United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division
R.R., a Minor, By and through her Mother and Next of Friend Christie Rogers, Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID EATON, Defendants.
MEMORDANDUM OPINION
T.
MICHAEL PUTNAM UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This
cause is before the court on the motion for summary judgment
filed September 27, 2018, by the sole defendant, David Eaton
(“Defendant” or “Eaton”). (Doc. 44).
Defendant seeks dismissal of all R.R.'s
(“Plaintiff”) claims arising from the search of
her grandmother's home, where she was then living, on May
9, 2015, when Eaton and Deputy Dill (“Dill”)
entered the home to serve an arrest warrant on R.R.'s
sister, Breana Clayton. (Doc.44). The motion has been fully
briefed. The parties consented to dispositive jurisdiction by
a magistrate judge on September 28, 2016. (Doc. 14).
Accordingly, the court enters the following Memorandum
Opinion.
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT STANDARD
Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is
proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The
party asking for summary judgment “always bears the
initial responsibility of informing the district court of the
basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of
‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any' which it believes demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 47 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)
(quoting former Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). The movant can meet this
burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of
material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has
failed to present evidence in support of some element of its
case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. There is no
requirement, however, “that the moving party support
its motion with affidavits or other similar materials
negating the opponent's claim.”
Id. at 323.
Once
the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56 “requires
the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own
affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate
‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.'” Id. at 324 (quoting former
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The nonmoving party need not present
evidence in a form necessary for admission at trial; however,
he may not merely rest on his pleadings. Celotex,
477 U.S. at 324. “[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c)
mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time
for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
Id. at 322.
After
the plaintiff has properly responded to a proper motion for
summary judgment, the court “shall” grant the
motion if there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The substantive law will identify which
facts are material and which are irrelevant. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute
is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Id. at 248. “[T]he judge's function is not
himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the
matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Id. at 246. His guide is the same
standard necessary to direct a verdict: “whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at
251-52; see also Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v.
N.L.R.B., 461 U.S. 731, 745 n. 11 (1983).
However,
the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The evidence
supporting a claim must be “substantial, ”
Marcus v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 651
F.2d 379 (5th Cir., Unit B, 1981); a mere scintilla of
evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact.
Young v. City of Palm Bay, 358 F.3d 859, 860 (11th
Cir. 2004); Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v.
Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1249-50 (11th Cir. 2004). If
the non-movant's evidence is so thoroughly discredited by
the rest of the record evidence that no reasonable
jury could accept it, the evidence fails to establish the
existence of a genuine issue of fact requiring a jury
determination. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
127 S.Ct. 1769, 1776, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007)
(“Respondent's version of events is so utterly
discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have
believed him. The Court of Appeals should not have relied on
such visible fiction; it should have reviewed the facts in
the light depicted by the videotape.”); Lewis v.
City of West Palm Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288, 1290 n. 3
(11th Cir. 2009). If the evidence is merely colorable, or is
not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (citations omitted);
accord Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256 (11th Cir.
1989). Furthermore, the court must “view the evidence
presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary
burden, ” so there must be sufficient evidence on which
the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The non-movant need not
be given the benefit of every inference but only of every
reasonable inference. Brown v. City of Clewiston,
848 F.2d 1534, 1540 n. 12 (11th Cir. 1988).
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT FACTS
For the
purposes of summary judgment the court construes all facts in
favor of the nonmovant, in this case the plaintiff. The
following facts, so construed, are relevant for the purposes
of summary judgment.
Eaton
is a deputy sheriff with the Jefferson County Sheriff's
Office (“JCSO”) in Alabama. On May 9, 2015, Eaton
was assigned to the “Birmingham Division, ” which
is one of two divisions within the JCSO that is tasked with
serving arrest warrants. On that date, the JCSO was
conducting a “Saturday roundup, ” an operation in
which the department seeks to serve arrest warrants based on
a determination that people are more likely to be home on
Saturday mornings than throughout the workweek. Eaton was
assigned to a felony warrant for Breana Clayton. The address
on the warrant was 2116 6th Place West, Birmingham, Alabama.
That address is the home of Bettie Clayton, R.R.'s and
Breana Clayton's grandmother. R.R. was living with Bettie
Clayton on May 9, 2015, but Breana was not.
The
arrest warrant for Breana Clayton had been issued on April
30, 2015, in response to a report taken by the Hueytown
Police Department on April 29, 2015, alleging that Breana
Clayton had stolen multiple items from a Walmart store. The
warrant listed Breana Clayton's address as 2116 6th Place
West, though she was not residing with Bettie Clayton at the
time. Breana Clayton had not provided that address to the
Hueytown police and it is not clear how the address was
obtained.[1]
Eaton
was first assigned the warrant a few days prior to the
Saturday roundup. On May 6, 2015, he searched for
Breana's address in the AlaCop database, an online portal
that gives law enforcement access to the information
contained in all Alabama driver's licenses. Eaton
confirmed that the address listed on Breana Clayton's
driver's license, issued in May 2011, was the same 2116
6th Place West listed on the warrant. Eaton did not take any
further measures to ascertain whether Breana Clayton actually
lived in the home. He agrees that he did not conduct
surveillance at the address or talk to neighbors to attempt
to confirm that Breana resided there. Eaton admits that he
often encounters people who do not live at the address on
their driver's licenses and that he often arrests people
at addresses other than that stated on the arrest warrant.
On May
9, 2015, Eaton and another deputy, Dill, went to the
residence at 2116 6th Place West to attempt to serve the
arrest warrant on Breana. Dill, who normally worked in the
county jail, was partnered with Eaton because, during
Saturday roundups, the JCSO will use deputies who are
normally assigned to the jails to partner with warrant
division deputies for safety purposes. Dill had no
specialized training or experience in serving arrest
warrants. The deputies arrived at the Clayton residence
between 9:00 and 9:30 a.m.[2] Outside of the home, there was one
vehicle. Eaton did not check the vehicle registration or
attempt to ascertain whether the vehicle belonged to Breana
Clayton.
At the
Clayton residence the front door consisted of an outer
security door made of a plexiglass and steel frame, inside of
which was a standard wooden door. When Eaton knocked on the
front door, Bettie Clayton came to the door and opened the
inner wooden door, but left the outer security door closed
and locked. Dill had gone to the back of the home to ensure
that no one ran out of the house through other doors. Eaton
spoke with Bettie Clayton and informed her that he was there
to serve an arrest warrant on Breana Clayton. Bettie Clayton
informed Eaton that Breana was not in the house, that she did
not live there, and that she had not lived there for several
months. Eaton neither asked Bettie Clayton about a familial
relationship with Breana Clayton nor determined that one
existed.[3]
While
this was occurring, plaintiff R.R., a thirteen-year old
middle school student, was in her bedroom at the back of the
house. Upon seeing a shadow outside of her bedroom window,
R.R. briefly opened the blinds to see who was walking around
the house. When she did, Dill saw the “movement”
in the window and reported it to Eaton. There is no
indication that Dill was able to see anything but
“movement” in the window. He was not able even to
say that a person caused the movement, or to see anyone that
looked like Breana. Dill reported to Eaton only that he had
seen “movement” in the window. Eaton instructed
Bettie Clayton to open the security door, but she refused
because, as she told him again, Breana Clayton did not live
in the home and was not there. Eaton then used a crowbar and
a sledgehammer to break open the security door and force
entry into the home. At the time, he possessed only the
arrest warrant for Breana; there was no search warrant for
the home.
Eaton
went room to room inside of the home searching for Breana
Clayton. Inside the home he encountered R.R., who was still
in her pajamas in bed. She was the only other person in the
house. He asked her for identification because he believed
she looked like the driver's license photograph he had of
Breana Clayton, who was 21 years old at that time. Because of
her young age, she had no identification other than her
middle school ID card, which she retrieved from a dresser.
After he was satisfied that Breana Clayton was not in the
home, he left a business card with Bettie Clayton and left
the house.
DISCUSSION
There
are only two federal causes of action remaining in the
lawsuit. Those claims are denial of due process[4] and unlawful
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment asserted pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. ยง 1983. (Doc. 36). Eaton asserts that these
remaining claims are appropriate for summary disposition
because he is entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. 44-1,
p.10). The plaintiff asserts that Eaton does not have
qualified immunity because no reasonable police officer would
conclude, under these ...