Lewis v. Ellington

          RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

          CHARLES S. COODY, UNITED STATES MAGISRATE JUDGE

         I. INTRODUCTION

         This case is before the court on a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Alabama inmate Kuatez Lewis (“Lewis”) on February 3, 2017. Doc. # 1.^[1] Lewis challenges his guilty plea convictions and resulting sentence entered by the Montgomery County Circuit Court for the offenses of attempted kidnapping in the first degree, attempted rape in the first degree, and robbery in the third degree. He presents claims that (1) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance; (2) the State failed to give him sufficient notice that it was amending a first-rape charge to attempted first-degree rape; (3) the trial court failed to wait three days after he signed the plea agreement before accepting his guilty pleas; and (4) no evidence was presented to support his convictions. Doc. # 1 at 5-8; Doc. # 17 (Amendment to Petition) at 5. The respondents argue that Lewis's petition is time-barred by the one-year federal limitation period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Doc. # 11 at 3. The court agrees with the respondents and finds that Lewis's petition should be denied without an evidentiary hearing.

         II. DISCUSSION

         A. AEDPA's One-Year Limitation Period

         Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) provides the statute of limitations for federal habeas petitions and states:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of-

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

         B. Lewis's State ...