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Smith v. Crowe
United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Southern Division
January 22, 2019
SHAWN DEVONTA SMITH, # 228061, Petitioner,
v.
JOHN CROWE, et al., Respondents.
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
CHARLES S. COODY, UNITED STATES MAGISRATE JUDGE.
I.
INTRODUCTION
This
case is before the court on a pro se petition for
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by
Alabama inmate Shawn Devonta Smith (“Smith”) on
November 29, 2016. Doc. # 1.[1] Smith challenges his convictions
and resulting sentence for three counts of first-degree
kidnapping and one count of second-degree kidnapping entered
by the Houston County Circuit Court in 2014. He claims that
his trial and appellate counsel rendered ineffective
assistance and that he is actually innocent of the crimes for
which he was convicted. Doc. # 1 at 5-7; Doc. # 1-1 at 2-9.
The respondents argue that Smith's petition is
time-barred by the one-year federal limitation period.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Doc. # 11 at 8-10. The
court agrees with the respondents and finds that Smith's
petition should be denied without an evidentiary hearing.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
AEDPA's One-Year Limitation Period
Title
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) provides the
statute of limitations for federal habeas petitions and
states:
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The
limitation period shall run from the latest of-
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for
State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect
to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be
counted toward any period of limitation under this
subsection.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
B.
Smith's State ...