United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Jasper Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION
MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
On
February 21, 2017, Mr. Haley filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus challenging his criminal conviction in the
Circuit Court of Walker County. (Doc. 1, pp. 28, 2). On March
17, 2017, the respondents answered Mr. Haley's petition
and argued that his petition is untimely under §
2244(d)(1) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (AEDPA). (Doc. 6). The magistrate judge assigned to this
case treated the respondents' submission as a motion for
summary judgment and gave Mr. Haley 20 days to respond. (Doc.
7, pp. 1, 2). Mr. Haley responded on April 6, 2017. (Doc. 8).
On
December 19, 2017, the magistrate judge recommended that the
Court deny Mr. Haley's petition. (Doc. 9, p. 7). The
magistrate judge gave Mr. Haley notice of the right to
object. (Doc. 9, pp. 7-8). Mr. Haley timely objected. (Doc.
10).
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A
district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole
or part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). When
a party objects to a report and recommendation, the district
court must “make a de novo determination of those
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made.”
Id. The Court reviews for plain error proposed
factual findings to which no objection is made, and the Court
reviews propositions of law de novo. Garvey v.
Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 779 n.9 (11th Cir. 1993); see
also United States v. Slay, 714 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th
Cir. 1983) (per curiam), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1050
(1984) (“The failure to object to the magistrate's
findings of fact prohibits an attack on appeal of the factual
findings adopted by the district court except on grounds of
plain error or manifest injustice.”) (internal citation
omitted); Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 Fed.Appx. 781,
784 (11th Cir. 2006).
II.
DISCUSSION
In his
petition, Mr. Haley challenges his murder conviction because
he contends that the state court lacked jurisdiction to
convict and sentence him. (Doc. 1). In recommending that the
Court deny Mr. Haley's request for relief, the magistrate
judge explained that Mr. Haley's one-year deadline to
file a § 2254 petition expired on March 17, 2001, and
that nothing tolled (i.e., suspended) the one-year deadline.
(Doc. 9, p. 5). The magistrate judge also discussed why the
Court could not provide habeas relief for the
respondents' alleged non-compliance with Alabama law
regardless of AEDPA's one-year deadline. (Doc. 9, p. 7).
In his
objections, Mr. Haley does not directly address the
magistrate judge's finding concerning the one-year
deadline under AEDPA, but Mr. Haley contends that his state
court judgment is void, and that a void judgment may be
challenged “in any court, by any person, at any
time.” (Doc. 10, p. 3); (see also Doc. 10, p.
4) (arguing that because the state court lacked jurisdiction
to act under state law, his § 2254 petition for habeas
relief “is properly before this court”). The
substance of Mr. Haley's objections presents a legal
theory that Mr. Haley did not raise before the magistrate
judge issued his report. In his habeas petition, Mr. Haley
asserts that he pleaded guilty to murder before he was
indicted. He states: “At no point during these thirteen
(13) days [between the date of his arrest and the date of
sentencing], was there any attempt or order issued for an
Information to be filed, and there never was an
indictment.” (Doc. 1, p. 14). In his habeas petition,
Mr. Haley argues that the 13-day period violated Alabama Code
§§ 15-15-21 and 15-15-22, sections that apply when
a defendant pleads guilty pursuant to an information. (Doc.
1).
In his
objections, Mr. Haley acknowledges that a grand jury returned
an indictment the day before he pleaded guilty and was
sentenced. Still, he argues that § 15-15-22 deprived the
state court of jurisdiction, rendering his conviction and
sentence void. (Doc. 10). Alabama law contradicts Mr.
Haley's assertion. In Long v. State, the Alabama
Court of Criminal Appeals held that § 15-15-22 does not
apply when a defendant pleads guilty after a grand jury
returns an indictment. 675 So.2d 532 (Ala.Crim.App.1996). The
Long Court stated: “Because the appellant was
charged by indictment instead of information, § 15-15-22
was not applicable, and the trial court had jurisdiction to
accept the appellant's guilty plea to the amended
charge.” 675 So.2d at 534.[1] Therefore, because a grand
jury returned an indictment the day before Mr. Haley pleaded
guilty and the state trial court sentenced him, the state
court did not convict and sentence Mr. Haley in the absence
of jurisdiction.
III.
CONCLUSION
The
Court has reviewed de novo those parts of the record
relating to Mr. Haley's objections as well as the
magistrate judge's report and recommendation. This Court
agrees with the magistrate judge that Mr. Haley's federal
habeas petition is untimely under AEDPA. The Court overrules
Mr. Haley's objection based on Ala. Code § 15-15-22
and finds that the state court had jurisdiction to accept his
guilty plea. Therefore, the Court denies Mr. Haley's
petition for writ of habeas corpus.
The
Court will enter a separate order consistent with this
opinion.
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