United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division
MARILYN B. NATASHA SATTERWHITE, Petitioner,
v.
DEIDRA WRIGHT, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
P.
BRADLEY MURRAY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Marilyn
B. Natasha Satterwhite, a state prisoner presently in the
custody of the respondent, has petitioned this Court for
federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2254. (Doc. 4). This matter has been referred to the
undersigned for the entry of a report and recommendation,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Rule 72 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and General Local Rule
72(a)(2)(R). Satterwhite challenges her convictions for
first-degree sodomy, pursuant to Alabama Code §
13A-6-63(a)(3), and first-degree sexual abuse of a child
under 12 years old, pursuant to Alabama Code §
13A-6-69.1. (Doc. 8-1 at pp. 130-133). Having carefully
reviewed the record, Satterwhite's petition,
Respondent's answer, Satterwhite's reply, and all
exhibits filed in this matter, the undersigned finds that
there are sufficient facts and information upon which the
issues under consideration may be properly resolved.
Therefore, no evidentiary hearing is required. Based upon the
undersigned's review, it is recommended that the instant
petition be denied for the reasons set forth below.
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Satterwhite
was convicted by a jury of first-degree sodomy, pursuant to
Alabama Code § 13A-6-63(a)(3), and first-degree sexual
abuse of a child under 12 years old, pursuant to Alabama Code
§ 13A-6-69.1, on June 23, 2014 in the Circuit Court of
Escambia County, Alabama, and was sentenced to concurrent
life sentences on August 13, 2014. (Doc. 8-1 at pp. 159-60).
During the course of the trial, Satterwhite moved for a
judgment of acquittal as to all counts at the close of the
State's case in chief, which was denied by the trial
judge. (Doc. 8-4 at pp. 126-53). Satterwhite did not raise or
mention any constitutional violation during the presentation
of her motion for acquittal. (Id.). At the close of
the defendant's case and at the close of all of the
evidence, Satterwhite again moved for a judgment of acquittal
as to all counts and again did not mention or argue any
constitutional violation. (Doc. 8-5 at pp. 23-25; 41). The
trial court granted the motion for acquittal as to counts one
and two. (Id. at p.84). Counts three and four were
presented to the jury for determination, and the jury found
Satterwhite guilty of sodomy first degree and guilty of
sexual abuse of a child under 12. (Id. at p. 150).
After the verdict was returned, Satterwhite moved for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the grounds that 1)
the evidence did not support a finding that all of the
alleged acts occurred in Escambia County, Alabama and,
therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction and 2) the
evidence did not support a finding that all of the alleged
acts occurred and, therefore, pursuant to the generic
evidence standard under which the State elected to proceed,
the evidence did not support the verdict. (Id. at
pp. 152). The trial court denied the motion finding that its
charges on these two matters were in compliance with Alabama
law. (Id.). Satterwhite did not raise or mention any
constitutional violation during the presentation of her
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Satterwhite
appealed her conviction to the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals, asserting the following claims: 1) the trial court
committed reversible error in failing to dismiss all charges
due to the state's failure to establish the court's
jurisdiction over said charges; 2) the trial court committed
reversible error in denying appellant's motions for
acquittal and motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict; 3) the trial court committed reversible error in
instructing the jury it could return with different verdicts
utilizing generic evidence; and 4) there was insufficient
evidence to sustain the guilty verdicts. (Doc. 8-6 at p. 3).
Satterwhite did not raise or mention any constitutional
violation in the brief she filed in support of her appeal to
the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. (Id. at pp.
1-54). Rather, she only argued state law claims;
specifically, that the evidence was insufficient to prove
jurisdiction beyond a reasonable doubt and to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that all of the acts alleged actually
occurred. (Id.). The Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed the convictions in an unpublished memorandum
opinion. See M.B.N.S. v. State, CR-13-1788, 222
So.2d 383 (table) (Ala. Cr. App. Dec. 18, 2015) (mem. op.)
(Doc. 8-8). The Court of Criminal Appeals held that
Satterwhite had waived each of these issues because she
failed to comply with Rule 28(a)(10) of the Alabama Rules of
Appellate Procedure. (Id.). Rule 28(a)(10) requires
appellants to support their arguments with citations to
specific cases (not just “general propositions of
law”), statutes, other authorities, and parts of the
record relied upon. (Id. at p. 3). In addition, the
appellate court found that evidence submitted to the jury
supported its jurisdictional determination, as well as its
findings on both the sodomy and sexual assault convictions,
and, therefore, affirmed for that reason as well.
(Id. at pp. 3-9).
Satterwhite
filed an application for rehearing on January 12, 2016, in
which she asserted the same claims as in her original brief
on appeal and again failed to raise, argue, or mention any
constitutional violation or any federal law issue. (Doc.
8-9). Her application for rehearing was overruled on January
22, 2016. (Doc. 8-10). She filed a petition for writ of
certiorari in the Alabama Supreme Court on February 5, 2016,
asserting that the decision of the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals “contravene[d] long standing Alabama Case
Law.” (Doc. 8-11 at p. 4). In her petition, she made
the same arguments as previously made with regard to the
jurisdiction issue; however, as to the “generic
evidence” issue; that is, whether the trial court's
finding that a prima facie case had not been made as to
counts one and two (soliciting an individual to engage in
deviate sexual intercourse with another individual) dictated
an acquittal on counts three (sodomy) and four (sexual abuse)
because the state proceeded with generic evidence, she
presented additional argument. (Doc. 8-11). Satterwhite
argued that, under her interpretation of the Alabama cases
discussing generic evidence, if the State proceeded with
generic evidence as to one count, it had to prove all of the
allegations supporting all four counts of the indictment had
occurred. (Id. at pp. 8-12). The State argued, and
the trial court and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
agreed, that the State only had to prove that all allegations
had occurred as to each count separately, not collectively.
(Id.).
In her
petition to the Alabama Supreme Court, Satterwhite argued,
for the first time, that “[t]he limited cases regarding
generic evidence, and their questionable interpretations,
unduly impairs a defendant's due process right to fair
notice of the charges against her, and a reasonable
opportunity to defend against those charges. A definitive
ruling pertaining to generic evidence is needed to insure the
safeguards of due process.” (Id. at p. 12). On
April 15, 2016, the Alabama Supreme Court denied the writ
with no opinion and entered a certificate of judgment. (Doc.
8-12).
Satterwhite
sought review in the United States Supreme Court, asserting
the first three issues she had presented to the Alabama Court
of Criminal Appeals and the Alabama Supreme Court. (Doc.
8-13). In her petition, she alleged that the constitutional
rights involved were the “Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Right and Right to a Fair and Impartial Trial, [sic] and
Fourteenth Amendment Right of Due Process and the Equal
Protection of the Law.” (Id. at p. 8). The
only explanation of how these rights were allegedly violated
was the following statement in the Conclusion section of
Satterwhite's brief: “The limited cases regarding
generic evidence, and their questionable interpretations,
unduly impairs a defendant's due process right to fair
notice of the charges against her, and a reasonable
opportunity to defend against those charges. A definitive
ruling pertaining to generic evidence is needed to insure
defendants are afforded the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment
right of confrontation and to a fair and impartial trial, and
the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and the equal
protection of the law.” (Id. at p. 24). Even
though Satterwhite was represented by counsel during all of
these proceedings, she did not cite a single case, federal or
otherwise, that supported her position that a constitutional
violation had occurred. On November 14, 2016, the United
States Supreme Court denied her petition for a writ of
certiorari. (Doc. 8-14).
Satterwhite
has not filed a Rule 32 petition in the state court. (Doc. 4
at p. 4). On July 3, 2017, Satterwhite filed the instant
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 1). This Court
ordered her to amend the petition to correct certain
deficiencies, and she filed an amended petition on July 27,
2017. (Doc. 4). Satterwhite asserts that she is being held in
prison “in violation of her Constitutional
rights” based upon the following claims: 1) the trial
court reversibly erred by failing to dismiss all charges
because the State failed to establish that the trial court
had jurisdiction over the charges; 2) the trial court
reversibly erred by denying her motions for acquittal and
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; 3) the trial
court reversibly erred when it instructed the jury that it
could return different verdicts on the two remaining counts
even though the State was proceeding under generic evidence;
and 4) there was insufficient evidence to sustain the guilty
verdicts. (Id. at p. 4). Respondent filed her answer
to the petition arguing that Satterwhite's petition is
due to be denied. (Doc. 8). Satterwhite filed a response to
the answer. (Doc. 10). As noted above, the Court finds that
it can resolve the issues presented here without an
evidentiary hearing, see supra at p.1. Therefore,
this matter is now ripe for decision.
II.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
“[I]t
is only noncompliance with federal law that renders
a State's criminal judgment susceptible to collateral
attack in the federal courts. The habeas statute
unambiguously provides that a federal court may issue the
writ to a state prisoner ‘only on the ground that he is
in custody in violation of the Constitution or law or
treaties of the United States.'” Wilson v.
Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
2254(a)). The Supreme Court has “repeatedly held that
‘federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors
of state law.'” Id. (quoting Estelle
v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)). “A state's
interpretation of its own laws or rules provides no basis for
federal habeas corpus relief, since no question of a
constitutional nature is involved.” McCullough v.
Singletary, 967 F.2d 530, 545 (11th Cir. 1992),
quoted in Alston v. Dep't of Corr., Fla., 610
F.3d 1318, 1326 (11th Cir. 2010).
“A
habeas petitioner is required to initially present his
federal claims to the state courts, and to exhaust all of the
procedures available in the state court system, before
seeking relief in federal court.” James v.
Culliver, Civ. A. No. CV-10-S-2929-S, 2014 WL 4926178,
at *5 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 30, 2014) (citing 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(1); Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 666
(2005) (holding that a petitioner “can seek federal
habeas relief only on claims that have been exhausted in
state court”)). The petitioner must “fairly
presen[t] federal claims to the state courts in order to give
the State the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged
violations of its prisoners' federal rights.”
Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). To satisfy this
requirement, state courts “must … be alerted to
the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the
United States Constitution.” Id. at 365-66.
For example, “[i]f a habeas petitioner wishes to claim
that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him
the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal court, but in
state court.” Id. at 366. The petitioner must
also present “his or her claims through one
‘complete round of the State's established
appellate review process.'” Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006) (quoting O'Sullivan
v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999)). “Federal
courts are not forums in which to relitigate state
trials.” Smith v. Newsome, 876 F.2d 1461, 1463
(11th Cir. 1989) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463
U.S. 880, 887 (1983)).
In
addition to the bar created by a failure to exhaust state
court remedies, a prisoner's claims can also be barred
from federal court review by the doctrine of procedural
default. A petitioner will be deemed to have procedurally
defaulted a claim if the petitioner “fails to initially
present a federal claim to the state courts at the time, and
in the manner, dictated by the state's procedural rules,
” and the state court thus decides “that the
claim is not entitled to review on its merits.”
James, 2014 WL 4926178, at *6. “Generally
speaking, if the last state court to examine a claim states,
clearly and explicitly, that the claim is barred because the
petitioner failed to follow state procedural rules,
and that procedural bar provides an
adequate and independent state ground for
denying relief, then federal review of the claim also is
precluded by the procedural default doctrine.”
Id. (emphasis in original).
If the
petitioner's claim has been properly brought before the
State courts and adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings, a writ may issue only if the adjudication
“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Jones v. Sec'y,
Dep't of Corr.,644 F.3d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 2011)
(stating that “under AEDPA, a federal court may not
grant habeas relief on a claim that has been considered and
rejected by a state court unless it is shown that the state
court's decision was ‘contrary to' federal law
then clearly established in the holdings of the United States
...