EX PARTE WILCOX COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION and Lester Turk, Donald McLeod, Joseph Pettway, Jr., and Shelia Dortch, in Their Individual and Official Capacities as Members of the Wilcox County Board of Education
v.
Wilcox County Board of Education and Lester Turk, Donald McLeod, Joseph Pettway, Jr., and Shelia Dortch, in Their Individual and Official Capacities as Members of the Wilcox County Board of Education, and Timothy Irvin Smiley and Roshanda Jackson, in Their Individual and Official Capacities as Teacher and Principal, Respectively, of J.E. Hobbs Elementary School In re: Kimberly Perryman, as Guardian and Next Friend of R.M., a Minor
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Petition for Writ of Mandamus (Wilcox Circuit Court,
CV-17-4). Marvin Wayne Wiggins, Judge
Dana B.
Hill of Hill, Hill, Carter, Franco, Cole & Black, P.C.,
Birmingham, for petitioners.
Gwendolyn
Thomas Kennedy, Montgomery, for respondent.
OPINION
MENDHEIM,
Justice.
The
Wilcox County Board of Education ("the Board"), and
Board members Lester Turk, Donald McLeod, Joseph Pettway,
Jr., and Shelia Dortch (hereinafter referred to collectively
as "the Board members"), petition this Court for a
writ of mandamus directing the Wilcox Circuit Court to vacate
its order denying their motion to dismiss the claims against
them based on immunity and to enter an order granting that
motion. We grant the petition in part and deny it in part.
I.
Facts
On
February 6, 2017, Kimberly Perryman, as guardian and next
friend of her minor son, R.M., sued the Board, Roshanda
Jackson, and Timothy Irvin Smiley. Jackson was the principal
at J.E. Hobbs Elementary School in Camden, Alabama -- a part
of the Wilcox County school system -- and Smiley was a
teacher at the elementary school at the time of the alleged
events. Perryman alleged that on March 1, 2016, Smiley,
"in a fit of rage and unprovoked, did lift the Plaintiff
R.M. and slam him down upon a table, with such force as to
break said table." Perryman further alleged in her
rendition of the facts that "Smiley was in the habit of
continuously and repeatedly using harsh, physical and
otherwise inappropriate tactics on the students in his
class" and that "Smileys behavior was known or
should have been known to the Principal Defendant and the
School Board Defendant[ ]." Perryman asserted that
Jackson had "prior knowledge of the violent and
inappropriate behaviors of Defendant Smiley prior to Smileys
violent assault upon Plaintiff R.M." but that no
disciplinary action was ever taken against Smiley. Perryman
also asserted that, despite the "assault" Smiley
committed
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upon R.M., the Board "failed to take any action
whatsoever against the Defendant Smiley." Perryman added
that, "despite [the] Boards policies and procedures
regarding protecting students from assault, Defendant
Jackson, and the Wilcox County Board of Education neither
reprimanded nor disciplined Defendant Smiley." Perryman
alleged that R.M. suffered physical pain and mental anguish
as a result of Smileys "violent assault" upon him
and that R.M. had to receive psychological counseling because
of the incident. Indeed, Perryman alleged that, "[s]ince
the assault upon the Plaintiff R.M., R.M. has been in an
almost noncommunicative state" and that "[h]is
emotional debilitation is likely permanent." Perryman
further asserted that
"R.M.s mental and physical conditions have been
directly caused and/or exacerbated by a systematic failure of
the Defendant Jackson, and the Wilcox County School Board to
supervise, discipline, suspend and reassign teachers, like
Defendant Smiley who showed a pattern and practice of abusive
and criminal behavior towards their students, and who posed a
real and immediate danger to said student population."
Perryman asserted claims of assault and battery and
intentional infliction of emotional distress against Smiley;
claims of negligence and negligent/wanton hiring, training,
retention, and supervision against Jackson; and a claim of
negligence against the Board. Specifically, the negligence
claim against the Board stated: "The ... Wilcox County
Board of Education negligently breached [its] dut[y] to R.M.
by failing to supervise, discipline or remove if necessary,
the Defendant teacher [Timothy Smiley], thereby placing the
Plaintiff R.M. in harms way."
Perryman listed several remedies in the "Prayer for
Relief" section of her complaint:
"a. Declare the conduct engaged in by the Defendants to
be in violation of Plaintiff RMs rights and Alabama law;
"b. Enter appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief;
"c. Award Plaintiff R.M. compensatory damages against
the Defendants, in an amount that will fully compensate him
for the physical injuries, mental distress, anguish, pain,
humiliation, embarrassment, suffering and concern that he has
suffered as a direct and/or proximate result of the statutory
and common law violations as set out herein;
"d. Enter a judgment against all the Defendants, save
the Wilcox County School Board, for such punitive damages as
will properly punish them for the constitutional, statutory
and common law violations perpetrated upon Plaintiff as
alleged herein, in an amount that will serve as a deterrent
to Defendants and others from engaging in similar conduct in
the future;
"...."
On
March 15, 2017, the Board filed a motion to dismiss
Perrymans action, asserting State immunity under Art. I, §
14, Ala. Const. 1901, as one of its defenses.
On
July 24, 2017, Perryman filed an amended complaint in which
she added the Board members as defendants in both their
official and individual capacities. In the amended complaint,
Perryman asserted, verbatim, the same claims she had asserted
in her original complaint, including her negligence claim
against the Board. None of the claims specifically mentioned
the Board members. The amended complaint requested the same
relief as the original complaint.
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On
August 3, 2017, the Board and the Board members filed a
motion to dismiss the amended complaint. Once again, State
immunity was asserted as a defense on behalf of the Board,
and it was also asserted as a defense for the Board members
in their official capacities. The motion to dismiss also
asserted that the Board members were entitled to State-agent
immunity in their individual capacities for any claims
asserted against them.
On
August 9, 2017, Perryman filed a response in opposition to
the motion to dismiss the amended complaint. Perryman
appeared to argue in that response that the defenses of State
immunity and State-agent immunity were not available in this
case because an assault had occurred that was committed by
someone who Jackson knew, and the Board should have known,
had a propensity for violence.
Also on
August 9, 2017, Perryman filed a second amended complaint.
The second amended complaint contained the same factual
allegations and asserted the same state-law claims as the
previous two complaints. It did not name the Board members in
any of the state-law claims. However, the second amended
complaint also added a claim alleging a "violation of
[R.M.s] federal civil rights" against all the
defendants, including the Board and the Board members, under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("the § 1983 claim").
Specifically, the § 1983 claim stated:
"Count 5
"Violation of Federal Civil Rights (As to all named
Defendants)
"....
"51.... 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 provides that:
" Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress ....
"52. The Defendants violated various dimensions of the
U.S. Constitution and of federal law as they relate to
[R.M.], and as are set forth in the counts in this Complaint.
"53. The defendants violations of such provisions were
done with the defendants acting under color of state law, in
their capacities as school district and
administrative/supervisory employees of the district acting
in the scope of their employment.
"54. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants
violations of [R.M.s] federal civil rights, [R.M. has]
suffered financial, physical, and emotional injuries.
"55. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants
conduct, [R.M.] suffered the injuries described herein."
The
second amended complaint requested the same relief as did the
previous two complaints.
On
August 21, 2017, the Board and the Board members filed a
motion to dismiss the second amended complaint. Once again,
they asserted State immunity and State-agent immunity as
defenses to Perrymans state-law claims. The Board and the
Board members also contended that the amendments to
Perrymans original complaint were nullities because, they
said, the original complaint, which named only the Board and
none of the Board members as defendants, had failed to invoke
the subject-matter jurisdiction of the circuit
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court. With respect to the § 1983 claim, they argued, among
other things, that the Board was entitled to immunity under
the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution and
that the Board members in their individual capacities were
entitled to federal qualified immunity.
On
November 16, 2017, the circuit court held a hearing on the
motion to dismiss filed by the Board and the Board members.
On March 21, 2018, the circuit court entered an order denying
the motion to dismiss the second amended complaint. In the
order, the circuit court did not explicate the reasons for
its ruling.
On
April 13, 2018, the Board and the Board members filed a
motion to stay the circuit courts ruling in anticipation of
their filing a petition for a writ of mandamus concerning the
March 21, 2018, order denying their motion to dismiss the
second amended complaint. On the same date, the circuit court
granted the motion to stay. The Board and the Board members
subsequently filed their petition for a writ of mandamus on
May 2, 2018.
II. Standard of Review
In
Ex parte Branch, 980 So.2d 981 (Ala. 2007), this
Court stated:
"The denial of a motion for a summary judgment or of a
motion to dismiss grounded on immunity is reviewable by a
petition for a writ of mandamus. Ex parte Rizk, 791
So.2d 911, 912 (Ala. 2000). Ex parte Haralson, 853
So.2d 928, 931 n.2 (Ala. 2003) (The denial of a motion to
dismiss or a motion for a summary judgment generally is not
reviewable by a petition for writ of mandamus, subject to
certain narrow exceptions, such as the issue of ...