United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Southern Division
DANE J. CORPA, Plaintiff,
v.
LT. STEVE BAXLEY, et al., Defendants.
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
CHARLES S. COODY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I.
INTRODUCTION
This 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action is pending before the court on a
complaint filed by Dane J. Corpa, an indigent inmate
currently incarcerated at the Dale County Jail on several
charges related to his alleged possession of child
pornography and dissemination of such pornography. In this
case, Corpa challenges his area of housing in the jail and
the lack of medical treatment he received after an alleged
attack by other inmates, all of which occurred in July of
2018. Doc. 1 at 2-3. The defendants remaining in this civil
action are Steve Baxley and Eric Baker, correctional officers
employed at the Dale County Jail. Corpa seeks a declaratory
judgment, injunctive relief and monetary damages for the
alleged violations of his constitutional rights. Doc. 1 at 4.
The
defendants filed a special report and supporting evidentiary
materials addressing the claims presented in the complaint.
In these documents, the defendants deny they acted in
violation of Corpa's constitutional rights and further
argue that this case is due to be dismissed because prior to
filing this cause of action Corpa failed to properly exhaust
an administrative remedy available to him at the Dale County
Jail addressing the claims presented in the complaint. Doc.
14 at 4-6. The defendants base their exhaustion defense on
Corpa's failure to file any grievance regarding the
claims raised in this case. Doc. 14-3 at 2-3; Doc. 14-5 at
2-3.
Upon
review of the special report filed by the defendants, the
court issued an order on March 13, 2019 providing Corpa an
opportunity to file a response to the report. Doc. 15. This
order specifically directed Corpa to address “the
defendant's argument[] that . . . [h]is claims are due to
be dismissed because he failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies [available at the Dale County Jail] as required by
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
[prior to filing this federal civil action.]” Doc. 15
at 1. The order also advised Corpa that his response should
be supported by affidavits or statements made under penalty
of perjury and/or appropriate other evidentiary materials.
Doc. 15 at 3. The order further cautioned Corpa that unless
“sufficient legal cause” is shown within
fifteen days of entry of this order “why such
action should not be undertaken, . . . the court may at
any time [after expiration of the time for his filing a
response] and without further notice to the parties
(1) treat the special report[] and any supporting evidentiary
materials as a motion to dismiss or motion for summary
judgment, whichever is proper, and (2) after considering any
response as allowed by this order, rule on the motion in
accordance with the law.” Doc. 15 at 4 (footnote
omitted). The time allowed Corpa to file a response to this
order expired on March 28, 2019. As of the present date,
Corpa has filed no response to the arguments set forth by the
defendants as required by the March 13, 2019 order.
Pursuant
to the aforementioned order, the court deems it appropriate
to treat the report filed by the defendants as a motion to
dismiss with respect to the exhaustion defense. Thus, this
case is now pending on the defendants' motion to dismiss.
Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1374-75 (11th Cir.
2008) (internal quotations omitted) (“[A]n exhaustion
defense . . . is not ordinarily the proper subject for a
summary judgment [motion]; instead, it should be raised in a
motion to dismiss, or be treated as such if raised in a
motion for summary judgment.”); Trias v. Florida
Dept. of Corrections, 587 Fed.Appx. 531, 534 (11th Cir.
2014) (holding that the district court properly construed
Defendant's “motion for summary judgment as a
motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies[.]”).
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In
addressing the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e with
respect to exhaustion, the Eleventh Circuit has
recognized that “[t]he plain language of th[is] statute
makes exhaustion a precondition to filing an action in
federal court.” Higginbottom v. Carter, 223
F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (quoting
Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 643-44 (6th Cir.
1999)). This means that “until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted, ” a prisoner
is precluded from filing suit in federal court. See
id. (affirming dismissal of prisoner's civil rights
suit for failure to satisfy the mandatory exhaustion
requirements of the PLRA); Harris v. Garner, 190
F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (“reaffirm[ing] that
section 1997e(a) imposes a mandatory requirement on prisoners
s-eeking judicial relief to exhaust their administrative
remedies” before filing suit
in federal court), modified on other
grounds, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc);
Miller v. Tanner, 196 F.3d 1190, 1193 (11th Cir.
1999) (holding that under the PLRA's amendments to §
1997e(a), “[a]n inmate incarcerated in a state prison .
. . must first comply with the grievance procedures
established by the state department of corrections before
filing a federal lawsuit under section 1983.”);
Harper v. Jenkin, 179 F.3d 1311, 1312 (11th Cir.
1999) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of prisoner's
civil suit for failure to satisfy the mandatory exhaustion
requirements of § 1997e(a)); Alexander v. Hawk,
159 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 1998) (affirming dismissal of
prisoner's Bivens action under § 1997e(a)
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to
filing suit in federal court).
Leal v. Georgia Dept. of Corrections, 254 F.3d 1276,
1279 (11th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original). Furthermore,
the law is well-settled that “the question of
exhaustion under the PLRA [is] a threshold matter that
[federal courts must] address before considering the merits
of the case. Because exhaustion is mandated by the statute,
[a federal court has] no discretion to waive this
requirement.” Myles v. Miami-Dade County
Correctional and Rehabilitation Dept., 476
Fed.Appx. 364, 366 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278,
1286 (11th Cir. 2004) and Alexander v.
Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1325-26 (11th Cir. 1998)). The
court will therefore “resolve this issue first.”
Myles, 476 Fed.Appx. at 366.
“When
deciding whether a prisoner has exhausted his remedies, the
court should first consider the plaintiff's and the
defendants' versions of the facts, and if they conflict,
take the plaintiff's version of the facts as true.”
Myles, 476 Fed.Appx. at 366. “If in that
light, the defendant[s] [are] entitled to have the complaint
dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, it
must be dismissed.” Turner v. Burnside, 541
F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 2008). “If the complaint is
not subject to dismissal at this step, then the court should
make specific findings in order to resolve the disputed
factual issues related to exhaustion.” Myles,
476 Fed.Appx. at 366 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Consequently, a district court “may resolve
disputed factual issues where necessary to the disposition of
a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust [without a
hearing]. The judge properly may consider facts outside of
the pleadings to resolve a factual dispute as to exhaustion
where doing so does not decide the merits, and the parties
have a sufficient opportunity to develop the record.”
Trias, 587 Fed.Appx. at 535 (internal citations
omitted). Based on the foregoing, the Eleventh Circuit
specifically rejected the argument that “disputed facts
as to exhaustion should be decided by a jury [or other
factfinder].” Id.
Upon
review of the complaint, the defendants' special report
and the evidentiary materials filed in support of such
report, the court concludes that the defendants' motion
to dismiss is due to be granted.
III.
DISCUSSION
Corpa
challenges actions taken against him and conditions to which
was subjected at the Dale County Jail. In their response, the
defendants deny they violated Corpa's constitutional
rights and also assert that this case is subject to dismissal
because Corpa failed to properly exhaust the administrative
remedy provided to him at the Dale County Jail prior to
filing the instant ...