United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
C. MARKS, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on Defendant Megan J.
Brennan's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (doc.
14) filed on October 5, 2018. The motion has been fully
briefed by the parties. (Docs. 15 & 19). For the reasons
that follow, the Defendant's motion is granted.
STANDARD OF REVIEW.
12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss.
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, may be a factual or facial attack on subject
matter jurisdiction. Barnett v. Okeechobee Hosp.,
283 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2002). A factual attack
permits the district court to weigh evidence outside the
pleadings to satisfy itself of the existence of subject
matter jurisdiction in fact. Id. at 1237. However, a
facial attack merely questions the sufficiency of the
pleading. Id. Under a facial attack, the district
court accepts the plaintiff's allegations as true and
need not look beyond the face of the complaint to determine
whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Id.;
Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir.
1990). If the court then finds that the pleading does not
allege a basis for subject matter jurisdiction, the court
will dismiss the complaint.
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss.
survive a motion to dismiss [for failure to state a claim], a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 663 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Id. at 679.
analyzing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court assumes the factual
allegations in the complaint to be true. However, “if
allegations [in the complaint] are indeed more conclusory
than factual, then the court does not have to assume their
truth.” Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d
1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Mamani v.
Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153- 54 (11th Cir. 2011)).
“[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds
of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT.
Tiffany Dillard is employed as a Rural Carrier Associate
(“RCA”) with the United States Postal Service.
(Doc. 2, p. 2). The Plaintiff alleges that she experienced
gender discrimination, race discrimination, harassment, and
retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964; further, the Plaintiff alleges that, at the hands of
her supervisor, she experienced a violation of her First
Amendment rights. Id. at 4-8.
Plaintiff's claims of discrimination are based on her
allegation that she was not permitted “to close U.S.
Postal stations” while other RCAs were permitted to do
so. Id. at 4. The Plaintiff claims that, because she
was not permitted to perform this duty, she was precluded
from “earn[ing] the associated extra pay.”
Id. at 3. The Plaintiff alleges that “males,
at least two maybe more, were allowed to ‘close'
U.S. Postal Stations” and that the Plaintiff “had
more seniority time” than those male RCAs. Id.
at 3, 4, 6. The Plaintiff does not specify the race of these
two unidentified men, but instead asserts that she
“cannot think of any other reason, other than her being
a Female, or specially [sic] a Black Female, that she was not
being allowed the opportunity to earn the extra money
closing.” Id. at 3.
support of her harassment claim, the Plaintiff alleges that
her supervisor was “following her, bumping into her,
setting her up for discipline in an Express Mail situation,
threatening her, calling her and telling her she was not
needed when she was, among other acts . . . .”
Id. at 8.
Plaintiff claims she suffered retaliation when the U.S.
Postal Service ceased allowing RCAs to close U.S. Postal
Stations after the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission
(“EEOC”) sent an investigator in response to the
Plaintiff's complaint. Id. at 3-5. She alleges
that her co-workers blamed her for this policy change and
that she received “flack” from these co-workers.
Id. at 4.
the Plaintiff claims that her First Amendment rights were
violated when, in a group meeting, she asked her supervisor
why some RCAs with less seniority were permitted to close
U.S. Postal Stations when she was not permitted to do so.
Id. According to the Plaintiff, her supervisor cut
her off and did not permit her to speak. Id.
Plaintiff exhausted her administrative remedies, and the EEOC
mailed her a notice, which specified that the Plaintiff had
the right to file a civil action in United States District
Court within ninety days of receiving the notice. (Doc. 2-1,
p. 3). The notice further specified that “the
Commission will presume that this decision was received
within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed.”
Id. at 4. The notice was ...