Smith v. Crowe

          RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

          CHARLES S. COODY, UNITED STATES MAGISRATE JUDGE.

         I. INTRODUCTION

         This case is before the court on a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Alabama inmate Shawn Devonta Smith (“Smith”) on November 29, 2016. Doc. # 1.^[1] Smith challenges his convictions and resulting sentence for three counts of first-degree kidnapping and one count of second-degree kidnapping entered by the Houston County Circuit Court in 2014. He claims that his trial and appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance and that he is actually innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted. Doc. # 1 at 5-7; Doc. # 1-1 at 2-9. The respondents argue that Smith's petition is time-barred by the one-year federal limitation period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Doc. # 11 at 8-10. The court agrees with the respondents and finds that Smith's petition should be denied without an evidentiary hearing.

         II. DISCUSSION

         A. AEDPA's One-Year Limitation Period

         Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) provides the statute of limitations for federal habeas petitions and states:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of-

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

         B. Smith's State ...