United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION
T.
MICHAEL PUTNAM, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This
matter is before the court on the motions to dismiss
Plaintiff Buford Burks's (“Plaintiff” or
“Burks”) “Expanded Complaint, ” filed
by defendants Anthony Gardner (“Gardner”), Tommie
Campbell, Anne P. Luke, Daisybelle Thomas-Quinney, Julene
Delaine, Toby Fitch, and Johnny Patrick (collectively
“Defendants”) on February 19, 2019. (Docs. 16,
18). Plaintiff was given an opportunity to respond, but to
date, no response has been filed.
Defendants
are all employees or board members of the Sumter County Board
of Education.[1] They jointly argue that all claims against
them arising from the termination of Plaintiff's
employment are due to be dismissed. The parties have
consented to the exercise of dispositive jurisdiction by a
United States Magistrate Judge in accordance with 28 U.S.C.
§ 636. (Doc. 21). The court has considered all of the
arguments and enters the following memorandum opinion.
Procedural
History and Facts
Buford
Burks filed his initial complaint on November 15, 2018. (Doc.
1). He alleged several violations of law stemming from his
termination by the Sumter County Board of Education on
October, 16, 2018. Defendants filed a motion for more
definite statement on January 10, 2019, alleging that
Plaintiff's complaint did not contain a short, plain
statement of the facts giving rise to his claims. (Doc. 8).
The court convened a hearing on January 25, 2019. (Docs. 10,
13). At that hearing the court explained the pleading
requirements to the pro se plaintiff in great detail
and ordered him to file an amended complaint.
Plaintiff
filed an amended complaint (titled “Expanded
Complaint”) on February 4, 2019. Burks alleged that his
termination by the Board violated his rights under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family Medical Leave
Act, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act because
he was seeking treatment at the Tuscaloosa VA Hospital for a
mental disability at the time of his termination. He further
alleged that he had sick days that he was entitled to use for
his absence from work. Burks also alleged that the Board
entered into a contract with him to provide full pay and
benefits for 75 days after voting to terminate him but failed
to do so, constituting a breach of contract. Finally, Burks
alleged that he was denied substantive and procedural due
process rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution. The defendants filed the pending motions to
dismiss on February 19, 2019. Gardner filed a motion to
dismiss by himself and also joined in a motion to dismiss
filed with all of the other defendants.
Standard
of Review
On a
motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all of the
facts alleged in the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-51, 173 L.Ed.2d 868
(2009). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires only a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Liberal notice
pleading standards embodied in Rule 8(a) “do not
require that a plaintiff specifically plead every element of
a cause of action, ” Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. For
Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001), or set
out in precise detail the specific facts upon which she bases
her claim. The complaint must only “contain either
direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material
elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable
legal theory.” Id. (quoting In re Plywood
Antitrust Litigation, 655 F.2d 627, 641 (5th Cir. Unit A
Sept. 8, 1981)). The Supreme Court raised the threshold for a
sufficient pleading in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007)
(rejecting the standard from Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), that any
“conceivable” set of facts supporting relief is
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss). The threshold
of plausibility is met where the plaintiff “pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129
S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). To withstand
scrutiny under Rule 12(b)(6) a plaintiff must plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face, ” and that will thus
“nudge [his] claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. This
requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that the
principles set forth in Twombly and Iqbal
require the complaint to set forth sufficient facts to
“raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Speaker v. U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Servs. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
623 F.3d 1371, 1380 (11th Cir. 2010).
Because
the plaintiff is pro se, the court also is required
to liberally construe his pleading. See Alba v.
Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). This
creates an obvious tension with the Twombly/Iqbal
pleading standard, a tension the district courts have
struggled with. While pro se pleaders are given a
liberal reading, they still must comply with the rules of
procedure. Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829
(11th Cir. 2007). This means that, at the least, the pro
se pleading must allege facts that “raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.” Smith v.
Murphy, No. 2:16-CV-01251-MHH-TMP, 2016 WL 7974660, at
*1 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 1, 2016), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 2:16-CV-01251-MHH-TMP, 2017 WL 345571 (N.D. Ala.
Jan. 24, 2017) (quoting Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d
1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Discussion
Plaintiff
asserts five claims in his amended complaint: a violation of
the Americans with Disabilities Act, a violation of the
Family and Medical Leave Act, a violation of the Employee
Retirement Income and Security Act, a state law breach of
contract, and a violation of his procedural and substantive
due process rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. For
reasons that will be discussed under the appropriate
subheading, the defendants contend that all of the
plaintiff's claims against them are due to be dismissed.
A.
Facts Alleged in the Amended Complaint
The
court has assumed to be true the following facts alleged in
the amended complaint and the exhibits annexed to it.
On July
10, 2018, the Sumter County Board of Education
(“SCBE”) voted and approved hiring the plaintiff
as a Language Arts teacher for the 2018-2019 school year at
the Livingston Middle School. This was the first time the
plaintiff had been employed by the SCBE. By August 27, 2018,
dealing with rowdy eighth grade students caused the plaintiff
stress, and he sought treatment at the Veterans
Administration Hospital in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. On that day,
he wrote the following letter to Dr. Anthony Gardner, the
superintendent of the Sumter County schools:
I am a disabled veteran, and the challenging students at
Livingston Junior High have made me mentally and physically
exhausted. I have come close to grabbing them to force them
into line and into their seats. As a result, Saturday Aug.
25, 2018, I called the VA Mental Crisis line, and I am
seeking a medical approval to retire effective Nov. 16, 2018.
I will visit VA Hospital in Tuscaloosa Monday, August 27,
2018, to have my vital signs checked and VA Crisis Center
will contact me next week. I have 59 sick days to use until
Nov. 16, 2018. I can leave daily lessons, or Kelly Services
can allow substitute teacher to follow the curriculum. Please
have all other correspondence after Sept. 20, 2018 including
my first check before direct deposit starts sent to my home
address at 322 8th Terrace West Birmingham,
Alabama 35204.
In the
body of the amended complaint, the plaintiff alleges that, in
fact, he had 61 sick days available for use. Although he was
not present at the school, he sent lessons to the principal
to cover the days from August 27 to November 13, 2018.
On
September 14, 2018, the plaintiff was notified by letter from
Dr. Gardner that he would recommend the plaintiff's
termination at a meeting of the SCBE scheduled for October
16, 2018. The letter informed the plaintiff that he had the
right to submit a written statement as to why he should not
be terminated. On September 21, 2018, the plaintiff responded
to Dr. Gardner's letter with the following:
In reference to your letter dated Sept. 14, 2018, I ask that
you and the board accept my resignation effective Nov. 16,
2018 when my 61 sick leave days are exhausted. I am a
Disabled Veteran, and I was treated for mental stress Spring
1981 at Charleston Air Force Base South Carolina. The
recalcitrant students refusing to follow rules of not talking
as I taught, walk single-file and orderly in line, and
pressure from Principal Maye to get them in order had me
under such stress I nearly placed some in seats and in line.
As a result, I felt it best to seek treatment from
Veteran's Administration Hospital, use sick days, and
submit my resignation. I have sent Principal Maye a lesson
for each day through Nov. 16, 2018. Due to the mitigating
circumstances please[2]
Apparently
on that same day, the plaintiff wrote a second letter to Dr.
Gardner, as follows:
This is a follow up to the statement dated today for members
of the school board and you requesting you recommend
acceptance of my resignation as English teacher at Livingston
Junior High effective Nov. 16, 2018 due to mental stress
rather than recommending termination. I am a Disabled veteran
with a “Service-connected” disability, and I am
still in ...