United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Southern Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [1]
SUSAN
RUSS WALKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff
Charles Lyons, proceeding pro se, initiated this
lawsuit by the filing of a complaint against defendant Henry
County Sheriff's Office on January 10, 2019. (Doc. 1).
Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma
pauperis (Doc. 2) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915,
which provides that
[A]ny court of the United States may authorize the
commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or
proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without
prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who
submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets
such [person] possesses that the person is unable to pay such
fees or give security therefor. Such affidavit shall state
the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant's
belief that the person is entitled to redress.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The court granted plaintiff
in forma pauperis status, but entered an order
deferring service of process for the purpose of conducting a
review of plaintiff's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). (Doc. 7). While the court has
determined that plaintiff lacks the resources necessary to
pay the filing fee, it concludes, upon its review of the
complaint, that plaintiff's complaint is due to be
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). In
relevant part, § 1915(e) provides: “the court
shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines
that … the action or appeal … fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted ….” 28
U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii).
“Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards govern [a
court's] review of dismissals under section
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)[.]” Mitchell v. Farcass, 112
F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). See also Jones v.
Brown, 649 Fed.Appx. 889, 890 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing
Mitchell, supra) (“We review the
district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim
for which relief may be granted pursuant to §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) de novo, applying the same
standards that govern Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).”). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the
court
must view the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, accepting all of the plaintiff's well-pleaded
facts as true. Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez,
480 F.3d 1043, 1056-57 (11th Cir. 2007). Pro se
pleadings are liberally construed and held to a less
stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys.
Powell v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir.
1990). However, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, the
plaintiff's complaint must contain facts sufficient to
support a plausible claim to relief. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Id. This court has reviewed plaintiff's
complaint in light of the foregoing principles.
In his
complaint, plaintiff alleges that his Fourth Amendment rights
have been violated. (Doc. 1 at 4). He claims that his house
was illegally searched and his property seized. Id.
He maintains that he was arrested/charged without a search
warrant by Henry County deputies on February 1, 2017, and
that he was wrongfully imprisoned and falsely arrested.
Id. He alleges that the Henry County Sheriff's
Office committed gross negligence. Id. He maintains
further that “[t]he deputy knowingfully and
willingfully [sic] filed charges with no warrant to justify
the arrest which would cause me to lose my job, pay an
excessive bond to be released and ordered to follow strict
bonding requirements/check-ins, toll on mental
health/depression.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff seeks
damages in the amount of $400, 000 for violations of his
Fourth Amendment rights; $200, 000 for wrongful imprisonment;
$200, 000 for false arrest; $200, 000 for gross negligence;
and $500, 000 in punitive damages. Id. The only
defendant named in the complaint is the Henry County
Sheriff's Office. See Doc. 1.
Plaintiff's
allegations are vague and conclusory, and they fail to allege
facts sufficient to support a plausible claim for relief as
required by Iqbal. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. Moreover, plaintiff's claims against Henry County
Sheriff's Office fail as a matter of law. In order to
state a viable section 1983 claim, the defendant must be an
entity that is subject to suit. Dean v. Barber, 951
F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992). The capacity of a party to
be sued is “determined by the law of the state in which
the district court is held.” Id. at 1214
(citation and quotation omitted). In Alabama, a sheriff's
department is not subject to suit, because a sheriff's
department is not a legal entity under Alabama law. See
Ex parte Haralson, 853 So.2d 928, 931 (Ala. 2003)
(“[i]t is clear under Alabama law that the
sheriff's department is not a legal entity subject to
suit”); White v. Birch, 582 So.2d 1085, 1087
(Ala. 1991) (cause of action against Chambers County
Sheriff's Department could not be maintained because it
was not a legal entity subject to suit). See also
Dean, 951 F.2d at 1214 (an Alabama county sheriff's
department “is not subject to suit or liability under
section 1983.”); Brooks v. Arrington, 2014 WL
6836444, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 3, 2014) (dismissal of Blount
County Sheriff's Office and Correctional Facility
warranted because sheriff's departments and police
departments are not legal entities subject to suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983). Accordingly, plaintiff's claims
against the Henry County Sheriff's Office are due to be
dismissed.
Even if
plaintiff had properly named the government official
representing the entity as a defendant, plaintiff's
claims would still fail against the Sheriff's Office, as
plaintiff has not alleged a policy or custom that was a
moving force behind the alleged constitutional deprivations.
It is well-settled that a governmental entity can be held
monetarily liable only for the execution of a governmental
policy or custom. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
“[M]unicipalities and other bodies of local government
are ‘persons' within the meaning of [§ 1983
and] may therefore be sued directly if [they are] alleged to
have caused a constitutional tort through ‘a policy
statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially
adopted and promulgated by that body's officers …
[or] for ‘constitutional deprivations visited pursuant
to governmental custom.'” City of St. Louis v.
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121 (1988) (quoting
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91). “[A] local
government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury
inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is
when execution of a government's policy or custom,
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or
acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,
inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is
responsible under § 1983.” Monell, 436
U.S. at 694. “Regardless of whether the basis of the
claim is an officially promulgated policy or an unofficially
adopted custom, it must be the ‘moving force behind the
constitutional deprivation before liability may
attach.'” Fundiller v. City of Cooper
City, 777 F.2d 1436, 1442 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting
City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808
(1985)). Construing the pro se plaintiff's
allegations liberally, the complaint fails to point out any
policy or custom that could give rise to potential liability
against the governmental entity, even if it were properly
named.
Accordingly,
it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that this
matter be DISMISSED prior to service of process in accordance
with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). It is further
ORDERED
that on or before April 24, 2019, plaintiff may file an
objection to this Report and Recommendation. Any objection
filed must specifically identify the findings in the
Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which plaintiff
objects. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not
be considered by the District Court.
Failure
to file a written objection to the Magistrate Judge's
findings and recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
shall bar a de novo determination by the District
Court of legal and factual issues covered in the
Recommendation and waives the right of a party to challenge
on appeal the district court's order based on
unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions accepted or
adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain
error or manifest injustice. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; Resolution ...