EEOC charge and this lawsuit. In lieu of
dismissal, Jones asks the court to allow him to amend the
complaint to include the trustee as a party plaintiff. Doc.
26 at 1-2. The court will address first the judicial estoppel
contention in Section A, followed by the jurisdictional issue
in Section B.
A.
Judicial Estoppel
The
doctrine of judicial estoppel “protect[s] the integrity
of the judicial process by prohibiting parties from changing
positions according to the exigencies of the moment.”
New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001).
“Judicial estoppel applies when (1) a party takes an
inconsistent position under oath in a separate proceeding,
and (2) the party's inconsistent positions were
‘calculated to make a mockery of the judicial
system.'” Silva v. Pro Transp., Inc., 898
F.3d 1335, 1339 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Slater v.
United States Steel Corp., 871 F.3d 1174, 1181 (11th
Cir. 2017)). A plaintiff takes an inconsistent position when
he “assert[s] in the civil lawsuit that he has a claim
against the defendant while denying under oath in the
bankruptcy proceeding that the claim exists.”
Id.
To
demonstrate Jones' inconsistent positions under oath, SSC
contends that Jones failed to disclose his EEOC charge in his
initial bankruptcy petition and also failed to amend his
financial statements to reflect this lawsuit as an additional
asset. Doc. 24 at 6-8. Indeed, the evidence indicates that
although Jones filed his EEOC charge before his bankruptcy
petition, he declared under the penalty of perjury in his
petition that he had no pending claims against third parties,
including administrative proceedings. Doc. 24-1 at 14, 32.
Thus, Jones violated his initial duty to disclose the pending
EEOC charge. See Barger v. City of Cartersville,
Ga., 348 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003), overruled
on other grounds by Slater, 871 F.3d at 1174 (citing 11
U.S.C. § 541(a)) (The “property of the bankruptcy
estate includes all potential causes of action that exist at
the time petitioner files for bankruptcy.”);
Casanova v. Pre Sols., Inc., 228 Fed.Appx.
837, 841 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that “pending EEOC
charges” constitute disclosable administrative
proceedings and “other contingent and unliquidated
claims.”).
Moreover,
Jones also had a continuing duty to amend his bankruptcy
filings. This duty does not “end once the forms are
submitted to the Bankruptcy Court; rather a debtor must amend
his financial statements if circumstances change.”
Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 595 F.3d 1269, 1276
(11th Cir. 2010) (holding that the doctrine of judicial
estoppel barred plaintiff's action because she failed to
disclose her workers compensation claim in the initial
bankruptcy petition and her subsequently filed discrimination
suit as a contingent asset). The record indicates that Jones
failed to amend his bankruptcy petition to disclose this
lawsuit as a legal or equitable interest in his bankruptcy
case, and Jones never explains why he failed to do so. Docs.
24-2; 26. See Robinson, 595 F.3d at 1274 (noting
that the continuing duty to disclose applies in both Chapter
13 and Chapter 7 bankruptcies alike due to the need for
complete and honest disclosures in all types of
bankruptcies). Because Jones signed his bankruptcy petition
...