United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Northwestern Division
AMANDA J. ECKL, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
LAUDERDALE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ABDUL
K. KALLON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Amanda
J. Eckl, Jessica L. VanDerVelde, and Angela C. West bring
these employment actions against the Lauderdale County Board
of Education (the “Board”), former Superintendent
Jennifer Gray, and current Superintendent Jonathan Hatton,
pursuant to the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e, et seq. The plaintiffs assert that the
defendants violated the Equal Pay Act and Title VII by paying
them significantly less than a male colleague for allegedly
substantially similar work and by retaliating against them
after they complained of the pay disparity. Doc. 1; Doc. 3
(No. 3:17-cv-1232-AKK).[1] Presently before the court are the
defendants' motion for summary judgment, doc. 33, and the
plaintiffs' motion to strike, doc. 36. For the reasons
explained below, the motion to strike is due to be denied,
and the motion for summary judgment is due to be granted
solely as to the Equal Pay Act claims based on the pay
disparity. In all other respects, the motion is due to be
denied.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary
judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a). “Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that
party's case, and on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party
bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis
of the motion and proving the absence of a genuine dispute of
material fact. Id. at 323. If the moving party meets
that burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party,
who is required to go “beyond the pleadings” to
establish that there is a “genuine issue for
trial.” Id. at 324 (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). A dispute about a material fact is
“genuine” if “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The
court must construe the evidence and all reasonable
inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the
non-movant. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144, 157 (1970). However, “mere conclusions and
unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to
defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ellis v.
England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing
Bald Mountain Park, Ltd. v. Oliver, 863 F.2d 1560,
1563 (11th Cir. 1989)). Moreover, “[a] mere
‘scintilla' of evidence supporting the opposing
party's position will not suffice; there must be enough
of a showing that a jury could reasonably find for that
party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577
(11th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The
plaintiffs work in the Board's bookkeeping department,
which is responsible for handling the Board's business
and finances. Docs. 37-7 at 3; 37-5 at 6. Larry Vance, the
Chief School Finance Officer, supervised the department's
four employees during the relevant time. Docs. 37-2 at 3, 8;
37-5 at 3. Mark Collier worked in the department from June
1993 until he retired in October 2016, earning at his
retirement an annual salary that exceeded the plaintiffs'
by at least $23, 000. See docs. 34-1 at 1; 37-12 at
6-7, 12-13, 19-20, 26-27.
When
the Board hired Collier in June 1993, it initially advertised
for a bookkeeper-payroll position, which required an
associate's degree in accounting or business.
See docs. 34-2 at 12; 37-3 at 2. But, the Board
ultimately hired Collier, who has a bachelor's degree in
accounting, for a payroll accountant/computer operator
position, which required a bachelor's degree in
accounting. Docs. 34-2 at 1, 12; 37-2 at 3. The pay scale for
Collier's position at the time ranged from $27, 274 for
step zero to $32, 074 for step ten, and Collier began at step
zero. Docs. 34-2 at 12; 37-3 at 4. Early in his career,
Collier also “performed duties regarding computer
technology.” Doc. 34-1 at 1. These responsibilities
ended when the Board began employing dedicated IT personnel
sometime before 1999. Id. In spite of the change in
duties, Collier kept the same job title. See doc.
34-2 at 55. In 2011 or earlier, the Board changed
Collier's salary schedule from payroll
accountant/computer operator to accounting specialist I, with
a pay scale that ranged from $47, 783 - $57, 660 for a person
with a bachelor's degree. See docs. 37-11 at 3;
37-12 at 2. Collier earned approximately $55, 900 annually
when he retired in 2016. Doc. 37-12 at 6-7.
Collier
attests that “[i]n addition to [his] regular duties and
responsibilities, ” his duties included the following
twenty-four tasks:
1. Preparation of [] LEAPS reports;
2. Salary schedule (until [] Vance was employed [sometime
before 1999]);
3. Ethics report;
4. Fixed Asset Inventory report;
5. 941 quarterly tax report;
6. Booking of annual [Board] auction and calculation of the
proceeds to the various schools and departments;
7. Retiree consultations;
8. Auditing of local school financial accounts and providing
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