United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division
ORDER AND AMENDED REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RUSS WALKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
that the court's report and recommendation dated May 6,
2019 (Doc. 10) is VACATED, and the court issues the following
amended report and recommendation.
Willie Henry Pitts, proceeding pro se, initiated
this lawsuit on June 14, 2017, by the filing of a civil
rights complaint against multiple prison facilities for
alleged constitutional violations during the time of his
incarceration. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff filed an application
to proceed in district court without prepaying costs and
fees. (Doc. 2). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915,
any court of the United States may authorize the
commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or
proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without
prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who
submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets
such [person] possesses that the person is unable to pay such
fees or give security therefor. Such affidavit shall state
the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant's
belief that the person is entitled to redress.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The court granted plaintiff
in forma pauperis status, and directed that he file
an amended complaint that “establishes this court's
subject matter jurisdiction, demonstrates the propriety of
venue in this judicial district, and sets out allegations of
fact and legal claims in a manner that is consistent with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and especially Rules 8, 9,
10 and 11, as applicable.” (Doc. 8 at 3). The court
further directed that the amended complaint must include: (1)
the specific constitutional or statutorily protected rights
that allegedly were violated by defendant's actions, (2)
each defendant's specific actions resulting in such
alleged violations, and (3) the relevant dates of all such
actions.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff filed an amended
complaint. (Doc. 9). Upon its review of the amended
complaint, the court finds that plaintiff's amended
complaint is due to be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). In relevant part, § 1915(e) provides:
“the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the
court determines that … the action or appeal …
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted
… .” 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii).
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards govern [a
court's] review of dismissals under section
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)[.]” Mitchell v. Farcass, 112
F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). See also Jones v.
Brown, 649 Fed.Appx. 889, 890 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing
Mitchell, supra) (“We review the
district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim
for which relief may be granted pursuant to §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) de novo, applying the same
standards that govern Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).”). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the
must view the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, accepting all of the plaintiff's well-pleaded
facts as true. Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez,
480 F.3d 1043, 1056-57 (11th Cir. 2007). Pro se
pleadings are liberally construed and held to a less
stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys.
Powell v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir.
1990). However, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, the
plaintiff's complaint must contain facts sufficient to
support a plausible claim to relief. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Id. This court has reviewed plaintiff's amended
complaint in light of the foregoing principles.
amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that he was sentenced to
prison for 22 years for attempted murder. (Doc. 9 at 1). He
claims that he did not do all that they said he did.
Id. He says he was put in the electric chair for
something he did not do, and paid a price he did not deserve.
Id. at 2. He is suing for $999, 99, 999, 000, 000,
nearly a quadrillion dollars. Id. at 1-2. He states
that he is suing everybody for everything they did to him.
Id. at 2. He lists multiple Alabama state prisons in
which he alleges he was incarcerated over 27 years.
Id. at 3.
amended complaint, plaintiff fails to name any individual in
his lawsuit, or give any factual detail of what was
purportedly done to him. On the back of the envelope in which
he mailed his complaint, he states that one of his sentences
was for three months, but he was incarcerated for five years.
Id. at 5. He does not include this allegation in his
pleading, nor does he identify which sentence, when it
occurred, or where it occurred. He states that he is suing
for alleged unspecified wrongs during his time of
incarceration between 1994 and 2013 and possibly for years
after 2013. Id. at 2.
his initial complaint, most of Plaintiff's amended
complaint is rambling and unintelligible. Moreover, the
plaintiff names only prison facilities as defendants.
However, a state correctional facility is merely a building
which is not a legal entity, see Dean v. Barber, 951
F.2d 1210, 1214 (11thCir. 1992), nor “a
‘person' within the meaning of § 1983[,
]”and, therefore, is not subject to suit or liability
in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. As to the plaintiff's
identification of 2013 as the date on which the alleged
violation(s) of his constitutional rights last occurred, any
claims for relief presented by the plaintiff arising from
actions which occurred on or before June 14, 2015 (two years
prior to the filing of the initial complaint) are barred by
the two-year period of limitations applicable to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 actions filed in this court. Owens v.
Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989) (The proper statute
of limitations for § 1983 suits is the forum state's
general or residual statute of limitations for personal
injury actions.); McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168,
1173 (11th Cir. 2008) (“All constitutional claims
brought under § 1983 are tort actions, subject to the
statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in
the state where the §1983 action has been brought.);
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275-76 (1985). The
plaintiff's claim was brought in Alabama where the
governing limitations period is two years. See Ala.
Code § 6-2-38; Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin,
876 F.2d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc). Therefore, in
order to have his claims heard, plaintiff was required to
file his lawsuit within two years from the date the
limitations period began to run. Thus, those claims Pitts
seeks to present regarding actions that occurred before June
14, 2015, are barred by the applicable two-year period of
the statute of limitations is raised as an affirmative
defense. However, when a plaintiff proceeds in forma
pauperis in a civil action, the court may sua
sponte consider affirmative defenses that are apparent
from the face of the complaint. Clark v. Ga. Pardons
& Parole Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 640 n.2 (11th Cir.
1990); see also Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438 (5th Cir.
1990). “[I]f the district court sees that an
affirmative defense would defeat the action, a section
1915[(e)(2)(B)(i)] dismissal is allowed.”
Clark, 915 F.2d at 640. “The expiration of the
statute of limitations is an affirmative defense the
existence of which warrants dismissal as frivolous.”
Id. at n.2.
makes a vague reference to violations occurring
“possibly for years after 2013, ” see
Id. at 2, but such an allegation is too nebulous to
establish a valid claim. Also, even if the court were
inclined to consider plaintiff's vague reference to
alleged wrongs occurring more recently than 2013 - and thus,
potentially within the statute of limitations - the amended
complaint still fails, as plaintiff's rambling and