United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division
GARY W. YOUNGBLOOD, Youngblood,
v.
JEFFREY DUNN, et al., Defendants.
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Susan
Russ Walker, United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff
Gary Youngblood, formerly an inmate in the custody of the
Alabama Department of Corrections (“ADOC”), files
this pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
that prison officials at the Easterling Correctional Facility
(“Easterling”) are liable on constitutional
claims arising from Defendants' processing and handling
of Plaintiff's legal mail and their failure to provide
him with adequate assistance in filing meaningful legal
papers. Youngblood brings suit against Commissioner Jefferson
Dunn, Captain Nathaniel Lawson, Gerald Wagner, Laura Morgan,
Sharon Blakely, Warden Derrick Carter, Warden Carter
Davenport, Lieutenant Phelix Woods, and Captain Willie
Bryant. He requests actual and punitive damages, court costs,
and legal fees. Doc. 1.
Defendants
filed special reports and supporting evidentiary materials
addressing Youngblood's claims for relief. Docs. 28, 42.
In these filings, Defendants deny they acted in violation of
Youngblood's constitutional rights. Id. Upon
receipt of Defendants' special reports the court issued
an order directing Youngblood to file a response, including
sworn affidavits and other evidentiary materials, and
specifically cautioning Youngblood that “the court may
at any time thereafter and without notice to the parties (1)
treat the special reports and any supporting evidentiary
materials as a motion for summary judgment.” Doc. 30,
46. Youngblood filed responses to Defendants' special
reports, see Docs. 34, 36, 38, 44, 47, but these
responses fail to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material
fact. Doc. 30 at 2. The court will treat Defendants'
reports as motions for summary judgment, and it recommends
that these motions be resolved in favor of Defendants.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Summary
judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine
[dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d
1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007)(per curiam); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)
(“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”). The party moving for summary judgment
“always bears the initial responsibility of informing
the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of the [record, including
pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine [dispute] of
material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by
presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of
material fact or by showing the non-moving party has failed
to present evidence to support some element on which it bears
the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-324.
Defendants
have met their evidentiary burden. Thus, the burden shifts to
Youngblood to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the
pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case
exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d
604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324;
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3); Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox,
Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593-594 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding
that, once the moving party meets its burden, “the
non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by
its own affidavits [or sworn statements], or by depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, ”
demonstrate there is a genuine dispute of material fact)
(internal quotations omitted). This court will also consider
“specific facts” pled in Youngblood's sworn
complaint when considering his opposition to summary
judgment. Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748
F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014). A genuine dispute of
material fact exists when the non-moving party produces
evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return
a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263;
Allen v. Bd. of Public Educ., 495 F.3d 1306, 1313
(11th Cir. 2007). The evidence must be admissible at trial,
and if the nonmoving party's evidence “is merely
colorable … or is not significantly probative …
summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986);
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). “A mere ‘scintilla' of
evidence supporting the opposing party's position will
not suffice … .” Walker v. Darby, 911
F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson,
477 U.S. at 252). Only disputes involving material facts are
relevant, and materiality is determined by the substantive
law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248.
To
demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the party
opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply
show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts… . Where the record taken as a whole could not
lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving
party, there is no ‘genuine [dispute] for
trial.'” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “The
evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; see also United
States v. Stein, 881 F.3d 853 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding
that a plaintiff's self-serving and uncorroborated, but
not conclusory, statements in an affidavit or deposition may
create an issue of material fact which precludes summary
judgment); Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707
F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted)
(“To be sure, [plaintiff's] sworn statements are
self-serving, but that alone does not permit us to disregard
them at the summary judgment stage… . ‘Courts
routinely and properly deny summary judgment on the basis of
a party's sworn testimony even though it is
self-serving.'”). “Conclusory, uncorroborated
allegations by a plaintiff in an affidavit or deposition will
not create an issue of fact for trial sufficient to defeat a
well-supported summary judgment motion.” Solliday
v. Fed. Officers, 413 Fed. App'x 206, 207 (11th Cir.
2011) (citing Earley v. Champion Int'l Corp.,
907 F.2d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 1990)); see also Holifield
v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997)
(holding that conclusory allegations based on subjective
beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine dispute
of material fact).
Although
factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable
to the non-moving party and pro se complaints are
entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, a pro
se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing
by sufficient evidence a genuine dispute of material fact.
See Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 525 (2006);
Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir.
1990). Youngblood's pro se status alone does not
compel this court to disregard elementary principles of
production and proof in a civil case.
II.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Youngblood
previously sued prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging, in part, that they unconstitutionally prevented him
from using money in his prison account to pay a patent
application fee. Youngblood v. Ala. Dept. of
Corrections, Civil Action No. 2:15-cv-214-MHT (M.D. Ala.
2018). Youngblood desired a patent for an invention he
developed and which he believed would have commercial
potential. Id. He sought a patent to protect his
intellectual property. Id.
In the
present action, Youngblood challenges Defendants' conduct
in processing inmate mail under Administrative Regulation
[“AR”] 448, and specifically, their failure to
maintain proper legal mail logs for outgoing and incoming
inmate legal mail. This failure, Youngblood claims, prevented
him from submitting copies of legal mail logs to the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) to
support a petition to withdraw a holding of
abandonment.[1]Youngblood maintains that this conduct also
prevented him from producing legal mail logs as evidence in a
prior civil suit to support his motions arguing that
Defendants were not complying with AR 448's requirement
that: (1) inmates be provided two stamps per week for legal
mail, and (2) the names of inmates receiving free stamps be
maintained in a log. Additionally, Youngblood complains that
Defendants' failure to process correspondence considered
legal mail properly under AR 448 prevented him from providing
evidence to the Alabama Department of Revenue that he had not
received prior mailings from the state agency regarding false
tax returns filed in his name. Although he provided proof to
the Department of Revenue that he was incarcerated when the
false tax returns were filed in his name, Plaintiff maintains
that he could not provide the agency with copies of prison
legal mail logs as evidence he had received no notices from
them prior to receiving a notice of possible penalties and
sanctions for failing to reply to the agency's previous
mailings. Doc. 1.
III.
DISCUSSION [2]
A.
Absolute Immunity
To the
extent that Youngblood requests monetary damages from
Defendants in their official capacities, they are entitled to
absolute immunity. Official capacity lawsuits are “in
all respects other than name, … treated as a suit
against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159, 166 (1985). As the Eleventh Circuit has held,
the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from
entertaining suits by private parties against States and
their agencies [or employees]. There are two exceptions to
this prohibition: where the state has waived its immunity or
where Congress has abrogated that immunity. A State's
consent to suit must be unequivocally expressed in the text
of [a] relevant statute. Waiver may not be implied. Likewise,
Congress' intent to abrogate the States' immunity
from suit must be obvious from a clear legislative statement.
Selensky v. Alabama, 619 Fed. App'x 846, 848-49
(11th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Thus, a state official may not be sued in his or
her official capacity unless the state has waived its
Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Pennhurst State School
& Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984), or
Congress has abrogated the State's immunity, see
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996).
Neither waiver nor abrogation applies here. The Alabama
Constitution states that “the State of Alabama shall
never be made a defendant in any court of law or
equity.” Ala. Const. Art. I, § 14. The Supreme
Court has recognized that this prohibits Alabama from waiving
its immunity from suit.
Selensky, 619 Fed. App'x at 849 (citing
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (consent
is prohibited by the Alabama Constitution). “Alabama
has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity in § 1983
cases, nor has Congress abated it.” Holmes v.
Hale, 701 Fed.Appx. 751, 753 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing
Carr v. City of Florence, Ala., 916 F.2d 1521, 1525
(11th Cir. 1990)). In light of the foregoing, Defendants are
entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment
for claims seeking monetary damages from them in their
official capacities. Selensky, 619 Fed. App'x at
849; Harbert Int'l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d
1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that state officials
sued in their official capacities are protected under the
Eleventh Amendment from suit for damages); Edwards v.
Wallace Community College, 49 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir.
1995) (holding that damages are unavailable from state
official sued in his official capacity); Jackson v.
Georgia Department of Transportation, 16 F.3d 1573, 1575
(11th Cir. 1994).
B.
Injunctive Relief
To the
extent that Youngblood requests declaratory and/or injunctive
relief against Defendants, such request is due to be
dismissed as moot. Youngblood is no longer incarcerated. The
transfer or release of a prisoner renders moot any claims for
injunctive or declaratory relief. See County of Los
Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979); see also
Cotterall v. Paul, 755 F.2d 777, 780 (11th Cir. 1985)
(past exposure to even illegal conduct does not in and of
itself show a pending case or controversy regarding
injunctive relief if unaccompanied by any continuing present
injury or real and immediate threat of repeated injury).
C.
Qualified Immunity
Qualified
immunity offers complete protection from civil damages for
government officials sued in their individual capacities if
their conduct does not violate “clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536
U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity is not merely a
defense against liability but rather immunity from suit, and
the Supreme Court “repeatedly [has] stressed the
importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest
possible stage in litigation.” Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009) (quotation marks
and citations omitted). To receive qualified immunity, the
public official must first prove he was acting within the
scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly
wrongful acts occurred. Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d
1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). There is no dispute that
Defendants here were acting within the course and scope of
their discretionary ...