United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Northeastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION [1]
STACI
G. CORNELIUS U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The
plaintiff, Christopher Brown, appeals from the decision of
the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the
“Commissioner”) denying his applications for
Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). Brown
timely pursued and exhausted his administrative remedies, and
the Commissioner's decision is ripe for review pursuant
to 42 U.S.C §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). For the
reasons discussed below, the Commissioner's decision is
due to be reversed and remanded.
I.
Procedural History
Brown
completed the eighth grade and has previously worked as a
diesel mechanic. (Tr. at 179). In his applications for DIB
and SSI, Brown alleged he became disabled on August 17, 2014,
as a result of neck problems, knee problems, back problems,
arthritis, depression, right eye blindness, and
“legs.” (Id. at 173, 178). After his
claims were denied, Brown requested a hearing before an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (Id.
at 92). Following a hearing, the ALJ denied Brown's
claims. (Id. at 18-27). Brown was fifty-one years
old when the ALJ issued his decision. (Id. at 27,
173). After the Appeals Council denied review of the
ALJ's decision (id. at 1-3), that decision
became the final decision of the Commissioner, see Frye
v. Massanari, 209 F.Supp.2d 1246, 1251 (N.D. Ala. 2001
(citing Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1322 (11th
Cir. 1998)). Thereafter, Brown commenced this action. (Doc.
1).
II.
Statutory and Regulatory Framework
To
establish eligibility for disability benefits, a claimant
must show “the inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result
in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42
U.S.C. §§ 416(i)(1)(A), 423(d)(1)(A); see also
Id. at § 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1505(a), 416.905(a). Furthermore, a DIB claimant must
show he was disabled between his alleged initial onset date
and his date last insured. Mason v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 430 Fed.Appx. 830, 831 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing
Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1209, 1211 (11th Cir.
2005); Demandre v. Califano, 591 F.2d 1088,
1090 (5th Cir. 1979)). The Social Security Administration
(“SSA”) employs a five-step sequential analysis
to determine an individual's eligibility for disability
benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4),
416.920(a)(4).
First,
the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is
engaged in “substantial gainful activity.”
Id. at §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i),
416.920(a)(4)(i). “Under the first step, the claimant
has the burden to show that [he] is not currently engaged in
substantial gainful activity.” Reynolds-Buckley v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 457 Fed.Appx. 862, 863 (11th
Cir. 2012). If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful
activity, the Commissioner will find the claimant is not
disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i) and (b),
416.920(a)(4)(i) and (b). At the first step, the ALJ
determined Brown meets the Social Security
Administration's insured status requirements through
December 31, 2019, and has not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since his alleged onset date of August 17, 2014.
(Tr. at 20).
If the
claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the
Commissioner must next determine whether the claimant suffers
from a severe physical or mental impairment or combination of
impairments that has lasted or is expected to last for a
continuous period of at least twelve months. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An
impairment “must result from anatomical, physiological,
or psychological abnormalities which can be shown by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques.” Furthermore, it “must be established
by medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and
laboratory findings, not only by [the claimant's]
statement of symptoms.” Id. at §§
404.908, 416.908; see also 42 U.S.C. §§
423(d)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(D). An impairment is severe if it
“significantly limits [the claimant's] physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities . . . .” 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c).[2]“[A]n
impairment can be considered as not severe only if it is a
slight abnormality which has such a minimal effect on the
individual that it would not be expected to interfere with
the individual's ability to work, irrespective of age,
education, or work experience.” Brady v.
Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 920 (11th Cir. 1984); see
also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(a), 416.921(a). A
claimant may be found disabled based on a combination of
impairments, even though none of the individual impairments
alone is disabling. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1523, 416.923.
The claimant bears the burden of providing medical evidence
demonstrating an impairment and its severity. Id. at
§§ 404.1512(a) and (c), 416.912(a) and (c). If the
claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of
impairments, the Commissioner will find the claimant is not
disabled. Id. at §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) and
(c), 416.920(a)(4)(ii) and (c). At the second step, the ALJ
determined Brown has the following severe impairments:
degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine,
osteoarthritis, and right eye blindness. (Tr. at 20).
If the
claimant has a severe impairment or combination of
impairments, the Commissioner must then determine whether the
impairment meets or equals one of the “Listings”
found in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii); see
also Id. at §§ 404.1525-26, 416.925-26. The
claimant bears the burden of proving his impairment meets or
equals one of the Listings. Reynolds-Buckley, 457
Fed.Appx. at 863. If the claimant's impairment meets or
equals one of the Listings, the Commissioner will find the
claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R §§
404.1520(a)(4)(iii) and (d), 416.920(a)(4)(iii) and (d). At
the third step, the ALJ determined Brown does not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of one of the Listings. (Tr. at
21).
If the
claimant's impairment does not meet or equal one of the
Listings, the Commissioner must determine the claimant's
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) before
proceeding to the fourth step. Id. at §§
404.1520(e), 416.920(e); see also Id. at
§§ 404.1545, 416.945. A claimant's RFC is the
most he can do despite his impairments. See Id. at
§§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). At the fourth
step, the Commissioner will compare an assessment of the
claimant's RFC with the physical and mental demands of
the claimant's past relevant work. Id. at
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) and (e), 404.1560(b),
416.920(a)(4)(iv) and (e), 416.960(b). “Past relevant
work is work that [the claimant] [has] done within the past
15 years, that was substantial gainful activity, and that
lasted long enough for [the claimant] to learn to do
it.” Id. at §§ 404.1560(b)(1),
416.960(b)(1). The claimant bears the burden of proving his
impairment prevents him from performing his past relevant
work. Reynolds-Buckley, 457 Fed.Appx. at 863. If the
claimant is capable of performing his past relevant work, the
Commissioner will find the claimant is not disabled. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1560(b)(3),
416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.960(b)(3).
Before
proceeding to the fourth step, the ALJ determined Brown has
the RFC to perform light work[3] with the following limitations:
although he can frequently balance, he cannot kneel, crouch,
crawl, or climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; he can only
occasionally stoop and climb ramps and stairs; he must avoid
concentrated exposure to cold and vibration; and he must
avoid all exposure to hazardous machinery and unprotected
heights. (Tr. at 22-25). At the fourth step, the ALJ
determined Brown is unable to perform his past relevant work.
(Id. at 25).
If the
claimant is unable to perform her past relevant work, the
Commissioner must finally determine whether the claimant is
capable of performing other work that exists in substantial
numbers in the national economy in light of the
claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v) and (g)(1),
404.1560(c)(1), 416.920(a)(4)(v) and (g)(1), 416.960(c)(1).
If the claimant is capable of performing other work, the
Commissioner will find the claimant is not disabled.
Id. at §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v) and (g)(1),
416.920(a)(4)(v) and (g)(1). If the claimant is not capable
of performing other work, the Commissioner will find the
claimant is disabled. Id.
At the
fifth step, considering Brown's age, education, work
experience, and RFC, the ALJ determined there are jobs that
exist in significant numbers in the national economy that
Brown can perform, such as those of bottling line attendant,
marker, and mail clerk. (Tr. at 25-26). Therefore, the ALJ
concluded Brown is not disabled. (Id. at 26).
III.
Standard of Review
Review
of the Commissioner's decision is limited to a
determination of whether that decision is supported by
substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner applied
correct legal standards. Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). A district
court must review the Commissioner's findings of fact
with deference and may not reconsider the facts, reevaluate
the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner. Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007); Dyer
v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005).
Rather, a district court must “scrutinize the record as
a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable
and supported by substantial evidence.” Bloodsworth
v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)
(internal citations omitted). Substantial evidence is
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Id. It is “more than a scintilla, but less
than a preponderance.” Id. A district court
must uphold factual findings supported by substantial
evidence, even if the preponderance of the evidence is
against those findings. Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d
1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Martin v.
Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).
A
district court reviews the Commissioner's legal
conclusions de novo. Davis v. Shalala, 985
F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). “The
[Commissioner's] failure to apply the correct law or to
provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for
determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted
mandates reversal.” Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936
F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991).
IV.
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