United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION
T.
Michael Putnam United States Magistrate Judge
I.
introduction
The
plaintiff, Annie Grant Gordon, appeals from the decision of
the Commissioner[1] of the Social Security Administration
(“Commissioner”) denying her application for a
period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits
(“DIB”). Mrs. Gordon timely pursued and exhausted
her administrative remedies and the decision of the
Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The parties have consented
to the exercise of dispositive jurisdiction by a magistrate
judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 13).
The
plaintiff was 56 years old on the date of the ALJ's
opinion on November 1, 2016. (Tr. at 30, 169). Her past work
experience includes employment as a child development center
teacher and childcare center director. (Tr. at 31). The
plaintiff claims that she became disabled on July 17, 2010,
from Addison's disease, hypothyroidism, Cushing's
disease, osteoarthritis, and depression. (Tr. at 46).
Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements under the
Social Security Act on December 31, 2014. (Tr. at 22).
When
evaluating the disability of individuals over the age of
eighteen, the regulations prescribe a five-step sequential
evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920; see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245
F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The first step requires a
determination of whether the claimant is “doing
substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If she is, the claimant
is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If she
is not, the Commissioner next considers the effect of all of
the physical and mental impairments combined. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). These
impairments must be severe and must meet the durational
requirements before a claimant will be found to be disabled.
Id. The decision depends on the medical evidence in
the record. See Hart v. Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341
(5th Cir. 1971). If the claimant's impairments are not
severe, the analysis stops. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). Otherwise, the
analysis continues to step three, which is a determination of
whether the claimant's impairments meet or equal the
severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the
claimant's impairments fall within this category, she
will be found disabled without further consideration.
Id. If they do not, a determination of the
claimant's residual functional capacity will be made and
the analysis proceeds to the fourth step. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). Residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) is an assessment, based on all
relevant evidence, of a claimant's remaining ability to
do work despite her impairments. 20 C.F.R. §
404.945(a)(1).
The
fourth step requires a determination of whether the
claimant's impairments prevent her from returning to past
relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv),
416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can still do her past
relevant work, the claimant is not disabled and the
evaluation stops. Id. If the claimant cannot do past
relevant work, then the analysis proceeds to the fifth step.
Id. Step five requires the court to consider the
claimant's RFC, as well as the claimant's age,
education, and past work experience, in order to determine if
she can do other work. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can do
other work, the claimant is not disabled. Id. The
burden is on the Commissioner to demonstrate that other jobs
exist which the claimant can perform; once that burden is
met, the claimant must prove her inability to perform those
jobs in order to be found disabled. Jones v. Apfel,
190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999).
Applying
the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that the
plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since the application date, July 17, 2010. (Tr. at 24).
According to the ALJ, the plaintiff has the following
impairments that are considered “severe” based on
the requirements set forth in the regulations:
“Addison's disease, [2] hypothyroidism, [3] Cushing's
syndrome, [4]adjustment disorder, and
osteoarthritis.” Id. He determined that the
plaintiff's claim related to celiac disease was not
supported by evidence of a medically determinable physical or
mental condition. (Tr. at 25). The ALJ found that the
plaintiff's impairments, separately and in combination,
neither meet nor medically equal any of the listed
impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
Id. at 25. The ALJ found that the plaintiff's
hypothyroidism, Cushing's syndrome, and Addison's
disease were not limiting to the levels required by the
listing. Id. The ALJ also found that the
plaintiff's adjustment disorder did not meeting listing
requirements because she has only mild restriction in
activities of daily life, mild difficulties in social
functioning, and moderate difficulties with regard to
concentration. Id. The ALJ determined that the
plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform
work at the light level of exertion with additional
limitations. Id. at 26. The ALJ further elaborated:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the
administrative law judge finds that since July 17, 2010, the
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform
light work as defined in CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) with
the following clarifications and/or exceptions. The claimant
is limited to unskilled work not requiring complex
instructions or procedures. The claimant cannot work at
unprotected heights or around hazardous machinery, and she
cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant can
occasionally stoop, couch [sic], and crawl. The claimant
should avoid concentrated exposure to extreme heat and
extreme cold. Lastly, the claimant can tolerate frequent
interaction with coworkers, supervisors and the general
public.
(Tr. at 26).
According
to the ALJ, the plaintiff is unable to perform her past
relevant work. (Tr. at 31). Before March 29, 2015 (the date
on which she attained 55 years of age), she was an
“individual closely approaching advanced age” and
the “transferability of job skills was not material to
the determination of disability because using the
Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding
that the claimant is ‘not disabled' whether or not
the claimant has transferrable job skills.” (Tr. at
31). During this time, the ALJ used the testimony of a
vocational expert to determine that there are a significant
number of jobs in the national economy that she was capable
of performing, such as garment sorter, marker, and
inspector/hand packager. (Tr. at 32). However, on March 29,
2015, plaintiff's age category changed and she became an
“individual of advanced age.” After that date,
she was “unable to transfer job skills to other
occupations” and there were “no jobs that exist
in significant numbers in the national economy that [she]
could perform.” (Tr. at 32). The plaintiff has
“at least a high school education” and is
“able to communicate in English” as those terms
are defined in the regulations. (Tr. at 31). The ALJ
concluded his findings by stating that Plaintiff “was
not disabled prior to March 29, 2015, but became disabled and
has continued to be disabled through the date of this
decision.” Id. at 33. Therefore, although the
plaintiff was entitled to receive Supplemental Security
Income, she was not entitled to disability insurance benefits
because she became disabled after her last insured date of
December 31, 2014.
II.
Standard of Review
This
court's role in reviewing claims brought under the Social
Security Act is a narrow one. The scope of its review is
limited to determining (1) whether there is substantial
evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of
the Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards
were applied. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 390, 401 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d
1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). The court approaches the factual
findings of the Commissioner with deference, but applies
close scrutiny to the legal conclusions. See Miles v.
Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). The court
may not decide facts, weigh evidence, or substitute its
judgment for that of the Commissioner. Id.
“The substantial evidence standard permits
administrative decision makers to act with considerable
latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent
an administrative agency's finding from being supported
by substantial evidence.'” Parker v.
Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Federal Mar.
Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed, even if
this court finds that the evidence preponderates against the
Commissioner's decision, the Court must affirm if the
decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400. No. decision is automatic,
however, for “despite this deferential standard [for
review of claims] it is imperative that the Court scrutinize
the record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of
the decision reached.” Bridges v. Bowen, 815
F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987). Moreover, failure to apply
the correct legal standards is grounds for reversal. See
Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984).
The
court must keep in mind that opinions such as whether a
claimant is disabled, the nature and extent of a
claimant's residual functional capacity, and the
application of vocational factors “are not medical
opinions, . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved
to the commissioner because they are administrative findings
that are dispositive of a case; i.e., that would direct the
determination or decision of disability.” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(d). Whether the plaintiff
meets the listing and is qualified for Social Security
disability benefits is a question reserved for the ALJ, and
the court “may not decide facts anew, reweigh the
evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the
Commissioner.” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d
1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). Thus, even if the court were to
disagree with the ALJ about the significance of certain
facts, the court has no power to reverse that finding as long
as there is substantial evidence in the record supporting it.
III.
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