United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
TERRY
F. MOORER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Now
pending before the Court is Defendant Jennifer Stewart's
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 17, filed August 21, 2018).
The Court has carefully reviewed the pleadings, motion, and
response in this matter, and it is ripe for review. For the
reasons discussed below, the motion is
GRANTED.
I.
Jurisdiction
The
Plaintiff, Terry Chaney (“Plaintiff” or
“Chaney”) asserts claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), as she alleges
violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; and
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101
et seq. No. party contests either subject matter or
personal jurisdiction and adequate support exists for both.
II.
Background and Procedural History
Chaney,
proceeding pro se, filed a complaint in this case
asserting claims of discrimination on the basis of race,
national origin, age, and mental disability by her former
employer, Community Hospice of Baldwin County
(“CHBC”), and Jennifer Stewart
(“Stewart”) (collectively,
“Defendants”), a registered nurse and
administrator for CHBC[1] (Doc. 1, filed May 22, 2018). She also
asserts that Defendants retaliated against her for reporting
discrimination and harassment. Specifically, Chaney alleges
that she began working for CHBC in October 2008, and that she
was harassed and discriminated against by Stewart and another
employee referred to as “Dr. Dan.” Id.
at 2. She asserts that she reported the discrimination to a
superior at CHBC and filed charges alleging discriminatory
conduct with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) on May 6, 2017, and that Stewart
retaliated against her for doing so. Chaney alleges that
“she”- presumably Stewart-“remind[ed] me
when she started back to work in April or May, 2017 that she
[was] going to terminate me from my job, and [would] make
sure I will never work again.” Id. at 1.
Chaney asserts she was terminated on September 25, 2017,
“because of my age and in retaliation for
reporting” the discrimination and harassment to a vice
president at CHBC. Id. at 3. She alleges Stewart
stated that, “because of my age I can't do what I
used to do. I could not believe Dr. Dan told me that they
[were] firing me for that and some more, I could not believe
his words.” Id. Chaney asserts that she
received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC on March 28,
2018. From this action Chaney seeks, inter alia,
back pay and reinstatement to her former job.
Stewart
has moved for summary judgment (Doc. 17, filed August 21,
2018), arguing that Chaney's claims against her are due
to be dismissed because Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA do
not provide for such causes of action against an individual
employee. Stewart asserts that she was not Chaney's
employer, but rather, her former supervisor and an agent of
CHBC. Stewart argues that, because Chaney has correctly named
CHBC in the suit, also naming Stewart as a party is
unnecessary and redundant.
Stewart
has attached to her motion an affidavit in which Stewart
states that Chaney was a CHBC employee from October 8, 2008,
until September 25, 2017. Doc. 18-1 at 2. Stewart avers that,
during Chaney's period of employment, Stewart served as
CHBC's administrator, a role in which she directed and
had oversight of all employees, including Chaney. She
asserts, however, that: (1) Chaney directly reported to
another supervisor; (2) she did not pay Chaney any wages; (3)
there was no contract of employment between Chaney and
herself; (4) she did not employ Chaney in any way; and (5)
she and Chaney both were employees of CHBC. She also asserts
that, as Chaney's superior, she did not make any
decisions regarding Chaney's employment on the basis of
Chaney's age or in retaliation for Chaney's engaging
in any protected activity.
In a
response (Doc. 30, filed 9/11/18), Chaney states that Stewart
“made sure that she got her point across to me in front
of everyone at our CNA luncheon that she [was] going to
terminate me, make sure I would never work again, if she had
[anything] to do with it. She used her [p]ower to make my job
very difficult.” Id. at 1. Chaney asserts, as
an example, that Stewart had hired a part-time employee to
cover shifts when workers needed time off, but when Chaney
was sick and needed time off, Stewart told her no one could
cover her shift. She alleges that, instead, Stewart sent her
“a nasty text that I need to speak to her, ” even
though Chaney had followed the same procedure as other
employees. Id. Chaney states that Stewart “did
everything to humiliate me from day one, ” from May
2017 until her firing in September 2017. Id. She
alleges that “Dr. Dan” and CHBC went along with
Stewart's behavior, and that they discriminated against
her based on her race, national origin, and age, made fun of
her disability, [2] harassed her, and retaliated against her
for trying to protect her rights through complaints to the
EEOC. Id. at 1-2. She also asserts that Defendants
hacked her phone and destroyed evidence supporting her
allegations. Stewart did not file a reply.
III.
Standard
of Review
“The
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A factual dispute alone is not enough to
defeat a properly pleaded motion for summary judgment; only
the existence of a genuine issue of material fact will
preclude a grant of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510,
91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “[T]he substantive law will
identify which facts are material.” Id. at
248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. At the summary judgment stage, the
court does not “weigh the evidence and determine the
truth of the matter, ” but merely “determine[s]
whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. An issue is genuine
if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the non-moving party. Mize v. Jefferson City
Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996)
(citation and internal quotations omitted).
The
moving party bears the initial burden of showing the court,
by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine
issues of material fact that should be decided at trial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106
S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). “When a
moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party
must then ‘go beyond the pleadings,' and by its own
affidavits, or by ‘depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc.,
64 F.3d 590, 593-94 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553). The
court must view facts and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party. Moore v. Reese, 637
F.3d 1220, 1231 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Rosario v. Am.
Corrective Counseling Servs., Inc., 506 F.3d 1039, 1043
(11th Cir. 2007)). However, to avoid summary judgment, the
nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89
L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ...