United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
KATHERINE P. NELSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff
Caryn J. Montgomery (“Montgomery”) brought this
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial
review of a final decision of the Defendant Commissioner of
Social Security (“the Commissioner”) denying her
application for supplemental security income
(“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq. Upon
consideration of the parties' briefs (Docs. 13, 24) and
those portions of the administrative record (Doc. 10)
(hereinafter cited as “(R. [page number(s) in
lower-right corner of transcript])”) relevant to the
issues raised, the Court finds that the Commissioner's
final decision is due to be AFFIRMED under
sentence four of § 405(g) (applicable to SSI claims
under § 1383(c)(3)).[1]
I.
Background
On
September 12, 2014, Montgomery filed an application for SSI
with the Social Security Administration (“SSA”),
alleging disability beginning August 15, 2014.[2] After her
application was initially denied, Montgomery requested a
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) with the SSA's Office of Disability
Adjudication and Review on January 13, 2015. The hearing was
held with an ALJ on July 19, 2016. On January 13, 2017, the
ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on Montgomery's
application, finding her not disabled under the Social
Security Act and thus not entitled to benefits. (See
R. 20).
The
Commissioner's decision on Montgomery's application
became final when the Appeals Council for the Office of
Disability Adjudication and Review denied her request for
review of the ALJ's decision on November 17, 2017. (R. 1
- 6). Montgomery subsequently filed this action under §
405(g) and § 1383(c)(3) for judicial review of the
Commissioner's final decision. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1383(c)(3) (“The final determination of the
Commissioner of Social Security after a hearing [for SSI
benefits] shall be subject to judicial review as provided in
section 405(g) of this title to the same extent as the
Commissioner's final determinations under section 405 of
this title.”); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any
individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party,
irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a
review of such decision by a civil action commenced within
sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such
decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of
Social Security may allow.”); Ingram v. Comm'r
of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir.
2007) (“The settled law of this Circuit is that a court
may review, under sentence four of section 405(g), a denial
of review by the Appeals Council.”).
II.
Standards of Review
“In
Social Security appeals, [the Court] must determine whether
the Commissioner's decision is ‘ “supported
by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards.
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.”' ”
Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176,
1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Crawford v. Comm'r of
Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Lewis v.
Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997))).
However, the Court “ ‘may not decide the facts
anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for
that of the [Commissioner].' ” Id.
(quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240
n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting
Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th
Cir. 1983))). “‘Even if the evidence
preponderates against the [Commissioner]'s factual
findings, [the Court] must affirm if the decision reached is
supported by substantial evidence.' ”
Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Martin v.
Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).
“Yet,
within this narrowly circumscribed role, [courts] do not act
as automatons. [The Court] must scrutinize the record as a
whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and
supported by substantial evidence[.]”
Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239 (citations and
quotation omitted). See also Owens v. Heckler, 748
F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (“We are
neither to conduct a de novo proceeding, nor to rubber stamp
the administrative decisions that come before us. Rather, our
function is to ensure that the decision was based on a
reasonable and consistently applied standard, and was
carefully considered in light of all the relevant
facts.”).[3] “In determining whether substantial
evidence exists, [a court] must…tak[e] into account
evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the
[Commissioner's] decision.” Chester v.
Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).
However,
the “substantial evidence” “standard of
review applies only to findings of fact. No. similar
presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner]'s
conclusions of law, including determination of the proper
standards to be applied in reviewing claims.”
MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir.
1986) (quotation omitted). Accord, e.g., Wiggins
v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982)
(“Our standard of review for appeals from the
administrative denials of Social Security benefits dictates
that ‘(t)he findings of the Secretary as to any fact,
if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive
....' 42 U.S.C.A. s 405(g) … As is plain from the
statutory language, this deferential standard of review is
applicable only to findings of fact made by the Secretary,
and it is well established that no similar presumption of
validity attaches to the Secretary's conclusions of law,
including determination of the proper standards to be applied
in reviewing claims.” (some quotation marks omitted)).
This Court “conduct[s] ‘an exacting
examination' of these factors.” Miles v.
Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam)
(quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529
(11th Cir. 1990)). “‘The [Commissioner]'s
failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing
court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the
proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates
reversal.'” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260
(quoting Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143,
1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991)). Accord Keeton v. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066
(11th Cir. 1994).
In sum,
courts “review the Commissioner's factual findings
with deference and the Commissioner's legal conclusions
with close scrutiny.” Doughty v. Apfel, 245
F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). See also Moore v.
Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per
curiam) (“In Social Security appeals, we review de
novo the legal principles upon which the
Commissioner's decision is based. Chester v.
Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). However, we
review the resulting decision only to determine whether it is
supported by substantial evidence. Crawford v. Comm'r
of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir.
2004).”).
Eligibility for…SSI requires that the claimant be
disabled. 42 U.S.C. §…1382(a)(1)-(2). A claimant
is disabled if she is unable “to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically
determinable physical or mental impairment ... which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of
not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §…
1382c(a)(3)(A).
Thornton v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 597
Fed.Appx. 604, 609 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam)
(unpublished).[4]
The
Social Security Regulations outline a five-step, sequential
evaluation process used to determine whether a claimant is
disabled: (1)
whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial
gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe
impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the
impairment meets or equals the severity of the specified
impairments in the Listing of Impairments; (4) based on a
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment,
whether the claimant can perform any of his or her past
relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) whether there
are significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that
the claimant can perform given the claimant's RFC, age,
education, and work experience.
Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citing 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v);
Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237-39).[5]
“These
regulations place a very heavy burden on the claimant to
demonstrate both a qualifying disability and an inability to
perform past relevant work.” Moore, 405 F.3d
at 1211 (citing Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090,
1093 (11th Cir. 1985)). “In determining whether the
claimant has satisfied this initial burden, the examiner must
consider four factors: (1) objective medical facts or
clinical findings; (2) the diagnoses of examining physicians;
(3) evidence of pain; and (4) the claimant's age,
education, and work history.” Jones v. Bowen,
810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (citing
Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir.
1983) (per curiam)). “These factors must be considered
both singly and in combination. Presence or absence of a
single factor is not, in itself, conclusive.”
Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 (citations omitted).
If, in
Steps One through Four of the five-step evaluation, a
claimant proves that he or she has a qualifying disability
and cannot do his or her past relevant work, it then becomes
the Commissioner's burden, at Step Five, to prove that
the claimant is capable-given his or her age, education, and
work history-of engaging in another kind of substantial
gainful employment that exists in the national economy.
Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir.
1999); Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th
Cir. 1985). Finally, although the “claimant bears the
burden of demonstrating the inability to return to [his or]
her past relevant work, the Commissioner of Social Security
has an obligation to develop a full and fair record.”
Shnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987).
See also Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276
(11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“It is well-established
that the ALJ has a basic duty to develop a full and fair
record. Nevertheless, the claimant bears the burden of
proving that he is disabled, and, consequently, he is
responsible for producing evidence in support of his
claim.” (citations omitted)). “This is an onerous
task, as the ALJ must scrupulously and conscientiously probe
into, inquire of, and explore for all relevant facts. In
determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ must
consider the evidence as a whole.” Henry v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir.
2015) (per curiam) (citation and quotation omitted).
When
the ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review
of that decision, the Court “review[s] the ALJ's
decision as the Commissioner's final decision.”
Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278. But “when a
claimant properly presents new evidence to the Appeals
Council, a reviewing court must consider whether that new
evidence renders the denial of benefits erroneous.”
Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1262. Nevertheless, “when
the [Appeals Council] has denied review, [the Court] will
look only to the evidence actually presented to the ALJ in
determining whether the ALJ's decision is supported by
substantial evidence.” Falge v. Apfel, 150
F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 1998).
III.
Summary of the ALJ's Decision
At Step
One, the ALJ determined that although Montgomery worked after
the application date, the work activity did not rise to the
level of substantial gainful activity. (R. 12). At Step Two,
the ALJ determined that Montgomery had the following severe
impairments: a history of Guillain-Barre syndrome dating from
2007, peripheral neuropathy, hearing loss, auditory
neuropathy, anxiety, and depressive disorder. (R. 12). At
Step Three, the ALJ found that Montgomery did not have an
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