United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Middle Division
TAMERA JEAN PEACE, as Administrator of the Estate of Donald Ray Peace, Plaintiff,
v.
KEITH ROCK, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ANNEMARIE CARNEY AXON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This
case is before the court on Plaintiff Tamara Jean Peace's
motion for default judgment against Defendant Berkeley Scrap
Metal.[1] (Doc. 36). For the reasons explained
below, the court DENIES the motion
WITHOUT PREJUDICE to refiling at a later
date.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A
defaulting defendant “admits the plaintiff's
well-pleaded allegations of fact” for purposes of
liability. Buchanan v. Bowman, 820 F.2d 359, 361
(11th Cir. 1987) (quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, for
purposes of this motion for default judgment, the court takes
as true the well-pleaded allegations of Ms. Peace's
amended complaint.
On May
23, 2017, while traveling in St. Clair County, Alabama,
Donald Ray Peace and Defendant Keith Rock were involved in a
car accident that resulted in Mr. Peace's death. (Doc.
1-8 at 104). Defendants RDW Transport, LLC, Rock Trans, LLC,
“and/or” Berkeley Scrap Metal owned “the
tractor and/or trailer” that Mr. Rock was driving, and
Mr. Rock was “acting within the line and scope of his
employment and/or agency for Defendants RDW, Rock Trans
and/or Berkeley Scrap Metal.” (Id. at 105
¶¶ 11-13).
Ms.
Peace filed this lawsuit against Defendants, asserting state
law claims for negligence; wanton and reckless conduct;
negligent, reckless, and/or wanton violations of the rules of
the road; negligent entrustment; and uninsured/underinsured
motorist claims. (Doc. 1-8 at 108-114). All of the defendants
except Berkeley Scrap Metal have appeared and are actively
defending this action. Berkeley Scrap Metal, however, has not
appeared, and on July 9, 2018, the Clerk entered default
against it. (Doc. 24). Ms. Peace now moves for a default
judgment against only Berkeley Scrap Metal. (Doc. 36).
II.
DISCUSSION
Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 55 establishes a two-step procedure
for obtaining a default judgment. First, when a defendant
fails to plead or otherwise defend a lawsuit, the Clerk of
Court must enter the party's default. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a).
Second, if the defendant is not an infant or an incompetent
person, the court may enter a default judgment against the
defendant as long as the well-pleaded allegations in the
complaint state a claim for relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b);
Nishimatsu Contr. Co. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515
F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975).[2]
Here,
Ms. Peace has obtained from the Clerk an entry of default
against Berkeley Scrap Metal, so she has satisfied the first
step of the procedure. But the court cannot grant Ms.
Peace's motion for a default judgment at this point, for
two reasons. First, the allegations in the amended complaint
do not, standing alone, state a claim for relief against
Berkeley Scrap Metal. Nor does Ms. Peace's motion for a
default judgment set forth any argument explaining how the
allegations made against Berkeley Scrap Metal would establish
liability for any of the claims she asserts against it.
(See Doc. 36). Instead, she asks for a hearing to
prove damages; but the court cannot determine damages until
after it determines liability.
Second,
where a case involves multiple defendants, a court should not
enter judgment against a defaulting party who may be jointly
liable until the court adjudicates the matter with respect to
all defendants. Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. 552, 554
(1872). If a plaintiff prevails against non-defaulting
defendants, then she is entitled to judgment against all
defendants, but if the non-defaulting defendants prevail,
then generally the judgment accrues to the benefit of the
defaulting defendant as well. Id. at 554
(“[I]f the suit should be decided against the
complainant on the merits, the bill will be dismissed as to
all the defendants alike the defaulter as well as the others.
If it be decided in the complainant's favor, he will then
be entitled to a final decree against all. But a final decree
on the merits against the defaulting defendant alone, pending
the continuance of the cause, would be incongruous and
illegal.”). The prohibition against inconsistent
judgments extends to situations beyond that involving joint
liability. In Gulf Coast Fans v. Midwest Electronics
Importers, Inc., 740 F.2d 1499, 1512 (11th Cir. 1984),
the Eleventh Circuit described as “sound policy”
the rule that “when defendants are similarly situated,
but not jointly liable, judgment should not be entered
against the default defendant if the other defendant prevails
on the merits.” In this case, the other defendants have
appeared and are defending the action. If the court enters a
default judgment against Berkeley Scrap Metal and the other
defendants later prevail, the result will be inconsistent
judgments. Entry of a default judgment against Berkeley Scrap
Metal is therefore not appropriate at this stage of the
proceedings. Accordingly, the court DENIES
Ms. Peace's motion for default judgment WITHOUT
PREJUDICE to refiling at a later date.
DONE
and ORDERED.
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Notes:
[1] Some of the pleadings in this case
spell Defendant's name as “Berkley” and some
spell it as “Berkeley.” The court will use the
spelling from Ms. Peace's amended ...