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Shaper v. Forniss

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division

May 3, 2019

MATTHEW SHAPER, #298782, Plaintiff,
v.
LEON FORNISS, et al., Defendants.

          RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

          WALLACE CAPEL, JR. CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

         I. INTRODUCTION [1]

         This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is pending before the court on a complaint filed on May 23, 2016, by Matthew Shaper, an indigent state inmate, challenging actions which occurred on December 8, 2015, at Elmore Correctional Facility. (Doc. 1 at p. 2). Later, he filed an amendment to his complaint challenging actions that took place on January 26, 2016, at Elmore Correctional Facility. (Doc. 6 at p. 2). Specifically, Shaper alleges that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference when they failed to protect him from an attack by black inmates on December 8, 2015, and thereafter delayed his access to medical treatment until December 14, 2015, when a medical body chart was performed. (Doc. 1 at pp. 5-7). He also alleges that defendants retaliated against him for filing this § 1983 action when certain correctional officer defendants assisted inmates with breaking into his personal locker on January 26, 2016. (Doc. 6 at pp. 2-3). He further alleges that the defendants failed to investigate these events. (Doc. 1 at p. 7; Doc. 6 at p. 3). The named defendants are Warden Leon Forniss, the Alabama Department of Corrections, Sgt. Oliver, C.O. McDonald, C.O. Green, Lt. Burk, C.O. Rogers, C.O Lewis, Captain McKee, and Captain Smiley. Shaper seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief in this cause of action.

         The defendants filed a special report (Doc. 27, Exs. 1-10)[2] and a supplemental special report (Doc. 33, Exs. 1-8), which included relevant evidentiary materials in support of these reports, specifically, affidavits, prison documents, and medical records addressing the claims presented by Shaper. At the direction of the court, the defendants also filed additional affidavits. (Docs. 30, Ex. 1; 50, Exs. 1-5; 68, Exs. 1-3; 72, Exs. 1-2; 83, Exs. 1-3). In these documents, the defendants deny they acted with deliberate indifference to Shaper's safety or medical needs, deny they participated in the actions that form Plaintiff's retaliation claims, and deny they failed to investigate these events. At the direction of the court, the defendants also filed video recordings under seal solely for the court's in camera review. (Docs. 86, 88, 89, 90). These video exhibits include video of activities occurring in the dorm on January 26, 2016, (Doc. 90; Ex. 1) and video of the plaintiff in the shift office on December 8, 2015. (Doc. 90; Ex. 2). The court has reviewed these videos.

         After reviewing the special reports and exhibits, the court issued an order on February 17, 2017, requiring Shaper to file a response to the defendants' special reports, supported by affidavits or statements made under penalty of perjury and other evidentiary materials. These orders specifically cautioned that “unless within fifteen (15) days from the date of this order a party . . . presents sufficient legal cause why such action should not be undertaken . . . the court may at any time [after expiration of the time for the plaintiff filing a response to this order] and without further notice to the parties (1) treat the special reports and any supporting evidentiary materials as a motion for summary judgment and (2) after considering any response as allowed by this order, rule on the motion for summary judgment in accordance with the law.” (Doc. 52 at 2-3). Shaper filed a response to this order. (Doc. 60).

         Pursuant to the directives of the order entered on February 17, 2017, the court now treats the defendants' special report and supplements thereto as a motion for summary judgment and concludes that summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the defendants.

         II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

         “Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Rule 56(a), Fed.R.Civ. P. (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”).[3] The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine [now dispute] of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Williamson Oil Company, Inc. v. Phillip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1298 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that moving party bears the initial burden of establishing there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact); Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593 (11th Cir. 1995) (same). The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by demonstrating that the nonmoving party has failed to present appropriate evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24. The moving party discharges his burden by showing that the record lacks evidence to support the nonmoving party's case or that the nonmoving party would be unable to prove his case at trial. Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011).

         When the defendants meet their evidentiary burden, as they have in this case, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact by [citing to materials in the record including affidavits, relevant documents or other materials] the court may . . . grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials-including the facts considered undisputed-show that the movant is entitled to it.”). Once the moving party meets its burden, “the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits [or sworn statements], or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, ” demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute of material fact. Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 593-94 (internal quotation marks omitted). This court will also consider “specific facts” pled in a plaintiff's sworn complaint when considering his opposition to summary judgment. Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263; Allen v. Bd. of Public Education for Bibb County, 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007). In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts “must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord deference to the views of prison authorities. Unless a prisoner can point to sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him to prevail on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage.” Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006) (internal citation omitted).

         To proceed beyond the summary judgment stage, an inmate-plaintiff may not rest upon his pleadings but must produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence” that would be admissible at trial supporting each essential element of his claim. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative . . . summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. “A mere ‘scintilla' of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576- 77 (11th Cir. 1990) (internal citation omitted). Conclusory allegations based on a plaintiff's subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that grant of summary judgment is appropriate where inmate produces nothing beyond “his own conclusory allegations” challenging actions of the defendants); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Mere verification of party's own conclusory allegations is not sufficient to oppose summary judgment.”); Evers v. General Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[C]onclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value.”). Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts supported by requisite evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (“[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”); Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11th Cir. 1987) (If on any part of the prima facie case the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence to require submission of the case to the trier of fact, granting of summary judgment is appropriate.); Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding that summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine dispute of material fact exists). At the summary judgment stage, this court must “consider all evidence in the record . . . [including] pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, affidavits, etc. - and can only grant summary judgment if everything in the record demonstrates that no genuine [dispute] of material fact exists.” Strickland v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 692 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir. 2012).

         For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant. United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74th Avenue, Miami, Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “Only factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will preclude entry of summary judgment.” Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004). “The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case.” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). “[T]here must exist a conflict in substantial evidence to pose a jury question.” Hall v. Sunjoy Indus. Group, Inc., 764 F.Supp.2d 1297, 1301 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (citing Anderson, supra).

         To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine [dispute] for trial.'” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In cases where the evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can be reduced to admissible form indicates there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. A court may grant summary judgment where the pleadings, evidentiary materials, and affidavits before the court show there is no genuine dispute as to a requisite material fact. Id. To establish a genuine dispute of material fact, the nonmoving party must produce evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his favor. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001). “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

         Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation, a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine dispute of material fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525, 126 S.Ct. at 2576; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, Shaper's pro se status alone does not mandate this court's disregard of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case.

         The court has undertaken a thorough and exhaustive review of all the evidence contained in the record. After such review, the court finds that Shaper has failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact in order to preclude entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

         III. FACTS

         In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges that on December 8, 2015, he “was beaten and robbed at knife point in A-2 dormitory by several black inmates, and his personal locker box was looted during this robbery.” (Doc. 1 at p. 5). He further alleges that “[f]ollowing the plaintiff's being beaten and robbed . . . plaintiff immediately proceeded to the shift office and reported this incident.” (Doc. 1 at p. 6). He admits that a medical body chart was performed on December 14, 2015, but complains that was “6 days after this assault/armed robbery initially occurred.” (Doc. 1 at p. 7). He also claims that “[n]o efforts have been made by these defendants to apprehend or even investigate this incident.” (Doc. 1 at. p 7). The plaintiff includes no factual support for these statements other than his bare bones pleadings in the complaint.

         In his amendment to the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that on January 26, 2016, in A2 dorm “several black inmates . . . attempted to rob the plaintiff's locker-box by trying to kick the box off its rails and trying to break the lock.” (Doc. 6 at. p. 2). He further alleges that “Corr. Officers Rogers, Green, and Lewis witnessed these inmates attempting to break into the plaintiff's locker, and C.O. Rogers assisted these inmates by using his baton to break the lock off of the plaintiff's locker and allowed them to loot the plaintiff's property while C.O. Green and C.O. Lewis stood by and watched.” (Doc. 6 at p. 2). He claims that “the officer assisted robbery on January 26, 2016, was in retaliation for plaintiff's pending § 1983 filing . ” (Doc . 6 at p. 2) . Plaintiff also attached to the ...


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