United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Middle Division
K. KALLON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
May brings this action pursuant to Section 405(g) of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review
of the Administrative Law Judge's denial of disability
insurance benefits, which has become the final decision of
the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(“SSA”). For the reasons explained below, the
court affirms the decision.
worked previously as a sales representative, telephone
solicitor, and waitress until she stopped working in 2012 due
to her alleged disability. R. 22, 56, 59, 81, 150. May filed
her application for disabled widow's benefits on May 26,
2015 asserting that she suffered from a disability beginning
on June 1, 2013, later amended to April 26, 2014, due to
scoliosis, stenosis, arthritis, bulging disk, lower back
problems, and hip problems. R. 75, 144, 149. After the SSA
denied her application, May requested a formal hearing before
an ALJ. R. 96, 106. Ultimately, the ALJ denied May's
request for disabled widow's benefits. Doc. 6-3 at 24.
The Appeals Council affirmed, rendering the ALJ's
decision the final decision of the Commissioner. R. 1. Having
exhausted her administrative remedies, May filed this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Doc. 8.
Standard of Review
federal district courts review the SSA's findings of fact
under the “substantial evidence” standard of
review. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c); Martin v.
Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). The
district court may not reconsider the facts, reevaluate the
evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner; instead, it must review the final decision as a
whole and determine if the decision is “reasonable and
supported by substantial evidence.” See
Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529 (citing Bloodsworth v.
Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)).
Substantial evidence falls somewhere between a scintilla and
a preponderance of evidence; “[i]t is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Id. (internal citations
omitted). If supported by substantial evidence, the court
must affirm the Commissioner's factual findings, even if
the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner.
determinations are the province of the ALJ. Moore v.
Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005). However,
“[t]he testimony of a treating physician must
ordinarily be given substantial or considerable weight unless
good cause is shown to the contrary, ” and the failure
of the Secretary “to specify what weight is given to a
treating physician's opinion and any reason for giving it
no weight” constitutes reversible error. MacGregor
v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986). Courts
have found good cause to discount a treating physician's
report when it is “not accompanied by objective medical
evidence, . . . wholly conclusory, ” or
“inconsistent with [the physician's] own medical
records.” Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436,
1440 (11th Cir. 1997); Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d
580, 583 (11th Cir. 1991). In contrast to the opinion of a
treating physician, “the opinion of a non-examining
physician is entitled to little weight if it is contrary to
the opinion of the claimant's treating physician.”
Broughton v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 960, 962 (11th Cir.
federal courts review the SSA's conclusions of law de
novo, see Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th
Cir.1987), and “[f]ailure to apply the correct legal
standards is grounds not for remand but, for reversal.”
Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988).
No. presumption attaches to either the ALJ's choice of
legal standard or to the ALJ's application of the correct
legal standard to the facts. Id.
reviewing courts have the power “to enter, upon the
pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming,
modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a
rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (emphasis added).
Statutory and Regulatory Framework
qualify for benefits as a disabled widow under the
Regulations of the Social Security Act, the claimant must
meet the definition of “disabled, ” and must
establish that she is at least 50 years of age and the widow
of a wage earner who died fully insured. Sullivan v.
Weinberger, 493 F.2d 855, 857 (5th Cir. 1974) (citations
omitted). The prescribed period of eligibility to receive
benefits as a disabled widow under the Social Security Act is
seven years from the month of the insured wage earner's
death. Id. Hill v. Berryhill, No.
5:16-CV-597-VEH, 2017 WL 3315364, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 3,
individual applying for DIB bears the burden of proving that
she is disabled. Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211. To
qualify, a claimant must show “the inability to engage
in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) and
416(i)(I)(A). A physical or mental impairment is “an
impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities which are demonstrated by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).
of disability under the Act requires a five step analysis. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520. Specifically, the ...