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Tubbs v. United States

United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Northern Division

March 13, 2019

VAN TUBBS, BOP Reg. #06762-027, Movant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

          REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

          KATHERINE P. NELSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

         Van Tubbs, a federal prisoner proceeding without counsel (i.e., pro se), has filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 748[1]) challenging the judgment entered against him in the above-styled criminal action. The motion has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for appropriate action. See S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(b); (11/17/2017 electronic reference). Under S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a)(2)(R), the undersigned is authorized to require responses, issue orders to show cause and any other orders necessary to develop a complete record, and to prepare a report and recommendation to the District Judge as to appropriate disposition of the § 2255 motion, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 8(b) and 10 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts.

         The Government timely filed a response (Doc. 751) in opposition to Tubbs's § 2255 motion, as ordered under Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings (see Doc. 749), and Tubbs has timely filed a reply (Doc. 752) to the response. Having reviewed the parties' submissions and other relevant portions of the record in accordance with Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, the undersigned finds that neither expansion of the record nor an evidentiary hearing is warranted and that Tubbs's § 2255 motion (Doc. 748) is due be DENIED and DISMISSED with prejudice.

         I. Background

         On May 29, 2014, the grand jury for this district returned an indictment against Tubbs and 17 co-defendants (Doc. 1). On September 17, 2014, Tubbs, represented by appointed counsel Larry Moorer, Esq., and pursuant to a written plea agreement (Doc. 281), pleaded guilty to both counts of the indictment that were asserted against him - Count 1, which charged an offense of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; and Count 27, which charged an offense of conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). (See Docs. 1, 296). On September 24, 2015, the Court sentenced Tubbs to concurrent terms of 180 months imprisonment followed by 5 years of supervised release on each count, along with a $200.00 assessment. (Doc. 670). Written judgment was entered on October 1, 2015. (See id.).

         Tubbs filed pro se a notice of appeal of the judgment (Doc. 678), and new counsel was appointed to represent him on appeal (see Doc. 712). However, on November 18, 2016, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Tubbs's direct appeal on motion of the Government pursuant to the appeal waiver in Tubbs's written plea agreement. (See Doc. 734; 11th Cir. Appeal No. 15-14483-FF, Order of Dismissal). Tubbs filed the present § 2255 motion less than a year later. (See Doc. 748 at 12).

         II. Legal Standards A. General Considerations under § 2255

         Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255 “permits a federal prisoner to bring a collateral challenge by moving the sentencing court to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence.” Winthrop-Redin v. United States, 767 F.3d 1210, 1215-16 (11th Cir. 2014). Specifically, § 2255 provides:

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence ... If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(a)-(b).

Once a petitioner files a § 2255 motion, “[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall ... grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto.” [28 U.S.C.] § 2255(b). A petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he “alleges facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief.” Aron[ v. United States], 291 F.3d [708, ] 715[ (11th Cir. 2002)] (quoting Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d 1545, 1552 (11th Cir. 1989)). “[A] petitioner need only allege-not prove-reasonably specific, non-conclusory facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief.” Id. at 715 n.6. However, a district court need not hold a hearing if the allegations are “patently frivolous, ” “based upon unsupported generalizations, ” or “affirmatively contradicted by the record.” Holmes, 876 F.2d at 1553 (quoting United States v. Guerra, 588 F.2d 519, 520-21 (5th Cir. 1979)); see, e.g., Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1239 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Because the ... affidavits submitted by Lynn amount to nothing more than mere conclusory allegations, the district court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issues and correctly denied Lynn's § 2255 motion.”).

Winthrop-Redin, 767 F.3d at 1216 (footnote omitted). Accord, e.g., Diveroli v. United States, 803 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2015). In making this determination, the Court is aware that it must “liberally construe pro se filings, including pro se applications for relief pursuant to § 2255.” Winthrop-Redin, 767 F.3d at 1215.

         “Once the defendant's chance to appeal has been waived or exhausted, ” a court is “entitled to presume he stands fairly and finally convicted, especially when, as here, he already has had a fair opportunity to present his federal claims to a federal forum.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164 (1982). “[A] collateral challenge, such as a § 2255 motion, may not be a surrogate for a direct appeal.” Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (citing Frady, 456 U.S. at 165 (collecting cases)). “Because collateral review is not a substitute for a direct appeal, the general rules have developed that: (1) a defendant must assert all available claims on direct appeal, and (2) relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other injury that could not have been raised in direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 1232 (internal citations, quotations, and footnote omitted).

         The “ ‘concern with finality served by the limitation on collateral attack has special force with respect to convictions based on guilty pleas.' ” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998) (quoting United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979)). “A defendant who enters a plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional challenges to the constitutionality of the conviction, and only an attack on the voluntary and knowing nature of the plea can be sustained.” Wilson v. United States, 962 F.2d 996, 997 (11th Cir. 1992). See also, e.g., United States v. Brown, 752 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2014) (“‘A guilty plea, since it admits all the elements of a formal criminal charge, waives all non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings against a defendant.'” (quoting United States v. Fairchild, 803 F.2d 1121, 1124 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam)); United States v. Saac, 632 F.3d 1203, 1208 (11th Cir. 2011) (“ ‘Generally, entering a guilty plea waives a defendant's right to all non-jurisdictional challenges to a conviction.' ” (quoting United States v. Bonilla, 579 F.3d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir. 2009)). Stated differently, “a voluntary and intelligent plea made by an accused person, who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked.” Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984). Therefore, when, as here, a § 2255 motion is filed collaterally challenging convictions obtained pursuant to guilty pleas, “the inquiry is ordinarily confined to whether the underlying plea was both counseled and voluntary.” United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989). See also Bousley, 523 U.S. at 618 (“A plea of guilty is constitutionally valid only to the extent it is ‘voluntary' and ‘intelligent.' (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)).

         B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

         The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution gives criminal defendants the right to effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-86 (1984). “[F]ailure to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct appeal does not bar the claim from being brought in a later, appropriate proceeding under § 2255.” Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 509 (2003). Indeed, “in most cases a motion brought under § 2255 is preferable to direct appeal for deciding claims of ineffective assistance.” Id. at 504. See also United States v. Curbelo, 726 F.3d 1260, 1267 (11th Cir. 2013) (“An ineffective assistance claim should usually be raised in a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” (citing United States v. Patterson, 595 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 2010))), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 962 (2014). “To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show that (1) ‘counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness' and (2) that such failure prejudiced him in that ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' ” United States v. Pease, 240 F.3d 938, 941 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694).

         “ ‘Conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance are insufficient.' ” Wilson v. United States, 962 F.2d 996, 998 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Lawson, 947 F.2d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 1991)). Moreover, “[b]ecause both parts of the test must be satisfied in order to show a violation of the Sixth Amendment, the court need not address the performance prong if the defendant cannot meet the prejudice prong, or vice versa.” Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). See also Osley v. United States, 751 F.3d 1214, 1222 (11th Cir. 2014) (“A habeas petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must carry his burden on both Strickland prongs, and a court need not address both prongs if the defendant has made an insufficient showing on one.”); Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1176 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The petitioner bears the burden of proof on the ‘performance' prong as well as the ‘prejudice' prong of a Strickland claim, and both prongs must be proved to prevail.”). “The Strickland test is not easily met; … ‘the cases in which habeas petitioners can properly prevail on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel are few and far between.[]'” Johnson, 256 F.3d at 1176 (quoting Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (citation omitted))).

         “The test for ineffectiveness is not whether counsel could have done more; perfection is not required.” Waters, 46 F.3d at 1518. Accord, e.g., Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 24 (2013) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment does not guarantee the right to perfect counsel; it promises only the right to effective assistance…”). “A lawyer can almost always do something more in every case. But the Constitution requires a good deal less than maximum performance.” Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 960 (11th Cir. 1992).

In evaluating the first, or “performance, ” prong of Strickland, “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential.” [Strickland, 466 U.S.] at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. Because retrospective evaluation of a lawyer's performance can be difficult, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that ... the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). A petitioner must identify specific acts or omissions that were not the result of reasonable professional judgment, and a court should deem these acts or omissions deficient only if they “were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. Simply put, the deference afforded an attorney's decision is great and the bar for proving a Sixth Amendment violation is high. In light of the “strong presumption in favor of competence, ”…in order to prove deficient performance, “a petitioner must establish that no competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take.” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
Under the second, or “prejudice, ” prong of Strickland, a petitioner must “affirmatively prove prejudice” by showing that counsel's errors “actually had an adverse effect on the defense.” 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. at 2067. This requires a showing of more than “some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. Instead, the petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. Although this standard is difficult to meet, it is significant that a petitioner must show only a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different; he “need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case.” Id. at 693, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. When evaluating this probability, “a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.” Id. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069.

Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1059-60 (11th Cir. 2002). “The reasonableness of counsel's performance is to be evaluated from counsel's perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances. In making the competency determination, the court should keep in mind that counsel's function, as elaborated in prevailing professional norms, is to make the adversarial testing process work in the particular case.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384 (1986) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-91) (citations and quotations omitted).

“A guilty plea is open to attack on the ground that counsel did not provide the defendant with ‘reasonably competent advice.' ” Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1716, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (quoting McMann[ v. Richardson], 397 U.S. [759, ] 770, 90 S.Ct. [1441, ] 1448[ (1970)]). The Supreme Court has held “that the two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); Slicker v. Dugger, 878 F.2d 1380, 1381 n.1 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d 1545, 1551 (11th Cir. 1989); McCoy v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1196, 1198 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam)…
Hill clarified the Strickland second or “prejudice” requirement in the context of guilty pleas: “the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370; Tahamtani v. Lankford, 846 F.2d 712, 714 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); see Long v. United States, 883 F.2d 966, 968 n.4 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); Agan v. Dugger, 835 F.2d 1337, 1340 n.6 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1205, 108 S.Ct. 2846, 101 L.Ed.2d 884 (1988); see also Holmes, 876 F.2d at 1553, Slicker v. Wainwright, 809 F.2d 768, 770 (11th Cir. 1987) (These cases were remanded to the district court to determine if accurate, rather than incorrect, information by the defense counsel as to the length of sentence would have changed the defendant's plea.); cf. Betancourt v. Willis, 814 F.2d 1546, 1549 (11th Cir. 1987) (This court affirmed the district court's granting a habeas corpus petition based upon its conclusion that petitioner's plea was not voluntary and that his counsel provided ineffective assistance because the evidence was “uncontroverted that petitioner was completely unaware of the ultimate consequences of his plea because his counsel misrepresented the existence of a sentence reduction agreement.”). The Hill court explained the prejudice requirement with specific regard to a defense counsel's alleged failure to investigate potentially exculpatory evidence:
In many guilty plea cases, the “prejudice” inquiry will closely resemble the inquiry engaged in by courts reviewing ineffective-assistance challenges to convictions obtained through a trial. For example, where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to investigate or discover potentially exculpatory evidence, the determination whether the error “prejudiced” the defendant by causing him to plead guilty rather than go to trial will depend on the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the plea. This assessment, in turn, will depend in large part on a prediction whether the evidence likely would have changed the outcome of a trial.

474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370; McCoy, 804 F.2d at 1198-99.

The Supreme Court has given finality to guilty pleas by precluding claims of constitutional deprivations occurring prior to entry of the plea. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258');">411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602');">93 S.Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973); see Tiemens v. United States, 724 F.2d 928, 929 (11th Cir.) (per curiam) (“[A] guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects occurring prior to the time of the plea, including violations of the defendant's rights to a speedy trial and due process.”), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837, 105 S.Ct. 134, 83 L.Ed.2d 74 (1984). The Court allows only challenges to the voluntary and intelligent entry of the plea if a convicted defendant can prove “serious derelictions” in his counsel's advice regarding the plea. McMann, 397 U.S. at 774, 90 S.Ct. at 1450; Tollett[ v. Henderson], 411 U.S. [258, ] 267, 93 S.Ct. [1602, ] 1608[ (1973)]; see Hill, 474 U.S. at 56, 106 S.Ct. at 369 (“The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is ‘whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.' ” (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 164, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970)). Without “reasonably effective assistance of counsel in connection with the decision to plead guilty, ” a defendant cannot enter a knowing and voluntary plea because the plea does not represent an informed choice. McCoy, 804 F.2d at 1198; Scott[ v. Wainwright], 698 F.2d [427, ] 429[ (11th Cir. 1983)]. Based upon his familiarity with the facts and law, defense counsel must advise the defendant. Scott, 698 F.2d at 429. “Counsel's advice need not be errorless, and need not involve every conceivable defense, no matter how peripheral to the normal focus of counsel's inquiry, but it must be within the realm of competence demanded of attorneys representing criminal defendants.” Id. (emphasis added); see McMann, 397 U.S. at 771, 90 S.Ct. at 1449; Long, 883 F.2d at 969.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the decision to plead guilty may occur without all of the state's evidence and necessarily takes place without knowledge of all facts revealed by witnesses at trial. McMann, 397 U.S. at 769-70, 90 S.Ct. at 1448. “[C]ounsel owes a lesser duty to a client who pleads guilty than to one who decides to go to trial, and in the former case counsel need only provide his client with an understanding of the law in relation to the facts, so that the accused may make an informed and conscious choice between accepting the prosecution's offer and going to trial.” Wofford v. Wainwright, 748 F.2d 1505, 1508 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1539 (11th Cir. 1985). An attorney's responsibility is to investigate and to evaluate his client's options in the course of the subject legal proceedings and then to advise the client as to the merits of each. Tafero, 796 F.2d at 1320; Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 F.2d 1447, 1451 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1042, 107 S.Ct. 1986, 95 L.Ed.2d 825 (1987)…

Stano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125, 1149-51 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (footnote omitted).[2] In claiming prejudice under Strickland and Hill, “[a] movant must [also] allege facts that would prove that a decision not to plead guilty ‘would have been rational under the circumstances.' ” Hernandez v. United States, 778 F.3d 1230, 1234 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010)).

         III. ...


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