United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Southern Division
FREDDIE B. WALKER, # 159866, Petitioner,
PATRICE RICHIE, et al., Respondents.
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
CHARLES S. COODY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
case is before the court on a pro se petition for
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by
Alabama inmate Freddie B. Walker. Doc. # 1. Walker challenges
his convictions for first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy,
and first-degree kidnapping entered against him by the
Circuit Court of Houston County in 2002. The trial court
sentenced Walker to 40 years in prison for each offense, the
terms to run consecutively. Walker filed a direct appeal,
which was later dismissed on his own motion. In his §
2254 petition, Walker argues that he was deprived of his
right to an appeal because his counsel “tricked”
him into dismissing his direct appeal. For the reasons that
follow, it is the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge that
Walker's § 2254 petition be dismissed as a
successive petition filed without the required appellate
instant petition is Walker's second habeas petition under
28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 2002 Houston
convictions and his resulting sentence. Walker filed his
first § 2254 petition with this court in July 2012.
See Walker v. Jones, Civil Action No.:12cv619-WHA
(M.D. Ala. 2015). In that habeas action, this court denied
Walker relief, finding his petition to be time-barred under
the federal limitation period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)
and dismissing the case with prejudice. Id.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A), “[b]efore a second or
successive application permitted by this section is filed in
the district court, the applicant shall move in the
appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the
district court to consider the application.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(3)(A). “A motion in the court of appeals
for an order authorizing the district court to consider a
second or successive application shall be determined by a
three-judge panel of the court of appeals” and may be
granted “only if [the assigned panel of judges]
determines that the application makes a prima facie showing
that the application satisfies the requirements of [28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(1) or (b)(2)].” 28 U.S.C. §
2244(b)(3)(B) & (C).
instant § 2254 petition is a successive petition and is
therefore subject to the limitations of §
2244(b). Walker furnishes no certification from the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals authorizing this court to
proceed on his successive petition. “Because this
undertaking [is a successive] habeas corpus petition and
because [Walker] had no permission from [the Eleventh
Circuit] to file a [successive] habeas petition, . . . the
district court lack[s] jurisdiction to grant the requested
relief.” Gilreath v. State Board of Pardons and
Paroles, 273 F.3d 932, 933 (11th Cir. 2001). See
Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir.
2003) (providing that, without an order from the court of
appeals authorizing the district court to consider a
successive habeas petition, the district courts lack
jurisdiction to consider the petition). Consequently, the
instant petition for writ of habeas corpus should be
it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that
Walker's petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 be DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction, as
Walker has failed to obtain the requisite order from the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals authorizing a federal
district court to consider his successive habeas application.
that on or before April 23, 2019, Petitioner may file
objections to the Recommendation. Petitioner must
specifically identify the factual findings and legal
conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is made.
Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be
to file a written objections to the Magistrate Judge's
findings and recommendations in accordance with the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) shall bar a party
from a de novo determination by the District Court
of factual and legal issues covered in the Recommendation and
waives the right of a party to challenge on appeal the
District Court's order based on unobjected-to factual and
legal conclusions accepted or adopted by the District Court
except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice.
11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust Co. v. Hallmark
Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993).