United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Eastern Division
BENJAMIN SHANE FOSTER, Reg. No 12258-002, Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Gray
M. Borden, Judge
I.
INTRODUCTION
Benjamin
Shane Foster, a federal inmate incarcerated at Victorville
Medium II Federal Correctional Institution in Adelanto,
California, filed a pleading this court construed as a
petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2241. See Docs. 1 & 2. In his petition, Foster
appears to request that the Federal Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”) recalculate his federal sentence so that
he is granted credit for time served on his state
sentence.[1] Implicit in Foster's request is a
claim that the BOP has erred in failing to grant him this
credit, thereby delaying his release date.
II.
DISCUSSION
A
federal prisoner challenging the execution of his sentence
must do so through a petition for writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241. See, e.g., Antonelli v.
Warden, U.S.P. Atlanta, 542 F.3d 1348, 1351 (11th Cir.
2008). A district court has jurisdiction under § 2241
over a claim concerning the BOP's failure to consider
whether a prisoner is entitled to time credit because this is
a challenge to the manner in which the sentence is being
executed. See, e.g., United States v.
Williams, 425 F.3d 987, 990 (11th Cir. 2005); Bishop
v. Reno, 210 F.3d 1295, 1304 n.14 (11th Cir. 2005).
Where the BOP's calculation of an inmate's sentence
impacts the duration of that sentence, the decision may
properly be challenged in a § 2241 petition for habeas
corpus relief. Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478
(3d Cir. 1990).
As a
general rule, a § 2241 petition for habeas corpus relief
“may be brought only in the district court for the
district in which the inmate is incarcerated.”
Fernandez v. United States, 941 F.2d 1488,
1495 (11th Cir. 1991); Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of
Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1973) (“The writ of
habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks
relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged
to be unlawful custody.”).
The federal habeas statute straightforwardly provides that
the proper respondent to a habeas petition is “the
person who has custody over [the petitioner].” 28
U.S.C. § 2242; see also § 2243 (“The
writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the person
having custody of the person detained”). The consistent
use of the definite article in reference to the custodian
indicates that there is generally only one proper respondent
to a given prisoner's habeas petition. This custodian,
moreover, is “the person” with the ability to
produce the prisoner's body before the habeas court.
Ibid. We summed up the plain language of the habeas
statute over 100 years ago in this way: “[T]hese
provisions contemplate a proceeding against some person who
has the immediate custody of the party detained,
with the power to produce the body of such party before the
court or judge, that he may be liberated if no sufficient
reason is shown to the contrary.” In accord with the
statutory language and Wales' immediate
custodian rule, longstanding practice confirms that in habeas
challenges to present physical confinement-“core
challenges”-the default rule is that the proper
respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner
is being held[.]
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434-35 (2004)
(citations omitted).
Foster
is incarcerated at the Victorville Medium II Federal
Correctional Institution, which is located in the
jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the
Central District of California. See 28 U.S.C. §
84(c)(1). Because habeas petitions under § 2241 must be
brought in the district of incarceration, this court lacks
personal jurisdiction over Foster's petition.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a).
Under
28 U.S.C. § 1631, if a federal court finds it lacks
jurisdiction over a civil action, it may transfer the action
to any other such court in which the action could have been
brought “if it is in the interest of justice.”
The undersigned finds it in the interest of justice that this
case be transferred to the United States District Court for
the Central District of California for review and
determination.
III.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that this
case be transferred to the United States District Court for
the the Central District of California.
It is
further ORDERED that on or before May 22,
2019, Petitioner may file objections to the
Recommendation. Any objection must specifically identify the
findings in the Recommendation objected to. Frivolous,
conclusive or general objections will not be considered by
the District Court. Petitioner is advised that this
Recommendation is not a final order of the court; therefore,
it is not appealable. Failure to file written objections to
the proposed findings and recommendations in the Magistrate
Judge's report shall bar Petitioner from a de
novo determination by the District Court of factual
findings and legal issues covered in the report and shall
“waive the right to challenge on appeal the District
Court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal
conclusions” except upon grounds of ...