United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division
RONALD VINCENT WILLIAMS, #239 426, a/k/a RONNIE WILLIAMS, [1] Plaintiff,
v.
JOSEPH WOMBLE, et al., Defendants.
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
STEPHEN M. DOYLE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I.
INTRODUCTION
This 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action is pending before the court on an
Amended Complaint (Doc. 13) filed by Ronald Vincent Williams
[“Williams”], an indigent state inmate, against
Joseph Womble, Karen Williams, Tara Walker, and Nurse
McArthur.[2] In his amended complaint, Williams alleges
that his transfer to the Red Eagle Honor Farm (“Red
Eagle”) in 2014 was retaliatory in nature and involved
a mistaken identity, improprieties occurred during his annual
classification review in 2015, and medical documents were
improperly removed from his prison medical file. Williams
seeks his release from prison, that he be recognized as
“Ronald Vincent Williams” rather than
“Ronnie Williams, ” and that he be awarded $8.3
million in damages from each defendant. Id.
Defendants
filed answers, special reports, a supplemental special
report, and supporting evidentiary materials addressing
Williams' claims for relief. (Docs. 21, 22, 26, 27, 40).
In these filings, Defendants deny they acted in violation of
Williams' constitutional rights. Upon receipt of
Defendants' special reports, the Court issued an order
directing Williams to file a response, including sworn
affidavits and other evidentiary materials, and specifically
cautioning Williams “the court may at any time
thereafter and without notice to the parties (1) treat the
special reports and any supporting evidentiary materials as
motions for summary judgment.” (Doc. 44) at 2. Williams
responded to Defendants' special reports, see
(Docs. 38, 45), but his responses do not demonstrate there is
any genuine issue of material fact. See (Doc. 44).
The Court will treat Defendants' reports as motions for
summary judgment and resolve these motions in their favor.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Summary
judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine
[dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d
1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)
(“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”). The party moving for summary judgment
“always bears the initial responsibility of informing
the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of the [record, including
pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine [dispute] of
material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by
presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of
material fact or by showing that the non-moving party has
failed to present evidence to support some element on which
it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at
322-324.
Defendants
have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated the
absence of any genuine dispute of material fact. Thus, the
burden shifts to Williams to establish, with appropriate
evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute
material to the case exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at
324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to
properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly
address another party's assertion of fact [by citing to
materials in the record including affidavits, relevant
documents or other materials], the court may . . . grant
summary judgment if the motion and supporting
materials-including the facts considered undisputed-show that
the movant is entitled to it . . . .”); see also
Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098
(11th Cir. 2014) (holding that the court should consider
facts pled in a plaintiff's sworn complaint when
considering summary judgment). A genuine dispute of material
fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that
would allow a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict in
its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263. The evidence
must be admissible at trial, and if the nonmoving party's
evidence “is merely colorable . . . or is not
significantly probative . . . summary judgment may be
granted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). “A mere
‘scintilla' of evidence supporting the opposing
party's position will not suffice . . . .”
Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir.
1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). Only
disputes involving material facts are relevant, materiality
is determined by the substantive law applicable to the case.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
To
demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the party
opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply
show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead
a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party,
there is no ‘genuine [dispute] for trial.'”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “The evidence of the
non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences
are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 255; see also United States v. Stein, 881
F.3d 853 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that a plaintiff's
self-serving and uncorroborated, but not conclusory,
statements in an affidavit or deposition may create an issue
of material fact which precludes summary judgment);
Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244,
1253 (11th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted) (“To be sure,
[plaintiff's] sworn statements are self-serving, but that
alone does not permit us to disregard them at the summary
judgment stage. . . . ‘Courts routinely and properly
deny summary judgment on the basis of a party's sworn
testimony even though it is self-serving.'”).
“Conclusory, uncorroborated allegations by a plaintiff
in an affidavit or deposition will not create an issue of
fact for trial sufficient to defeat a well-supported summary
judgment motion.” Solliday v. Fed. Officers,
413 Fed. App'x 206, 207 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing
Earley v. Champion Int'l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081
(11th Cir. 1990)); see also Holifield v. Reno, 115
F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that conclusory
allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise
insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact).
Although
factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable
to the nonmoving party and pro se complaints are
entitled to liberal interpretation by the Court, a pro
se litigant does not escape the burden of sufficiently
establishing a genuine dispute of material fact. See
Beard v. 9Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 525 (2006); Brown v.
Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, a
plaintiff's pro se status alone does not mandate
this Court disregard elementary principles of production and
proof in a civil case. Here, Williams fails to demonstrate a
requisite genuine dispute of material fact to preclude
summary judgment on his claims. See Matsushita, 475
U.S. at 587.
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
Injunctive Relief
Williams
seeks his release from prison. (Doc. 13). When the effect of
granting equitable relief under the civil rights statute
would be to substitute a § 1983 action for a federal
writ of habeas corpus challenging the basis for ongoing
detention or for a petition under § 2254 to attack a
state court conviction and/or sentence, a prisoner fails to
state a claim under § 1983. See Eutzy v. Tesar,
880 F.2d 1010, 1011 (8th Cir. 1989); Preiser, 411
U.S. at 500. A plaintiff, therefore, cannot seek declaratory
or injunctive relief relating to his confinement and/or
conviction in a § 1983 action. See Edwards v.
Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997); Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483-89 (1994); Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (“when a state
prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his
physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a
determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a
speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal
remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.”). Williams'
request for injunctive relief is, therefore, due to be
dismissed.
B.
Absolute Immunity - Official Capacity Claims
To the extent Williams requests monetary damages from
Defendants in their official capacities, they are entitled to
absolute immunity. Official capacity lawsuits are “in
all respects other than name, . . . treated as a suit against
the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,
166 (1985). As the Eleventh Circuit has held,
the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from
entertaining suits by private parties against States and
their agencies [or employees]. There are two exceptions to
this prohibition: where the state has waived its immunity or
where Congress has abrogated that immunity. A State's
consent to suit must be unequivocally expressed in the text
of [a] relevant statute. Waiver may not be implied. Likewise,
Congress' intent to abrogate the States' immunity
from suit must be obvious from a clear legislative statement.
Selensky v. Alabama, 619 Fed.Appx. 846, 848-49 (11th
Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Thus, a state official may not be sued in his official
capacity unless the state has waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity, see Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984), or
Congress has abrogated the State's immunity, see
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996).
“Neither waiver nor abrogation applies here. The
Alabama Constitution states that “the State of Alabama
shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or
equity.” Ala. Const. Art. I, § 14. The Supreme
Court has recognized that this prohibits Alabama from waiving
its immunity from suit.” Selensky, 619
Fed.Appx. at 849 (citing Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S.
781, 782 (1978) (consent is prohibited by the Alabama
Constitution)). “Alabama has not waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity in § 1983 cases, nor has Congress
abated it.” Holmes v. Hale, 701 Fed.Appx. 751,
753 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Carr v. City of Florence,
Ala., 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1990)). In light of
the foregoing, Defendants, as employees of the Alabama
Department of Corrections or acting as state agents, are
entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment
for claims seeking monetary damages from them in their
official capacities. Selensky, 619 Fed.Appx. at 849;
Harbert Int'l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271,
1277 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that state officials sued in
their official capacities are protected under the Eleventh
Amendment from suit for damages); Edwards v. Wallace
Community College, 49 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995)
(holding that damages are unavailable from state official
sued in his official capacity).
C.
Qualified Immunity - Individual Capacity Claims
Qualified
immunity offers complete protection from civil damages for
government officials sued in their individual capacities if
their conduct does not violate “clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536
U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity is not merely a
defense against liability but immunity from suit, and the
Supreme Court “repeatedly [has] stressed the importance
of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible
stage in litigation.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009) (quotation marks and citations
omitted). To receive qualified immunity, the public official
must first prove he was acting within the scope of his
discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts
occurred. Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th
Cir. 2002). There is no dispute the correctional defendants
here were acting within the course and scope of their
discretionary authority when the incidents occurred. Williams
must, therefore, allege facts that, when read in a light most
favorable to him, show that the correctional defendants are
not entitled to qualified immunity. Cottone v.
Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1358 (11th Cir. 2003).
To
satisfy his burden, a plaintiff must show that: 1) a
defendant committed a constitutional violation; and 2) the
constitutional right a defendant violated was “clearly
established.” Crosby v. Monroe Cty., 394 F.3d
1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004). “To be clearly
established, a right must be sufficiently clear that every
reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is
doing violates that right. In other words, existing precedent
must have placed the statutory or constitutional question
beyond debate.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S.
658, 664 (2012) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
“Clearly established law” means: 1) “a
materially similar case has already been decided”; 2)
“a broader, clearly established principle that should
control the novel facts of the situation”; or 3)
“the conduct involved in the case may so obviously
violate the constitution that prior case law is
unnecessary.” Gaines v. Wardynski, 871 F.3d
1203, 1208-09 (11th Cir. 2017)
(quotation
marks and citations omitted). The controlling authority is
from “the United States Supreme Court, the Eleventh
Circuit, or the highest court in the relevant state.”
See id. at 1209. “Qualified immunity gives
government officials breathing room to make reasonable but
mistaken judgments and protects all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”
Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012)
(quotation marks and citations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit
“has stated many times that if case law, in factual
terms, has not staked out a bright line, qualified immunity
almost always protects the defendant.” Gaines,
871 F.3d at 1210. “Exact factual identity with the
previously decided case is not required, but the unlawfulness
of the conduct must be apparent from pre-existing law.”
Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1013 (11th Cir.
2011). If a plaintiff cannot establish both elements to
satisfy his ...