United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Southern Division
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
STEPHEN M. DOYLE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I.
INTRODUCTION
This 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action is pending on a complaint filed by
Darnell Abner, an inmate incarcerated at the Dale County Jail
when he filed suit. Abner challenges the adequacy of medical
care provided during his incarceration at the county jail.
Abner names as defendants Sheriff Wally Olson, Jail
Administrator Ron Nelson, Jail Supervisor Steve Baxley, and
correctional officer Alan Chambers. Abner seeks injunctive
relief and monetary damages for the alleged violation of his
constitutional rights. Doc. 1 at 2-4.
Defendants
filed a special report and supporting evidentiary materials
addressing the claim in the complaint. In these documents,
Defendants deny they acted in violation of Abner's
constitutional rights and argues that this case is due to be
dismissed because prior to filing the complaint Abner failed
to properly exhaust an administrative remedy available to him
at the Dale County Jail addressing the claims presented. Doc.
26 at 5-7. Defendants base their exhaustion defense on
Abner's failure to file any grievance regarding his
claims.
Upon
receipt of Defendants' special report, the court issued
an order providing Abner an opportunity to file a response.
This order directed Abner to address “the
defendants' arguments that: 1. His claims are due to be
dismissed because he failed to fully exhaust his
administrative remedies available at the Dale County Jail as
required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act [prior to filing this federal civil
action.] . . .; and 2. He is entitled to no relief on the
claims presented herein as he has failed to establish that
the challenged action violated his constitutional
rights.” Doc. 27 at 1-2. The order also advised Abner
that his response should be supported by affidavits or
statements made under penalty of perjury and/or appropriate
other evidentiary materials. Id. at 3. The order
further cautioned Abner that unless “sufficient
legal cause” is shown within fifteen days of entry
of this order “why such action should not be
undertaken, the court may at any time [after expiration
of the time for his filing a response] and without
further notice to the parties (1) treat the special
report and any supporting evidentiary materials as a motion
to dismiss or motion for summary judgment, whichever is
proper, and (2) after considering any response as allowed by
this order, rule on the motion in accordance with the
law.” Id. at 3-4 (footnote omitted). Abner has
not filed a response to Defendants' report.
Pursuant
to the aforementioned order, the court deems it appropriate
to treat the report filed by Defendants as a motion to
dismiss regarding the exhaustion defense. This case is now
pending on Defendants' motions to dismiss. Bryant v.
Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1374-75 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotations omitted) (“[A]n exhaustion defense . . . is
not ordinarily the proper subject for a summary judgment
[motion]; instead, it should be raised in a motion to
dismiss, or be treated as such if raised in a motion for
summary judgment.”); Trias v. Florida Dept. of
Corrections, 587 Fed.Appx. 531, 534 (11th Cir. 2014)
(holding that the district court properly construed
Defendant's “motion for summary judgment as a
motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies[.]”).
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In
addressing the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e
exhaustion, the Eleventh Circuit has “recognized that
[t]he plain language of th[is] statute makes exhaustion a
precondition to filing an action in federal court. This means
that until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted, a prisoner is precluded from filing suit in
federal court.” Leal v. Ga. Dept. of
Corrs., 254 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001)
(citations and internal quotations omitted). Furthermore,
“the question of exhaustion under the PLRA [is] a
‘threshold matter' that [federal courts must]
address before considering the merits of the case, ”
and that cannot be waived. Myles v. Miami-Dade Cty. Corr.
& Rehab. Dept., 476 Fed.Appx. 364, 366 (11th Cir.
2012) (quoting Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278,
1286 (11th Cir. 2004)).
When deciding whether a prisoner has exhausted his remedies,
the court should first consider the plaintiff's and the
defendants' versions of the facts, and if they conflict,
take the plaintiff's version of the facts as true. If in
that light, the defendant is entitled to have the complaint
dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, it
must be dismissed. If the complaint is not subject to
dismissal at this step, then the court should make specific
findings in order to resolve the disputed factual issues
related to exhaustion.
Myles, 476 Fed.Appx. at 366 (citations and internal
quotations omitted). Consequently, a district court
“may resolve disputed factual issues where necessary to
the disposition of a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust
[without a hearing]. The judge properly may consider facts
outside of the pleadings to resolve a factual dispute as to
exhaustion where doing so does not decide the merits, and the
parties have a sufficient opportunity to develop the
record.” Trias, 587 Fed.Appx. at 535. Based on
the foregoing, the Eleventh Circuit has rejected an
inmate-plaintiff's argument that “disputed facts as
to exhaustion should be decided” only after a trial
either before a jury or judge. Id. at 534.
III.
DISCUSSION
Abner
challenges the adequacy of the medical care he received at
the Dale County Jail. In their response, Defendants deny this
allegation and also assert that this case is subject to
dismissal because Abner failed to properly exhaust the
administrative remedy provided to him at the Dale County Jail
prior to filing suit as required by the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
The
PLRA compels proper exhaustion of available administrative
remedies before a prisoner can seek relief in federal court
on a § 1983 complaint. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a) states that “[n]o action shall be brought with
respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this
title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in
any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.” “Congress has provided in §
1997(e)(a) that an inmate must exhaust irrespective of the
forms of relief sought and offered through administrative
remedies.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741
n.6 (2001). “[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement
applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they
involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and
whether they allege excessive force or some other
wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532
(2002). “The PLRA strengthened [the exhaustion]
provision [applicable to inmate complaints] in several ways.
Exhaustion is no longer left to the discretion of the
district court, but is mandatory. Prisoners must now exhaust
all ‘available' remedies, not just those that meet
federal standards. Indeed, as [the Supreme Court] held in
Booth, a prisoner must now exhaust administrative
remedies even where the relief sought-monetary damages-cannot
be granted by the administrative remedies.”
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006) (internal
citation omitted).
Exhaustion
of all available administrative remedies is a precondition to
litigation and a federal court cannot waive the exhaustion
requirement. Booth, 532 U.S. at 741; Alexander
v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 1998).
“[M]andatory exhaustion statutes like the PLRA
establish mandatory exhaustion regimes, foreclosing judicial
discretion.” Ross v. Blake, ___ U.S. ____,
___, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1857 (2016). However, “[a]
prisoner need not exhaust remedies if they are not
‘available.'” Id. at 1855.
Generally, a remedy is “available” when it has
“‘sufficient power or force to achieve an
end,' [or is] ‘capable of use for the
accomplishment of a purpose[.]'” Booth,
532 U.S. at 737. Moreover, “the PLRA exhaustion
requirement requires proper exhaustion.”
Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93. “Proper exhaustion
demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other
critical procedural rules [as a precondition to filing suit
in federal court] because no adjudicative system can function
effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the
courts of its proceedings. . . . Construing § 1997e(a)
to require proper exhaustion . . . fits with the general
scheme of the PLRA, whereas [a contrary] interpretation
[allowing an inmate to bring suit in federal court once
administrative remedies are no longer available] would turn
that provision into a largely useless appendage.” 548
U.S. at 90-91, 93. The Supreme Court reasoned that because
proper exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary an
inmate cannot “satisfy the Prison Litigation Reform
Act's exhaustion requirement . . . by filing an untimely
or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance
or appeal[, ]” or by effectively bypassing the
administrative process simply by waiting until the grievance
procedure is no longer available to him. 548 U.S. at 83-84;
Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1378 (To exhaust administrative
remedies in accordance with the PLRA, prisoners must
“properly take each step within the administrative
process.”); Johnson v. Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152,
1157 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that inmate who ...