United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Eastern Division
SARAH GRIFFIN, as Personal Representative and Administratrix of the Estate of MARK L. GRIFFIN, deceased, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
LEE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
STEPHEN M. DOYLE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I.
INTRODUCTION
This is
a class-of-one equal protection claim brought by three
technicians in the Lee County Schools Maintenance Department:
Mark Griffin[1] (“Griffin”), Brent Massey
(“Massey”), and Mike McConnell
(“McConnell”). 2d Amd. Compl. (Doc. 49)
¶¶ 14-25. Plaintiffs allege that they have been
denied equal protection of the laws because certain other
technicians in the maintenance department receive higher pay
for performing similar work. Plaintiffs do not allege that
this pay disparity is due to discrimination on the basis of a
protected or suspect class such as race, sex, age, or
national origin. Rather, they argue that the Lee County Board
of Education (“LCBOE”) gave certain bus mechanics
credit for their prior outside work experience while denying
electricians and heating, ventilation and air conditioning
(“HVAC”) technicians the same credit. Plaintiffs
argue that this “refusal to give . . . credit on the
salary schedule for relevant years of outside work is
arbitrary and irrational” and therefore violates the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Pls'
Opp. (Doc. 76) at 97. Plaintiffs' equal protection claims
are not cognizable because the Supreme Court has squarely
held that this “class-of-one theory of equal protection
does not apply in the public employment context.”
Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S.
591, 598 (2008). In addition, Defendants' action in
refusing to give Plaintiffs a pay raise easily satisfies
rational basis review.
Plaintiffs'
have stipulated to dismissal of their Title VII claims based
on the pay disparity, and Plaintiff Griffin's remaining
Title VII claim alleging a racially-hostile work environment
is time-barred. Finally, Plaintiffs' counts seeking
declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief, Counts I-III,
are dismissed for failure to state a claim because they plead
a remedy, not an independent cause of action.
Accordingly,
Defendants' motions for summary judgment (Docs. 67, 68)
are GRANTED, and Plaintiffs' claims are DISMISSED in
their entirety WITH PREJUDICE.
II.
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS
Plaintiffs
bring equal protection claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against the LCBOE, Superintendent James McCoy and board
members Larry Boswell, Milford Burkhalter, Roger Keel, Larry
Patterson, Napoleon Stringer, George Spence, Fred Copeland,
Jr., and Ralph Henderson in both their individual and
official capacities. 2d Amd. Compl., Count IV (Doc. 49)
¶¶ 56-62. They also bring an equal protection claim
directly under the Constitution against the LCBOE. Count VIII
(Doc. 49) ¶¶ 105-111. Plaintiffs allege that
“they have been denied equal protection in that other
maintenance department employees with less experience with
the LCBOE are paid more for performing similar and, in some
cases, less skilled jobs. The other employees are paid for
so-called ‘outside' experience, that is, experience
with an employer other than the LCBOE” while plaintiffs
are not. 2d Amd. Compl. (Doc. 49) ¶¶ 15-16.
Plaintiffs allege that this difference in pay is arbitrary
and capricious. Id. at ¶ 25.
In
addition to their class-of-one equal protection claims, each
individual Plaintiff brings a separate claim against the
LCBOE for alleged violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Counts
V, VI, and VII (Doc.49) at ¶¶ 63-104. However, in
their opposition papers, Plaintiffs “consent to the
dismissal of their Title VII claims insofar as they concern
the pay disparity.” Pls' Opp. to SJ (Doc. 76) at
111. Therefore, only Plaintiff Griffin's Title VII claim
alleging racial discrimination unrelated to the alleged pay
disparity remains.
Finally,
Plaintiffs allege counts for declaratory, mandamus, and
injunctive relief. Counts I, II, and III (Doc.49) at
¶¶ 26-55. These counts all relate strictly to the
pay disparity.
III.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary
Judgment
Summary
judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). When
the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial,
summary judgment is warranted if the nonmovant fails to
“make a showing sufficient to establish the existence
of an element essential to [its] case.” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The legal
elements of the claim dictate which facts are material and
which are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is not material if a dispute
over that fact will not affect the outcome of the case under
the governing law. Id.
IV.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
Griffin
is an African-American man. 2d Amd. Compl. (Doc. 49) ¶
64. Massey and McConnell are white men. Id. at
¶¶ 79, 92. Massey and McConnel are skilled
electricians. Id. at ¶¶ 9, 10. Griffin is
a skilled HVAC technician. Id. at ΒΆ 8. All had
prior outside work experience before accepting ...